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Abstract 
Drawing on Adele Clarke’s (2005) method of situational analysis as well insights from the social 
construction of social problems approach (Spector and Kitsuse 1977; Best 2008), symbolic 
interactionism (Prus 1999) and feminist approaches to power and situated knowledge (Collins 
1990; Smart 1992; Haraway 1999; Comack 2006), this study examines how law, religion and 
science interact to construct an image of the Canadian sex trade in the case of Bedford v. 
Canada. Historically, prostitution has been debated in academic accounts, public forums and the 
Canadian courts. This debate resurfaced in Canadian courts in 2010, deploying a host of 
perceptions from religious groups, academics and the general public. Attending to sites of silence 
as well as latent power relations in the current debate, I examine the interactions between law, 
religion and science in the Bedford case. Emphasizing how novel precedent developments in the 
Canadian context as well as historical discourses are shaping actors’ constructions of the dangers 
associated with prostitution in Canada, I explore concepts such as “legal moralism”, “the risk of 
harm”, “expertise” and “advocacy” and how legal definitions of these concepts shape the terrain 
on which rights cases are negotiated in Canadian courts. Moreover, the present case study 
examines how legal fictions presenting the law as neutral and objective construct false binaries 
between lay and expert knowledge, masking the value-laden nature of Canadian rights cases. 
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Introduction 
Canadian prostitution law is a highly contested issue. In 2010, this debate was brought before 
Canadian courts in the third major legal challenge to prostitution laws in Canadian history. In 
addition to offering an opportunity to analyze contemporary constructions of the sex trade in an 
arena where multiple perspectives on the issue are dialoguing with one another, Bedford v. 
Canada permits examination of how three major institutions—law, religion and science—
interact in rights cases. In this thesis, I analyze the original case of Bedford v. Canada using the 
social construction of social problems approach (Best 2008; Spector and Kitsuse 1977) as well as 
feminist approaches to power and situated knowledge (Mackinnon 1997; Haraway 1999; 
Comack 2006), and Adele Clarke’s (2005) method of situational analysis in an effort to 
understand the role of public opinion, religious intervention and expert witnesses in shaping how 
the Canadian sex trade is constructed in this case. Most centrally, I will argue that contrary to 
conventional assumptions that law, religion and science represent conflicting epistemologies, in 
the present case these institutions collude to construct a situation in which legal fictions 
presenting the law and politics as separate mask the moral and political nature of the current 
debate while constructing a false binary between lay and expert knowledge. As a result of this 
collusion, sex workers, who are arguably the most qualified individuals to explain the nature of 
the sex trade in this case (and whose rights are being negotiated through this legal challenge) are 
silenced while religious interveners are granted an erroneous status as representatives of the 
Canadian moral fabric in the Bedford case. Religious intervention for the purpose of representing 
the moral values of the Canadian public in rights cases is redundant because the moral values of 
Canadian society are central to Charter challenges. Ironically, through privileging the accounts 
of law and science in the current debate, Bedford v. Canada constructs a more morally charged 
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representation of the situation than would be the case if the accounts of sex workers were granted 
the same status as those of other actors.  
 
Background to the Current Case Study 
Although prostitution is not illegal in Canada, virtually all activities surrounding prostitution are 
criminalized by various sections of the Criminal Code of Canada. Prior to the 1980s street 
prostitution was controlled under the vagrancy and solicitation provisions of the Criminal Code. 
The 1978 decision in Hutt v. The Queen (1978 CanLII 190 (SCC), [1978] 2 WWR 247), in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that solicitation had to be pressing and persistent in 
order for police to charge a street worker, was a catalyst to Canada’s replacement of its 
solicitation laws (s. 195) with what is known as the communication law (s. 213 (1)(c)) in 1985. 
The Prostitution Reference (Reference re: ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), 
[1990] 1 S. C. R. 1123) was the first major constitutional challenge to Canada’s prostitution 
laws. Although the Supreme Court ruled that the communication law was an infringement on 
freedom of expression (Charter s. 2(b)), it also held that this infringement was justifiable under 
s. 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Moreover, the Court held that s. 213(1)(c) violated s. 
2(b) of The Charter but this infringement on freedom of expression was “demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society” (Charter s. 1). The debate over the constitutionality of 
Canada’s prostitution laws has currently resurfaced and is the focus of two constitutional 
challenges. 
 Two cases assessing the constitutionality of prostitution related provisions in the 
Criminal Code of Canada came before Canadian courts between 2007 and 2010: Downtown 
Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society v. Attorney General (Canada) 2008 
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BCSC 1726 and Bedford v. Canada 2010 ONSC 4264. The original determination in Bedford v. 
Canada will be the focus of this analysis. Issues associated with sex workers’ safety were central 
to this debate. The Bedford case was brought before the court by three women, Terri-Jean 
Bedford, Amy Lebovitch and Valerie Scott (henceforth referred to as the applicants), who were 
current and former sex workers. The Attorney General of Canada (henceforth referred to as the 
AG Canada) responded to their challenge in defence of Parliament and the laws it had put 
forward. Moreover, the case of Bedford v. Canada was ultimately between the applicants and the 
AG Canada. However, the Attorney General of Ontario (henceforth referred to as the AG 
Ontario) and a group comprised of the Christian Legal Fellowship, REAL Women of Canada 
and the Catholic Civil Rights League (henceforth referred to as the CLF et al.) were permitted to 
intervene in this case. The applicants in Bedford v. Canada (2010) challenged the 
constitutionality of provisions in the Criminal Code prohibiting operating or being an inmate of a 
common bawdy house (s. 210), living on the avails of prostitution (s. 212(1)(j)) and 
communicating in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution (s. 213(1)(c)). 
Evidence in this case consisted of facta or submissions to the court on behalf of all interest 
parties, some of whom relied on written and oral testimony from sex workers, police officers, 
journalists, concerned citizens and expert witnesses to build their cases.  
 The Bedford case came about in the wake of heightened attention to the safety issues 
associated with working in the sex trade in Canada. This is especially due to  the discovery of 
several Canadian serial killers preying on street-level sex workers (e.g. Robert Picton and 
Thomas Svekla) and an emergent moral panic over sex trafficking. This makes understanding 
contemporary discourses surrounding prostitution particularly important. Prostitution has 
historically been constructed on conventionally moralistic terms, producing discourses of the 
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prostitute as immoral, the prostitute as a vector of disease, and the prostitute as a public nuisance. 
However, recent developments in the Canadian context have led to an increasing focus on the 
dangers associated with working on-street in Canada, producing discourses of victimization. The 
current legal debate provides an opportunity for ascertaining the ways in which public attention 
to the dangers associated with prostitution in Canada are reshaping the ways in which the 
Canadian sex trade is being discursively constructed. Understanding contemporary discursive 
constructions of sex work and its practitioners in Canada offers a means to understand the moral 
and social context within which Canadian sex workers operate. This approach also enables the 
examination of how the institutions of law, religion and science intersect to collaboratively 
construct the situation facing Canadian sex workers in the Bedford case. What does this case tell 
us about the role of law in contemporary social arrangements? How do legal accounts 
constructing the role of law in rights cases influence the role of religious intervention? What is 
the role of religious interveners in this case and what are the grounds for their interest in Bedford 
v. Canada? What is the role of expert witnesses in this case and, given the state of sociological 
research on the sex trade, is it warranted? Are the expert witnesses offering anything that sex 
workers could not tell the courts themselves? Should the so-called experts be granted a more 
privileged position in this debate than those whom these laws directly affect? How effective is 
the current legal system at handling issues of this sort and is there an alternative means of 
reconciling this debate that would be more effective? 
 
Theoretical Framework 
In order to explore these questions, I have conducted documentary analysis of the legal facta and 
judicial determination for Bedford v. Canada as well as focused interviews with some of the 
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actors involved in this case. This approach was guided by Adele Clarke’s (2005) method of 
situational analysis which permits “thick analyses” in which the situation itself is the central unit 
of analysis (xxii-xxiii). As noted by Clarke, this approach replaces the concept of “action-
centered ‘basic social process’” undergirding traditional grounded theory with a focus on 
“situation centered ‘social worlds/arenas/negotiations’” as advocated by Anselm Strauss (xxii).  
Moreover, as a theory/methods package, situational analysis aims to “simultaneously address 
voice and discourse, texts and the consequential materialities and symbolisms of the nonhuman, 
the dynamics of historical change, and, last but far from least, power in both its more solid and 
fluid forms” (xxiii). This approach is particularly useful in the present case where myriad 
elements interacted with one another to produce a determination with the power to alter the 
Canadian sex trade and Canada’s approach to the sale of sex. As will be discussed further in 
chapter 2, in addition to permitting comprehensive examinations of situations in which multiple 
actors and elements are interacting with one another, this approach complements feminist calls 
for researchers’ reflexivity at all stages of the research process. Combining discursive analysis of 
legal text with focused interviews allowed me to probe into the role of various actors and 
institutions in constructing the situation facing Canadian sex workers in the legal arena. 
Moreover, beginning with documentary analysis of facta and the judicial determination 
facilitated identification of key areas of agreement and controversy among interest parties in this 
case and focused interviews aimed to clarify points of confusion in my original analysis. Where 
applicable, I have also conducted documentary analysis of historical materials in order to attend 
to the role of discourse in shaping the situation of inquiry. My analysis of Bedford v. Canada has 
been informed by insights from the social construction of social problems approach (Spector and 
Kitsuse 1977; Best 2008), symbolic interactionism (Prus 1999) and feminist approaches to power 
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and situated knowledge (see, for example, Collins 1990; Smart 1992; Mackinnon 1997; Comack 
2006). The current analysis focuses on the ways in which the situation facing Canadian sex 
workers is being discursively constructed while attending to power relations affecting who is 
permitted to influence the definition of reality being forwarded in this case.  
 Rather than conceptualizing social problems as objective conditions, the constructionist 
approach holds that social problems consist of actors’ claims-making activities (Best 2008; 
Spector and Kitsuse 1977). Spector and Kitsuse (1977) define social problems as “the activities 
of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some 
putative conditions” (75). Similarly, Joel Best (2008) defines social problems as “efforts to 
arouse concern about conditions within society” (10). For constructionists, putative conditions 
are not inherently problematic (Best 2008; Spector and Kitsuse 1977). Rather, conditions are 
symbolically defined as problematic and analyses must focus on this definitional process (Best 
2008; Spector & Kitsuse 1977). According to Spector and Kitsuse, “the significance of objective 
conditions…is the assertions made about them, not the validity of those assertions as judged 
from some independent standpoint, as for example, that of a scientist [original emphasis] ” 
(1977: 76). Thus, rather that attempting to negotiate between competing accounts or attempting 
to determine which definition of reality is most valid or accurate, I have focused on the process 
by which actors in this case construct the situation currently facing Canadian sex workers as 
problematic. To be clear, the Bedford case was premised on a tacit agreement among interest 
parties that the context in which Canadian sex workers operate is a social problem. Yet, actors in 
the Bedford case diverged in their constructions of why the Canadian sex trade is problematic 
and what constituted viable solutions to the issues identified. Attending to this definitional 
process permits deeper analysis of the roles played by the institutions of law, religion and science 
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in shaping the terrain on which Canadian rights law is constructed. Inspired by symbolic 
interactionism, constructionists analyze the “natural histories” or “careers” of social problems 
(Best 2008; Spector & Kitsuse 1977).  
 Understanding social problems claims requires appreciating that claims are dynamic, 
processual phenomena. As noted by constructionist scholars, framing involves rhetorical work 
(see, for example, Snow et al. 1986; Prus 1999; Best 2008). Claims-makers seeking to persuade 
audiences must devise strategies in order to have their claims accepted in the face of opposition 
and competition, in an evolving “social problems marketplace” (Best 2008). Rights cases entail 
debates over whether or not laws prohibiting conduct infringe on the fundamental rights and 
freedoms guaranteed to Canadian citizens under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, 
rights cases are an integral part of the “social problems marketplace” because they are arenas in 
which criminality and rights are symbolically defined. For constructionist scholars, audience 
segmentation makes it necessary for claims-makers to tailor their arguments differently 
depending on the target audience (Best 2008: 40-41). As noted by Best (2008), this is 
particularly true in cases such as the abortion debate, where individuals take “intractable, 
opposing positions” (41). Moreover, audiences are comprised of myriad groups who “have, if not 
different values, at least different interpretations of which values are most important and how 
they ought to be realized” (186). In Bedford v. Canada, claims had to be tailored to the legal 
arena--actors had to frame their arguments using a language that the law comprehends. Due to 
the adversarial nature of Canadian legal proceedings, interested parties must present oppositional 
accounts in attempts to persuade the judge and/or jury and these accounts must be couched in 
legal discourse. Thus, in addition to investigating the definitional process by which actors 
rhetorically construct their arguments, analyzing claims-making in legal debates requires 
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attending to how actors employ legal discourse to frame their arguments. In the Bedford case, 
interested parties presented Justice Susan Himel with competing accounts of how the impugned 
Criminal Code provisions affected the situation within which Canadian sex workers operated in 
attempts to persuade her to rule in favour of their position on the issue. Specifically, while the 
applicants presented arguments aimed at persuading Himel to strike down the impugned 
provisions on grounds that they violated the rights to freedom of expression (s. 2(b)) and to “life, 
liberty and security of the person” (s. 7) as guaranteed by the Charter, the AG Canada coaxed 
her to rule that the impugned provisions did not infringe on the Charter rights cited by the 
applicants (Bedford v. Canada 2010). In order to accomplish this, interested parties forwarded 
claims regarding the nature and purpose of the impugned provisions, the Canadian sex trade and 
the relationship between violence and prostitution in Canada, the role of conventional morality in 
legal debates, and the effects of the impugned provisions on the Charter rights in question. These 
claims were tailored to convince the judge that their definition of reality was more valid than that 
presented by the opposition.  
 Robert Prus’ (1999) interactionist approach to power provides a basis for understanding 
influence work as an enacted process. Arguing that researchers should conceptualize power as a 
definitional process, Prus (1999) provides a starting point for analyzing claims-making as 
influence work. This approach is particularly relevant when analyzing legal debates because the 
nature of legal proceedings is to persuade the judge to accept one’s definition of reality over 
other accounts. Moreover, actors in the court room vie for the power to define the situation. In 
the present case, actors are vying for the power to define Canada’s legal regime concerning 
prostitution. Noting that “all influence work connotes activity in the making [original emphasis]” 
(168), Prus outlines an interactionist approach to studying relationships between targets and 
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tacticians. For Prus,  “power implies an intent and a capacity on the part of a person  or 
collectivity to influence, control, dominate, persuade, manipulate, or otherwise affect the 
behaviors, experiences, or situations of some target [original emphasis]” (152). According to 
Prus, researchers must approach studies of power with an appreciation for its processual nature: 
“by viewing power in emergent or dynamic terms (and attending to its definitional base), all 
instances in which notions of power are invoked become amenable to a natural history or career 
analysis” (154). Claims-making involves participants’ actively constructing social problems, by 
assuming the roles of targets and tacticians. 
Prus (1999) argues that analyzing influence work requires attending to how individuals 
enact their roles as either targets or tacticians. Moreover, while individuals assume roles as either 
targets or tacticians in exchanges, “it is essential to recognize people’s abilities to assume an 
interchangeability of standpoints, to acknowledge that participants in a setting may assume roles 
as  both targets and tacticians in particular interchanges, on either a sequential or simultaneous 
basis [original emphasis]” (153). Similarly, Best (2008) asserts that “it is important to recognize 
that the audiences for claims are not passive. People who hear claims react, and claimsmakers 
must take those reactions into account, by adjusting, revising, and fine-tuning their claims to 
make them more effective, more persuasive” (44). This is particularly true in the present case 
where the judge was expected to consider all arguments and draw her own conclusions based on 
the evidence before her. Analyzing influence work requires exploring the ways by which 
tacticians plan and prepare frameworks to meet their objectives, attend to target circumstances by 
incorporating targets’ values and interests into their arguments, and engage in image work in 
order to shape targets’ perceptions of reality (Prus 1999: 173-4).  
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While Prus’ point is well taken, attending to claims-making activities in legal debates 
requires an appreciation that not all accounts are granted the same status in legal proceedings. 
Moreover, analyzing actors’ claims-making activities in Bedford v. Canada requires attending to 
power relations and the historical construction of relations of power via discourse. Thus, I have 
also drawn on feminist approaches to the social construction of gender and sexuality to guide my 
analysis of the Bedford case. Complementing analyses of claims-making activities in Bedford v. 
Canada with feminist approaches to power relations permits a more comprehensive 
understanding of the role of power, and thus of major institutions such as law, religion and 
science, in this case. 
Insights from feminist scholarship on power and situated knowledge provide a starting 
point for attending to power relations in the present study. For postmodern feminists, attending to 
power relations requires moving away from strictly Marxian analyses toward an understanding 
that power is generated and maintained through discourse. As Elizabeth Comack (2006) 
explains, shifting to non-economic analyses of power enables researchers to move from 
conceptions of “the state as key centre of power in society” toward an understanding of “how 
forms of knowledge (discourses) claim to speak the truth and thus exercise power in a society 
that values this notion of truth” (61). Similarly, Carol Smart (1989) argues that legal discourse is 
a form of power: “law operates as a claim to power in that it embodies a claim to a superior and 
unified field of knowledge which concedes little to other competing discourses” (Ibid). For 
Smart, law derives its power to “impose its definition of events on everyday life” through claims 
to represent a singular, unified body of knowledge/rules (4). From this perspective, analyzing 
power relations in legal debates requires attending to how law, as a discourse, produces 
difference among the legal subjects it constructs. 
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 According to Smart (1992), understanding discursive constructions of legal subjects 
requires analyzing law as a gendering strategy or a “technology of gender”. Noting that analyses 
of “law as sexist” and “law as male” are problematic because “any argument that starts with 
ceding priority to the binary division of male/female or masculine/feminine walks into the trap of 
demoting other forms of differentiation, particularly differences between these binary opposites” 
(33), Smart argues that researchers must conceptualize the “law as gendered”. As noted by 
Smart, “law does not serve the interests of men as a universal category any more than it serves 
the interests of women as a category [original emphasis]” (32-3). Moreover, conceptualizing the 
law as gendered “allows us to think of it [law] in terms of processes which will work in a variety 
of ways and in which there is no relentless assumption that whatever it does exploits women and 
serves men” (33). This approach allows researchers to analyze law “as a process of producing 
fixed gender identities rather than simply as the application of law to previously gendered 
subjects” (34). At this point the analytic question becomes “how does gender work in law and 
how does law work to produce gender?” (35).  
 Analyzing law as a technology of gender permits understandings of what would 
otherwise appear to be contradictory and inconsistent in constructions of the legal category 
“Woman”. As noted by Smart, legal discourse symbiotically constructs different types of women 
and “Woman” in contradistinction to “Man”. Analyzing law as a gendering strategy permits 
examinations of this “double strategy” by which the modern “Woman” is discursively 
constructed:  
Woman has always been both kind and killing, active and aggressive, virtuous and evil, 
cherishable and abominable, not either virtuous or evil. Woman therefore represents a 
dualism, as well as being one side of a prior binary distinction. Thus in legal discourse 
the prostitute is constructed as the bad woman, but at the same time she epitomizes 
Woman in contradistinction to Man because she is what any woman could be and 
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because she represents a deviousness and a licentiousness arising from her (supposedly 
naturally given) bodily form, while man remains innocuous. (36) 
 
Moreover, this approach reveals how “Woman” occupies multiple positions simultaneously in 
legal discourse, thus permitting researchers to attend the experiences of women of colour, for 
whom racism and classism may be experienced as more urgent than sexism (Kelly 1997: 346). 
For these women, oppression based on race, class and gender may be experienced as a complex 
totality which cannot be separated (Ibid).   
 As noted by bell hooks (1997), race and class operate in conjunction with sexism to 
“determine the extent to which an individual will be discriminated against, exploited, or 
oppressed” (23). Moreover, not all women occupy a common social location, nor do all men hold 
the same amount of power relative to other men (Collins 1990; hooks 1997). As Patricia Hill 
Collins (1990) explains, “white women are penalized by their gender but privileged by their 
race” (4). Further, gendered oppression may not be experienced in the same way by all women: 
Women in lower class and poor groups, particularly those who are non-white…know that 
many males in their social groups are exploited and oppressed….While they are aware 
that sexism enables men in their respective groups to have privileges denied to them, they 
are more likely to see exaggerated expressions of male chauvinism among their peers as 
stemming from the male’s sense of himself as powerless and ineffectual in relation to 
ruling male groups, rather than an expression of an overall privileged social status. 
(hooks 1997: 23) 
 
In Canada, state control of Aboriginal women’s sexuality has been facilitated by the Indian Act 
(Ouellette 2002; Monture 2006). As noted by Grace Ouellette (2002), “the oppression of Native 
women must be seen within a broader context, not simply on sex specific terms. The whole 
process of colonization must be taken into consideration, with the Indian Act recognized as 
Canada’s main legal instrument of colonialism” (39). Moreover, analyses of male dominance 
over Aboriginal women’s sexuality must incorporate the effects that colonialism has had on the 
lives of First Nations women. This is particularly true given that in many traditional First Nations 
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societies, men and women held equal status (Ouellette 2002). Rather than being solely based on 
constructions of male power and dominance, race, class and gender intersect to produce the 
oppression experienced by Aboriginal women. Describing her experience as a Mohawk woman, 
Patricia Monture (2006) explains that she experiences racial and gendered oppression 
simultaneously: “much of my identity was shaped on the recognition that I was oppressed. I was 
oppressed as an Indian. I was oppressed as a woman. I was oppressed as an Indian woman. I do 
not experience these categories of ‘Indian’ and ‘woman’ as singular and unrelated” (79). Echoing 
Ouellette (2002), Monture (2006) argues that any attempt to understand the oppression of 
Aboriginal women must take colonialism as its point of departure: “colonialism is the theory of 
power, while oppression is the result of the lived experience of colonialism” (80). Analyzing 
discursive constructions of the Canadian sex trade while attending to power relations requires an 
approach that simultaneously addresses racism, classism and sexism. 
 Collins’ (1990) “matrix of domination” provides a useful starting point for analyzing 
discursive construction of the sex trade in the Bedford case while simultaneously attending to 
divergent forms of oppression. For Collins, different forms of oppression intersect in a matrix of 
domination in which, “depending on the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member 
of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed” (4). Similarly, Donna 
Haraway (1999) argues that “there is no way to ‘be’ simultaneously in all, or wholly in any, of 
the privileged (subjugated) positions structured by gender, race, nation and class” (179). For 
Haraway, there are no “innocent” positions and “vision is always a question of the power to see” 
(Ibid). Thus, researchers must subject all perspectives to “critical reexamination, decoding, 
deconstruction, and interpretation” (178). This approach complements Prus’ (1999) assertion that 
researchers must appreciate actors’ abilities to assume interchangeable standpoints in exchanges 
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(153) and permits a more comprehensive examination of how relations of power influence 
actors’ abilities to forward their definition of reality in the Bedford case. 
 In order to conduct the current case study, I have examined the facta submitted by 
interested parties and the subsequent legal determination in the original hearing of Bedford v. 
Canada. In cases such as constitutional challenges, lawyers for interested parties submit legal 
facta or statements of fact to the court detailing their client(s)’s position(s) on the issue(s) in 
question. A factum is essentially a formal presentation of the argument one is forwarding for 
consideration by the courts; these documents provide a compilation of witness testimony, 
including testimony obtained via cross-examination, academic evidence and legal precedent that 
submitting parties are using to construct their argument(s). Upon consideration of all of the 
evidence submitted, judges provide a determination explaining their decision on the issue(s) in 
question as well as their reasoning for making said decision(s). Thus, I have examined the facta 
submitted on behalf of the applicants, the AG Canada and the interveners in this case—the AG 
Ontario and the CLF and colleagues—as well as Justice Himel’s determination. My analysis of 
discursive constructions in legal facta and Himel’s determination is complemented by interviews 
with two of the religious interveners and three expert witnesses involved in this case. Some of 
the parties involved in this case were unable to provide interviews for legal reasons because this 
case is ongoing. In addition to facilitating a more informed understanding of interest parties’ 
positions in the current debate, complementing my analysis of secondary data with focused 
interviews offers a more detailed understanding of the relationship between law, religion and 
science in Bedford v. Canada.   
 Rather than treating claims as static entities, the present research explores the ways that 
claims-makers frame their arguments in Bedford v. Canada as they attempt to influence Justice 
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Himel’s perception of the constitutionality of the impugned provisions and, by extension, of the 
Canadian sex trade. Guided by insights from the social construction of social problems approach 
(Spector and Kitsuse 1977; Best 2008), symbolic interactionism (Prus 1999) and feminist 
approaches to power and situated knowledge (Collins 1990; Mackinnon 1997; Comack 2006; 
Haraway 1999), the current analysis examines how the institutions of law, religion and science 
intersect to collaboratively construct the situation facing Canadian sex workers in Bedford v. 
Canada. Through exploring how public attention to the dangers associated with prostitution in 
Canada is reshaping social constructions of the Canadian sex trade as well as the roles of law, 
religion and science in the current debate, this case study investigates how the situation currently 
facing Canadian sex workers is being discursively constructed in the Bedford case.  
 
Literature Review  
Research on the Sex Trade 
Sociologists in Canada and abroad have examined the sex trade from a variety of angles. For 
example, research has been conducted on policing prostitution (Edmonton Police Commission 
Task Force on Prostitution 1999; LeBeuf 2006), the relationship between prostitution, violence 
and victimization (Brannigan 1994; Farley et al. 1998; Cler-Cunningham & Christensen 2001; 
Kurtz et al. 2004; Raphael & Shapiro 2004; Surratt et al. 2004; Brents & Hausbeck 2005; Farley, 
Lynne & Cotton 2005; Salfati, James & Ferguson 2008), men who purchase sex (Monto 2004; 
Lowman & Atchison 2006; Klein, Kennedy & Gorzalka 2009), HIV risk among sex workers 
(Shannon et al. 2008), sex workers’ views of their situations and the ways that they manage 
occupational hazards (Dala 2000; Sanders 2004a, 2004b; McKeganey 2006), health and safety 
issues associated with working in the sex trade (STAR 2005; Jackson, Bennett & Sowinski 2007; 
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Jackson et al. 2009; Shaver, Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale 2011), the ways in which indoor sex 
workers promote latex as a tool for safer sex (Moore 1997), the ways that internet technologies 
(Bernstein 2007) and tourism (Brents and Hausbeck 2007) have restructured the sex trade, and 
women’s negotiation of their bodies (Coy 2009) and identities (Sanders 2005) in commercial 
sexual transactions.  
 The majority of research on the sex trade concentrates on female, on-street sex workers 
(Lowman 2001; Vanwesenbeeck 2001; Benoit and Shaver 2006; Weitzer 2009b) in contexts 
where prostitution is criminalized (Vanwesenbeeck 2001; Weitzer 2009b). As noted by Ronald 
Weitzer (2009b), the lopsidedness of this literature produces a distorted picture of the sex trade 
(230). This is particularly problematic in light of the fact that street prostitution is the least 
common type of sex work (Lowman 2001; Vanwesenbeeck 2001; Benoit and Shaver 2006; 
Weitzer 2009b). Further, although some recent studies include male, transgendered and 
transsexual sex workers (for example, Weinberg, Shaver & Williams 1999; ENMP 2002; STAR 
2005; Koken, Bimbi & Parsons 2010; Shaver, Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale 2011), “almost all of 
the literature is divided into separate studies by gender, with virtually no systematic comparative 
examinations of males and females at the same level of work,” making any findings regarding 
differences in experiences of sex work between males and females tentative (Weitzer 2009b: 
222). And too little is known about transgendered and transsexual sex workers to draw even 
tentative conclusions (Ibid). Research on the Canadian sex trade is characterized by a tendency 
for researchers to focus on street-level prostitution, generalize findings to all forms of sex work, 
and view street prostitution as a monolithic entity (Lowman 1998: 5). Analyzing the extent to 
which constructions of the sex trade and its practitioners in Bedford v. Canada reproduce this 
tendency will shed light on the situation currently facing Canadian sex workers. Researchers’ 
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tendency to focus exclusively on street prostitution, hence focusing  on the most dangerous form 
of sex work, has resulted in a view that prostitution and violence are inextricably linked 
(Lowman 2001: 4; Vanwesenbeeck 2001: 279; Weitzer 2009b: 218).  
 Although recent Canadian scholarship suggests that trends are shifting, indoor forms of 
sex work have been mostly excluded from researchers’ foci because Canadian research on the 
sex trade has been largely fuelled by public concern over the nuisance aspects of sex work 
(Lowman 1998, 2001). Moreover, public perceptions of the sex trade in Canada have guided 
research funding initiatives, producing a distorted image of the sex trade in Canadian research. 
According to John Lowman (2001), Canadian research on prostitution was basically non-existent 
prior to the 1970s (1). In response to media portrayals that street-prostitution was expanding due 
to police crack-downs on indoor venues in Toronto (Brock 1998) and Vancouver (Lowman 
1998, 2000, 2001) toward the end of the 1970s, however, the government commissioned 
research on prostitution, providing an impetus for social scientific inquiry into the Canadian sex 
trade (Lowman 2001). Lowman (2001) notes that “after 1984 what had been a trickle of studies 
turned into a flood” (1). However, the methodology employed by researchers examining the 
Canadian sex trade was guided by socio-political contexts and resulting funding initiatives:  
In the early 1980s, concern about the nuisance aspects of the street prostitution trade 
provided the main stimulus for prostitution research funding. When the federal 
government initiated research, public nuisance concerns shaped research questions. 
While many researchers were interested in including men and women working in off-
street venues, most of the surveys of the 1980s and early 1990s involved street 
prostitutes. In the 1990s, the bulk of survey research was devoted to youth prostitution, 
most of which occurs on street. The image created by these studies is of an inseparable 
link between prostitution and victimization. (4) 
 
More recently, research agendas have been guided by an increasing tendency to conflate 
prostitution and trafficking (Weitzer 2007; Hubbard, Matthews & Scoular 2008: 139; Farrell & 
Fahy 2009: 621; Weitzer 2009a: 88; Scoular 2010: 16; Weitzer 2010: 70). Moreover, according 
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to Weitzer (2007), as a result of the American government’s acceptance of activists’ claims that 
prostitution and trafficking are inseparable (72), organizations applying for U.S funding for 
research on trafficking must take an abolitionist position on prostitution:  
Today, to be eligible for United States funding, any foreign NGO working on the 
trafficking front must declare its opposition to prostitution and especially legal 
prostitution. This requirement was added to the 2003 TVPRA [Trafficking Victims 
Prevention Reauthorization Act], and it applies to any funds or activities of the 
organization, including funds that come across from sources other than the government 
[original emphasis]. (74) 
    
In Canada, the case of serial killer Robert Picton has also altered the focus of research on the sex 
trade: “the issues of health and well-being, stigma, social exclusion and marginalization have 
become even more salient in light of the charging of Robert Picton for the multiple murders of 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside ‘missing women’” (Benoit & Shaver 2006: 245). Cecilia 
Benoit and Frances Shaver (2006) explain that while the majority of scholarship in Canada and 
abroad has focused on “the moral, criminal and legal aspects of the industry, or on the proximate 
risks associated with those involved…[more recently] research has shifted toward an 
understanding of the heterogeneity of those involved in the sex industry, the broader social 
determinants of their health and well-being, and the impact of stigma and social exclusion on 
their life chances” (244). Analyzing Bedford v. Canada provides a means for assessing the extent 
to which contemporary constructions of the Canadian sex trade attend to these factors. To what 
extent are female, on-street sex workers the focus of the current debate? And to what extent does 
the debate in Bedford v. Canada center on various forms of sex work conducted by male, female, 
transsexual and transgendered workers? Further, given that the increasing moral panic over sex 
trafficking and the case of Robert Picton are catalysts to a shift in discursive constructions of sex 
workers, to what extent are these factors incorporated into discursive constructions of safety 
issues associated with sex work in this case? Specifically, are the actors involved in the Bedford 
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case focusing on the dangers associated with trafficking and serial killers or are they 
incorporating a broad range of safety concerns?   
 
Research on the Sex Trade in Canada 
Frances Shaver, Jacqueline Lewis and Eleanor Maticka-Tyndale (2011) examine Canadian sex 
workers’ concerns with regard to physical, social and mental dimensions of health as outlined by 
the World Health Organization’s definition of health. Drawing on “over 450 face-to-face 
interviews with adult (i.e., ≥ 18 years of age) women, men, and transsexual/transgender (TS/TG) 
workers who represent a broad range of occupations (street-based prostitution, exotic dancing, 
escort, and massage)” as well as interviews with “some 40 key informants” such as police, 
community service organizations and “owners/managers of establishments where PWSI work” 
(49-50), Shaver et al. examine “three domains related to worker health and safety: risks to 
occupational health and safety (OHS), negative perceptions of and behaviors toward workers, 
and limited access to essential services” (49). Further, Shaver et al. attempt to “identify the risks 
posed to workers in each of these three domains and how they are exacerbated by the Criminal 
Code provisions” being challenged in the Bedford case (49). According to Shaver et al., health 
and safety concerns with regard to occupational health and safety, perceptions of and behaviours 
toward workers, and access to essential services vary depending on type of sex work and the 
gender/sexual orientation of the worker.  
Shaver et al. (2011) provide a good starting point for assessing the extent to which sex 
workers’ concerns are being addressed in Bedford v. Canada. Although the applicants in this 
case are sex workers and testimony from current and former sex workers is provided by the 
applicants and the AG Ontario, combining their accounts with those of sex workers who are not 
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present in current discussions offers a useful starting point for determining the extent to which 
current discursive constructions of the sex trade are reflective of the broad range of experiences 
characterizing sex work in Canada. Specifically, the applicants and experiential witnesses in 
Bedford v. Canada are all female sex workers, thus, Shaver et al.’s findings provide a starting 
point for assessing the extent to which safety concerns being discussed in these debates apply to 
Canadian male and transgendered sex workers. However, it is important to note that Shaver et 
al.’s findings are drawn from studies conducted in “Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and numerous 
smaller cities in southwestern Ontario” (49), and, therefore these findings are only representative 
of one region in Canada; it is possible that sex workers in other regions have different 
experiences of sex work and/or different concerns regarding occupational health and safety. 
Nonetheless, complementing these findings with findings from other Canadian locales as well as 
analysis of current discursive constructions of the Canadian sex trade promises to offer novel 
insights into how policies can address these concerns in the event Canadian courts rule in favour 
of decriminalization.   
 In 2003, the federal Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights established the 
Subcommittee on Solicitation Law Reform (SSLR). The committee’s mandate was “to review 
the solicitation laws in order to improve the safety of sex-trade workers and communities overall, 
and to recommend changes that will reduce the exploitation of and violence against sex-trade 
workers” (SSLR 2006: 2). Although the committee was disbanded during the 2005 dissolution of 
Parliament, a new committee was formed to complete the task in 2006 (Ibid). Conducting 300 
interviews across Canada, on a host of prostitution related issues, with a broad range of actors 
such as policy experts, academics, male, female, transsexual and transgendered sex workers, 
service providers and private citizens, the SSLR notes that “two broad and conflicting 
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perspectives concerning the very basic nature of prostitution” characterize these testimonies (71). 
Gwendolynne Taylor (2010) notes a similar trend in her analysis of submissions by women’s 
organizations, academics and legal advocates to the SSLR. Moreover, both the SSLR (2006) and 
Taylor (2010) observe that discussions about prostitution reform in Canada are framed by either 
discourses of prostitution as a form of violence against women or sex work discourses (the view 
that prostitution is a legitimate form of employment). Not surprisingly, researchers have noted a 
similar trend in academic work on the sex trade.  
 Ronald Weitzer (2009b) identifies three theoretical frameworks or paradigms through 
which prostitution is constructed in academic works: the oppression paradigm, the emancipation 
paradigm, and the polymorphous paradigm. Similarly, Jane Scoular (2004) identifies three 
dominant constructions in feminist accounts: discourses of victimization, sex work discourses 
and postmodern accounts. Scoular’s three categories are compatible with those outlined by 
Weitzer. According to Weitzer (2009b), “the oppression paradigm and the emancipation 
paradigm are diametrically opposed models based on entirely different assumptions, whereas the 
polymorphous paradigm integrates aspects of the others and is more empirically driven than the 
other two” (214). Complementing this assertion, Scoular (2004) argues that postmodern accounts 
incorporate elements of discourses of victimization and sex work discourses but present a more 
balanced, multifaceted account than either of the other two constructions: “postmodern work, in 
contrast to previous approaches, considers prostitution as neither a subversive sexual practice nor 
an inherently oppressive one” (348). The discursive categories outlined by Weitzer (2009b) and 
Scoular (2004) provide a point of departure for assessing contemporary constructions of sex 
work and its practitioners in the Bedford case. 
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Canadian Prostitution and the Law 
Although Canadian scholars have provided historical accounts of the development of prostitution 
law in Canada (see, for example, Lowman 1998; Robertson 2003), analyses of the social 
construction of sex work in Canadian law (Brock 1998), assessments of the relative effectiveness 
of the communicating law in Canada’s major cities (Larsen 1996), analyses of legal discourses in 
rape cases involving sex workers (Sullivan 2007) and analyses of Canadian debates surrounding 
legal reforms (Larsen 1999; Taylor 2010), there is yet to be a constructionist analysis of cases 
involving constitutional challenges to Canadian prostitution laws. 
 While scholarly attention has recently been directed toward the Bedford case, sociologists 
have yet to analyze discursive constructions of the sex trade in this case. Further, scholars have 
yet to attend to the relationship between law, religion and science in this type of constitutional 
challenge. Current analyses have produced detailed accounts of the historical progression of the 
current challenges to Canada’s prostitution laws (Louie 2012), examinations of Crown expert 
witness testimony in Bedford v. Canada (Lowman 2012) and analyses of prohibitionist claims in 
the Bedford case (Lowman and Louie 2012). Yet, sociological inquiry has yet to compare the 
ways in which both sides of this debate are constructing the situation while attending to the roles 
of law, religion and social science in this process. Moreover, all examinations of the arguments 
forwarded in this case focus on the prohibitionist stance, neglecting to incorporate analyses of 
how proponents of legal reform are constructing their claims and whether these accounts accept 
official definitions of the roles of law, religious intervention and expertise uncritically.   
 Echoing the applicants’ argument in Bedford v. Canada that minimizing harm to sex 
workers while respecting their liberty rights requires a shift from strictly moral perspectives to a 
harm reductionist approach, Christine Louie (2012) provides a detailed analysis of the events 
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leading up to Bedford v. Canada and Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence 
Society v. Attorney General (Canada). While the Bedford case was brought before the court by 
three individuals, the case of Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society 
v. Attorney General (Canada) was brought before the court by a sex workers’ group, Downtown 
Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society (SWUAV), and a former sex worker, 
Sheryl Kiselbach. Albeit on slightly different grounds, both cases challenged the constitutionality 
of the same prostitution related provisions in the Criminal Code: operating or being an inmate of 
a common bawdy-house (s. 210), living on the avails of prostitution (s. 212(1)(j)) and 
communicating in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution (s. 213(1)(c)). Yet, 
SWAUV and Kiselbach went further than the applicants in Bedford v. Canada, also challenging 
the Criminal Code prohibitions of transporting another person to a common bawdy-house (s. 
211), and procurement (s. 212(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h)). Employing a grounded theory 
approach, Louie analyzes the origin of these Charter challenges as well as the role of legal aid 
and legal advocacy, social science experts and international prostitution law reform in other 
Commonwealth countries through documentary analysis and interviews. Specifically, Louie 
examines published court documents and supplements this analysis with interviews with one 
applicant from each of these cases, Terri-Jean Bedford and Sheryl Kiselbach, and their 
advocates, Alan Young and Katrina Pacey, respectively.  Louie provides a convincing argument 
that, contrary to popular renditions of Marxian theory, the law is serving its purpose through a 
Marxist framework in these cases. Specifically, noting that “both followers and opponents of 
Marxism fail to understand the subtlety of [Marx and Engels’] materialist conception of history” 
(9) and that, according to Marx, “the economy is the ultimate determining element in history but 
not the only one [original emphasis]”(9-10), Louie argues that, for Marx, “laws reflect the 
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movement and interaction of industry and the money market, and are influenced by political 
struggles with classes and by religion and philosophy” (10).  From this perspective, the law is 
fulfilling its purpose of mitigating between political and economic struggles, ensuring that 
marginalized groups have the opportunity to gain emancipation via legal reform. While Louie’s 
account provides a good starting point for understanding the current legal debate, her approach 
does not question legal constructions nor does it focus on sites of silence and intrinsic power 
imbalances in these debates. Attending to the interactions between law, religion and science as 
they collectively construct the situation currently facing Canadian sex workers draws attention to 
the inefficacy of the Canadian legal system when moral issues requiring democratically informed 
resolutions come before the courts.  
 Offering a point of departure for analyzing constructions forwarded by the Attorneys 
General of Ontario and Canada as well as the role of religious intervention in the present case, 
John Lowman and Christine Louie (2012) compare the results of public opinion surveys to 
arguments forwarded by prohibitionist groups in Bedford v. Canada. Lowman and Louie find 
that public opinion survey results do not support the government and other prohibitionist groups’ 
contention that the majority of Canadians agree with prohibiting prostitution. Specifically, 
comparing the arguments forwarded by the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario and those 
of the Christian Legal Fellowship, REAL Women of Canada and the Catholic Civil Rights 
League to the results from seven public opinion surveys from 1984 to 2011, Lowman and Louie 
find that the claims forwarded by the government and other prohibitionist groups in Bedford v. 
Canada regarding Canadian beliefs on whether or not adult prostitution should be prohibited are 
false. As noted by Lowman and Louie, “should Bedford v. Canada be upheld, claims about 
public opinion will likely come to play an important part in the ensuing debate about how to 
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revise prostitution laws. Indeed, claims about public opinion on prostitution already did play a 
part in this case” (4).  
 Similarly, John Lowman’s (2012) exploration of testimony provided by Crown expert 
witnesses in Bedford v. Canada provides a good starting point for analyzing the role of expert 
witnesses in this case. Considering the core claims forwarded by Melissa Farley, Janice 
Raymond, Mary Sullivan and Richard Poulin, Lowman concludes that, rather than evidence-
based argument, these scholars presented the courts with victim-paradigm hyperbole. While 
Lowman’s analysis provides a good point of departure for considering the arguments forwarded 
by prohibitionist scholars in Bedford v. Canada, comparative analysis incorporating the claims 
forwarded by scholars for the other side of the debate is necessary to gain a full understanding of 
the ways in which the sex trade and its practitioners are being constructed in this case.  
 
Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is organized into three main sections: the role of collective values, the role of 
religious intervention and the role of expert witnesses in this case.  
 Chapter two details my research design and methodology, with emphasis on the 
importance of incorporating feminist research methods when conducting research of this sort. In 
this chapter, I discuss Adele Clarke’s (2005) situational analysis and how I used it to analyze the 
Bedford case. Throughout this discussion I draw attention to how, as a theory/methods package, 
situational analysis addresses many methodological concerns raised by feminist researchers.  
 In chapter three, I consider the role of collective values in Canadian law as a backdrop to 
examining the relationship between science and religion in Bedford v. Canada. I begin with an 
overview of classical and contemporary theories of the law-society relationship. Following this 
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account, I discuss the Canadian context and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, drawing 
attention to the importance of value consensus in official definitions of the nature and purpose of 
Canadian law. Having established the nature and purpose of the Charter as well as its power to 
shape Canadian jurisprudence, I examine the role of collective values in the Bedford case by 
analyzing actors’ constructions of the impugned Criminal Code provisions and the role of law in 
this case.  
 Chapter four provides an analysis of the role of religious intervention in the current case. 
In this chapter, I analyze both legal constructions of the role of religion and the claims forwarded 
by the religious interveners in Bedford v. Canada through documentary analysis and interviews. 
Beginning with a discussion of the role of conventional morality in shaping the Canadian legal 
tradition, I explore the nature and purpose of religious intervention in the Bedford case through 
analyzing the CLF and colleagues’ constructions of their role in this debate and what they claim 
to bring to the Bedford case that would not be present in their absence. Following this account, I 
explore actors’ constructions of the role of legal moralism in Bedford v. Canada in an attempt 
highlight the intrinsically moral nature of the current debate.  
 In chapter five, I consider the role of expert witnesses in this case. Through highlighting 
issues with legal definitions of expertise and suggesting feasible alternatives to binary 
distinctions between lay and expert knowledge, I explore legal constructions of expertise and 
how these understandings shape the current debate. Analyzing how legal accounts construct the 
role of expert witnesses in court proceedings highlights the extent to which law and science co-
construct legal fictions concealing the moral nature of the debate in Bedford v. Canada.  
 In chapter 6, I explore actors’ constructions of the “risk of harm” associated with sex 
trade involvement in Canada, highlighting the privileged status of expert witnesses in 
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constructing these accounts. Analyzing actors’ constructions of the situation in the Bedford case 
while attending to sites of silence in the data draws attention to the precarious status granted to 
expert witnesses in this case as well as the collusion of law, religion and science in Bedford v. 
Canada and the need for a more nuanced approach to evidence in legal debates of this nature. 
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Research Design and Methodology 
Drawing on Adele Clarke’s (2005) method of situational analysis, this research is based on 
documentary analysis of the facta and judicial determination in the case of Bedford v. Canada as 
well as focused interviews with some of the parties involved in this case. Legal facta are 
summaries of the arguments being forwarded by interest parties in legal proceedings. It is 
important to note, however, that legal facta are constructed using specific guidelines regarding 
what information is to be included and how that information is to be presented. Thus, the form 
and content of the arguments being forwarded by interest parties in this case were tailored to 
meet specific requirements imposed by the court. I have also incorporated analyses of historical 
materials which are particularly relevant to this case, namely precedent judicial determinations, 
because, as noted by Clarke, representations of the present are always informed by historical 
information (262). This is particularly true of legal constructions of the present in which legal 
precedent trumps all other forms of knowledge. In addition to permitting comprehensive 
analyses of discursive construction via its emphasis on attending to a range of elements which 
could potentially influence the situation of inquiry, situational analysis addresses many feminist 
methodological concerns central to the goals of my study. Specifically, situational analysis 
permits a focus on women’s experiences, allows analysts to conduct research for women rather 
than research on women, and locates the researcher in the same critical plane as the overt subject 
matter (Harding 1987).  
Situational analysis involves constructing maps and using them as the conceptual 
infrastructure of the research project (Clarke 2005). Moreover, Clarke’s (2005) maps are 
cartographic tools, aimed at helping researchers to gain comprehensive understandings of the 
situations they are analyzing. According to Clarke, employing situational maps, social 
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worlds/arenas maps and positional maps over the course of generating, analyzing and 
interpreting data, permits analyses that “simultaneously address voice and discourse texts and the 
consequential materialities and symbolisms of the non-human, the dynamics of historical change, 
and…power in its more solid and fluid forms” (xxiii). As noted by Lise Allen (2010), although 
situational maps are not a novel contribution to qualitative research, “Clarke’s introduction of 
them with her postmodern approach to grounded theory is unique” (1616). Situational analysis 
builds on Chicago School ecological and social worlds/arenas/discourse approaches, making 
them the “root images or metaphors” for her mapping (Clarke 2005: 39). Clarke (2005) notes 
that although grounded theorists “have recently produced more constructivist framings [of 
grounded theory], problematic positivist recalcitrancies remain” (xxii). Situational analysis aims 
to eradicate the positivist roots of traditional grounded theory by combining symbolic 
interactionist grounded theory with postmodernism.  
In contrast to traditional grounded theorists’ notions of the researcher as a tabula rasa 
(Clarke 2005; Charmaz 2009), situational analysis emphasizes the importance of reflexivity at all 
stages of the research process. This approach complements feminist calls for researchers’ 
reflexivity. As noted by Harding (1987), in feminist analyses, by “locating the researcher in the 
same critical plane as the overt subject matter (8),…the researcher appears to us not as an 
invisible, anonymous voice of authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete, 
specific desires and interests” (9). Similarly, Clarke (2005) emphasizes the importance of 
transparency and reflexivity throughout the research process: “we need to address head-on the 
inconsistencies, irregularities, and downright messiness of the empirical world— not scrub it 
clean and dress it up for the special occasion of a presentation or a publication” (15). Echoing 
Clarke’s (2005) assertions, Kathy Charmaz (2009) argues that the notion of the researcher as a 
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tabula rasa in the traditional grounded theory approach is problematic: “the notion of the 
researcher as a tabula rasa…sounded absurd to me in 1969 and still does. Rather than denying 
our pasts and removing ourselves from theoretical conversations of the present, we need to 
scrutinize how our experiences and disciplinary ideas have influenced us and what we find in the 
empirical world” (50). In sharp contrast to the traditional grounded theory approach, with 
situational analysis “the analyst uses their knowledge to help design the data collection and does 
not wait quietly for magically appearing data to speak! That is, the analyst needs to anticipate 
what data should be gathered in the initial design, as well as use theoretical sampling 
appropriately downstream” (Clarke 2005: 192). Contrary to traditional assumptions, making this 
subjective component of data collection known produces less distorted explanations of social 
reality. This practice increases objectivity while decreasing objectivism or the “stance that 
attempts to make the researcher’s cultural beliefs and practices invisible while simultaneously 
skewering the research objects beliefs and practices to the display board” (Harding 1987: 9).  
According to Harding (1987), in contrast to traditional approaches, which focus on what 
men consider important and merely “add women” to analyses (4), feminist research treats 
women’s experiences as empirical and theoretical resources (7). Conceptualizing the law and 
science as mechanisms for constructing sex workers’ identities is expected to ground my 
analyses in the lived experiences of those who are affected by these discourses. For Harding, the 
goal of feminist inquiry “is to provide for women explanations of social phenomena that they 
want and need, rather than providing for welfare departments, manufacturers, advertisers, 
psychiatrists, the medical establishment, or the judicial system answers to questions they have” 
(8). Whereas conventional readings of judicial determinations accept the legitimacy of legal 
discourse, analyzing law as a discursive tool enables more feminist understandings of the current 
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situation facing Canadian sex workers. Comack (2006) notes that “in the last three decades 
feminism has challenged us to reconsider the traditional approaches to understanding both the 
law-society relation and the claims of law itself in its Official Version” (42). Analyzing Bedford 
v. Canada as discourse offers a means of following this tradition by complicating the issue and 
drawing attention to the constructive nature of arguments for and against prohibiting sex work in 
Canada. 
Situational analysis is particularly useful for analyzing contemporary discursive 
constructions of sex work and its practitioners in a Canadian context and the roles of religion and 
science in the current debate because it permits a detailed, multifaceted and reflexive approach to 
analyzing discourse. An approach that permits investigation of difference as well as 
examinations of silenced voices is warranted in this case because of the nature of court 
proceedings. Moreover, court proceedings do not include evidence and/or affidavits from all 
parties wishing to make submissions. Judges and lawyers make decisions about whose evidence 
and/or affidavits are presented for consideration by the courts and whose evidence and/or 
affidavits are not. For example, while Maggie’s: The Toronto Sex Workers’ Action Project was 
granted joint intervention with Prostitutes of Ottawa-Gatineau Work Educate and Resist 
(POWER) in the appeal of Bedford v. Canada, their perspectives were absent from the initial 
hearing of this case. And while some sex workers were called to testify in the initial hearings, 
their evidence was treated as “experiential”, granting it less weight than evidence presented by 
expert witnesses, all of whom were social science researchers. Identifying which other 
individuals and groups have been silenced and/or omitted over the course of these proceedings 
allows deeper analysis of current discursive constructions of the Canadian sex trade. As noted by 
Clarke (2005), “in seeking to be ethically accountable researchers…we need to attempt to 
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articulate what we see as the sites of silence in our data [original emphasis]” (85). This 
complements feminists’ emphasis on the importance of attending to silence in research (see, for 
example, Anderson & Jack 1991).  
I began by examining the facta submitted to the Superior Court of Ontario and then 
analyzed Justice Himel’s determination in the Bedford case. This enabled a more comprehensive 
understanding of the ways in which the court constructed the roles of law, religion and science as 
well as the Canadian sex trade in this particular case. Facta were submitted on behalf of Terri 
Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovich and Valerie Scott (the applicants), the Attorney General of Canada, 
the Attorney General of Ontario and the Christian Legal Fellowship, REAL Women of Canada 
and the Catholic Civil Rights League. These documents amount to a total of 524 pages. All facta 
were retrieved via interested parties’ web sites and I retrieved the judicial determination for this 
case via CanLII. Submissions to the Court of Appeal for Ontario by parties who were excluded 
in the original hearing were also analyzed with attention to the ways in which the sex trade and 
other implicated actors/actants were constructed in these accounts as well as central areas of 
agreement and disagreement between the parties immediately involved in this arena.  
 I began my analysis by constructing situational maps of the facta submitted in order to 
identify the actors/actants directly involved. Situational maps allow researchers to get an in-
depth appreciation for the elements involved in the situation of inquiry, attending to both 
contributions to and silences in discourse (Clarke 2005: 86). Through this exercise, I identified 
actors/actants such as the following: female sex workers; lawyers; government representatives; 
members of religious groups; concerned citizens; social scientists; the judge; precedent legal 
determinations; legal procedures; studies on the sex trade; discursive constructions of clients; 
discursive constructions of sex work; discursive constructions of indoor/outdoor venues; 
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discursive constructions of the impugned provisions; and discursive constructions of sex 
workers. Notably absent were actors such as male, transvestite and transgendered sex workers. 
Following this step, I constructed social worlds/arenas maps and positional maps of the facta in 
order to identify patterns of collective commitment and positions taken in the discourses 
respectively. As noted by Clarke (2005), social worlds/arenas maps enable meso-level analysis 
by drawing attention to the fluidity of actions among structures and agencies (110) and positional 
maps allow analysts to identify positions taken and positions that are absent in the data in order 
to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the discourses at work in a given situation (198). 
My social worlds/arenas maps identified social worlds such as social science worlds, legal 
practice worlds, sexual service worlds, organized crime worlds, and bureaucratic worlds (i.e. 
governmental and religious). Positional mapping helped me identify positions taken in the data 
such as the following: Canadian sex workers operate in a dangerous context at present, the law 
makes sex work in Canada dangerous, the law makes sex work in Canada safer than it would be 
without the impugned provisions, morality is the basis for Canada’s criminal law, and clients are 
dangerous. This process also helped me identify positions that were not taken in the data, such as 
Canadian sex workers currently operate in a safe context. Moreover, analyzing the facta 
submitted to the court with the guidance of Clarke’s maps helped me identify areas of 
(dis)agreement as well as constructions that appeared to be characterizing this debate.  
 Reading through soft copies and making margin notes as well as voice notes facilitated a 
preliminary understanding of whom/what was involved in the situation of inquiry. Over the 
course of this preliminary reading, I attended to whom/what the actors involved in the situation 
were constructing as well as the rhetoric used to achieve this, with increased focus on the ways in 
which the sex trade and its practitioners were being constructed both overtly and via actors’ 
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constructions of other elements involved in the situation. I also attended to major areas of 
agreement and disagreement among the actors involved in order to provide a more detailed 
analysis of differing constructions should they arise. Following this step, all sources were 
manually coded in order to organize themes into conceptual trees and provide a more detailed 
examination of the relations among various actors’ constructions of the elements involved in the 
situation. Themes such as constructing the role of public opinion, constructing the role of 
religious intervention, constructing the sex trade and its practitioners, constructing the relative 
safety of prostitution venues, and constructing the role of the expert witness emerged as a result 
of this exercise.  
 After reading and coding the facta in this case, I read and coded the legal determination 
rendered by Justice Himel. In similar fashion to the way I analyzed the facta submitted to the 
courts, I began by reading the soft copy of this determination and making margin notes and voice 
notes in order to establish a preliminary understanding of whom/what was involved in this arena. 
Having identified patterns of collective commitment and major areas of agreement/disagreement 
in the facta submitted to the court, my analysis of the legal determination stemming from these 
facta centered on identifying changes in the way the current situation was being constructed by 
the judge assessing this case. Are the central areas of agreement/disagreement characterizing the 
facta submitted to the court also characterizing the situation as constructed within Himel’s 
determination? If not, on what areas is Justice Himel focusing in her determination and what 
areas are omitted? Which constructions of the elements involved in the situation is Himel 
reproducing and which constructions of the elements involved in the situation are being ignored 
in her determination? Are there any novel elements, rhetorical constructions and/or themes 
emerging in her determination for this case? 
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 Following my analysis of the documentation for this case, I conducted focused interviews 
in order to clarify points of confusion in my analysis. Although I invited lawyers for the 
applicants (Terri-Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovich and Valerie Scott) and the respondent (the 
Attorney General of Canada) as well as all interveners (the Attorney General of Ontario, the 
Christian Legal Fellowship, REAL Women of Canada and the Catholic Civil Rights League), 12 
of the expert witnesses, and excluded parties, such as Maggie’s and the United Church of 
Canada, to participate in interviews, only three expert witnesses for the applicants and two of the 
religious intervener groups participated. It is noteworthy that many of these parties may have 
been legally prohibited from participating in interviews at the point in time when I contacted 
them. The statement of informed consent for these interviews stressed that participants should 
not participate if it violated the terms of a retainer or some other legal agreement in any way. 
 Interviews were designed specifically for the interested party I was speaking with. Thus, 
questions were designed to attend to the experiences and views of the individual or group being 
consulted. For example, questions for expert witnesses focused on how s/he was retained by the 
interest party for whom s/he made submission, his/her subjective experience of being an expert 
witness in this case and what this experience taught him/her about the legal system and its use of 
expertise. Questions for religious interveners focused on the reason(s) for their intervention, what 
impact they felt it had on the case, and their thoughts about Justice Himel’s ruling. With the 
exception of one interview, all interviews were conducted via telephone, lasted approximately 90 
minutes and were tape recorded in order to ensure accuracy in transcription. One of the expert 
witnesses did not have time to participate in a tape recorded, telephone interview so his 
responses to my queries were provided via e-mail. Regardless of how responses to interview 
questions were obtained, all interviews were manually coded and organized into conceptual 
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trees. All participants were provided with the option of signing a waiver of 
anonymity/confidentiality in case s/he desired to have his/her proper name attached to any 
comments s/he made during the interview. All participating parties signed this waiver. Thus, 
presentation of this data will be accompanied by the name of the individual or group from whom 
it was acquired. This research has been approved by the Research Ethics Board at my home 
institution, Lakehead University.  
 Through conducting multiple readings and continuously weaving back and forth between 
sites of construction, novel themes emerged throughout the course of my analysis. This, in turn 
spurred on novel research questions and new approaches to data collection. Initially, this project 
was guided by the following questions: How are sex work and notions of safety being 
constructed in the current debate? To what extent do constructions of sex work and sex workers 
differ between accounts provided by the actors involved in this case? If there is a difference, to 
what extent does this difference appear to be linked to differing constructions of the applicants 
and other sex workers providing evidence for consideration by the court? Given that the 
Canadian sex trade is composed of multiple forms of indoor sex work as well as street-level sex 
work and its practitioners are male, female, transsexual and transgendered, to what extent do 
constructions of the sex trade and its practitioners in this case attend to the diversity of 
practitioners and experiences characterizing the Canadian sex trade? Given that discussions on 
prostitution have historically centered on moralism, to what extent are these debates focused on 
safety issues associated with working in the sex trade?  
 Over the course of my analysis, I became attuned to a host of new research questions 
worth exploring. What do constructions of the role of law in this case tell us about the role of law 
in contemporary social arrangements? How do legal accounts constructing the role of law in 
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rights cases influence the role of religious intervention? What is the role of the religious 
interveners in this case and what are the grounds for their interest in Bedford v. Canada? What is 
the role of expert witnesses in this case and, given the state of sociological research on the sex 
trade, is it warranted? Are the expert witnesses offering anything that sex workers could not tell 
the courts themselves? Should the so-called experts be granted a more privileged position in this 
debate than those whom these laws directly affect? How effective is the current legal system at 
handling issues of this sort and is there an alternative means of reconciling this debate that would 
be more effective? 
 I made use of situational analysis in order to provide a comprehensive account of the 
interactions between law, religion and science in contemporary discursive constructions of the 
Canadian sex trade in the Bedford case. In line with feminist research principles, situational 
analysis allowed me to attend to silence and power as well as the full range of voices and 
discursive positions participating in this case. Further, Clarke’s (2005) emphasis on reflexivity 
complements feminist calls to challenge traditional notions of value-neutrality. As noted by 
Verta Taylor (1998), the reflexive “element of feminist research stems from the belief that all 
methodologies are, to a degree, shaped by the interests and position of the researchers who 
deploy them” (368). Thus, any discussion about methods and data collection must be 
accompanied by a discussion about interests and positions in order to ensure transparency at 
every stage of the research process.  
 I decided to analyze this case for my thesis research because safety issues associated with 
sex work have been a focal point of my academic pursuits and personal activism for many years. 
Having lived in Vancouver, British Columbia at the time of Robert Picton’s arrest for the serial 
murder of 26 women from Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, attending part of his trial in New 
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Westminster, British Columbia, and working along-side families of murdered and missing 
Aboriginal women and former sex workers from across the country in Thunder Bay, Ontario for 
a number of years, I wanted to know how interest parties in the current debate were presenting 
the issue. While I have been fortunate enough to have never lost a loved one in the way that these 
individuals have, their stories, pain and anguish have had profound effects on my view of this 
situation. Yet, it is important to note that my social location as a middle-class, educated, white 
woman blurs my ability to truly identify with the situations they are describing. Moreover, by 
virtue of my social location I have never shared the experiences and subsequent concerns of 
Aboriginal women working in the sex trade and it is likely that I never will. While my awareness 
of this difference in perspective has helped me stay attuned to sites of silence in the data I have 
analyzed and informed many of the research questions that originally guided this endeavour, it 
has also led me to struggle with the issue of voice throughout the course of this research.  
 Throughout the research process I questioned whether or not my inability to identify with 
the situations and concerns of Aboriginal women working in the sex trade hindered my ability to 
critically analyze the Bedford case. This led me to question if I was merely reproducing the 
hierarchy that my research aims to challenge. Was I being hypocritical? Was raising my 
privileged voice to criticize over-reliance on other privileged voices (re)silencing those whose 
voices should be central to this debate? Did I have any place in this conversation at all? At times, 
I also worried that I was overcompensating for my inability to identify with their situations and, 
thus, not being critical enough of their positions. As noted by Haraway (1999), if one aims to be 
objective, the positionings of the subjugated cannot be “exempt from critical reexamination [sic], 
decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation…the standpoints of the subjugated are not 
‘innocent’ positions” (178).  
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 Similarly, I encountered a struggle with voice when analyzing the data yielded from 
interviews with the expert witnesses in this case. At times, I felt as though I was not probing 
sufficiently during interviews and, as a student, my subordinate status in the academic hierarchy 
made it difficult to critically analyze the perspectives of my superiors. However, I hope that my 
awareness of this issue has strengthened my ability to analyze the current situation from a 
feminist perspective and remain attuned to issues of voice and power imbalances in this case.   
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The Role of Collective Values in Law 
Law is…decidedly social. Human beings create laws and do so within the context of their 
times and societies (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 2). 
The present case study offers a unique opportunity to analyze the relationship between collective 
values and contemporary Canadian law. In addition to offering a means of exploring the concept 
of ‘rights’ in Canadian society, Bedford v. Canada poses a challenge to conventional wisdom 
regarding the role of religion and science in the legal arena. As will become clear in subsequent 
chapters, whereas scholarly legal analyses generally identify a conflict between the interests of 
science and religion in the court room (see, for example, Beaman 2008; Jasanoff 1999), religion 
and science both conflict and collude in the present case. Understanding the, seemingly 
paradoxical, relationship between religion and science in Bedford v. Canada requires an 
appreciation of theories of law and society. Moreover, this collusion is the result of a divergence 
between the law’s purported method and its practical application. Thus, in this chapter I begin by 
outlining the socio-legal theories of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Max Weber 
and George Herbert Mead as well as insights from feminist and critical legal scholars. Drawing 
on these insights permits a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter of chapters 4 
and 5: the role of religious intervention and the role of expert witnesses in the present case. It 
also provides a backdrop for understanding the Canadian legal context and the role of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. What does the Charter tell us about the purpose and 
function of law in Canadian society? How do legal actors construct the law’s role in rights cases? 
How do these constructions influence our understanding(s) of the role of law in rights cases? 
Finally, having established an understanding of theories of law and society and their relevance in 
the Canadian legal context, I provide a brief overview of the current case study in order to 
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provide a starting point for understanding the role of religious intervention and the role of expert 
witnesses in this case.  
 
Conceptualizing Law 
For Karl Marx, law is a tool for maintaining the dominance of the ruling class. As noted by 
Steven Vago and Adie Nelson (2008), Marx’s theory of law derives from his theory of economic 
determinism (35). Like other social institutions, law is a superstructure arising from the 
infrastructure or the existing system of material production in society (Comack 2006; Vago & 
Nelson 2008). Once established, the relation between the infrastructure and superstructure is 
dialectical: “the superstructure arises out of the economic base but, once created, acts back to 
reproduce it” (Comack 2006: 35). Under capitalism, the bourgeoisie (ruling class) own and 
control the means of production and the proletariat (working class) must make a living by 
working for wages (Marx 1847: 123). Vago and Nelson (2008) outline three principal 
assumptions in Marx’s theory of law: “(1) law is a product of evolving economic forces; (2) law 
is a tool used by the ruling class to maintain its power over the lower classes; and (3) in the 
communist society of the future, since law is an instrument of social control, it will ‘wither 
away’ and finally disappear” (35). Indeed, from this perspective, “the executive of the modern 
state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx & 
Engles 1848: 98). In Marx’s view, the conflict emerging from capitalist arrangements will 
eventually lead to a revolution, resulting in the emergence of a communist state in which 
“everyone’s needs will be fulfilled and universal harmony will prevail,” eliminating the need for 
law and coercion (Vago & Nelson 2008: 35). This view has inspired critical theories positing that 
law is inherently political and that its function is to maintain and reproduce systemic inequalities 
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(Comack 2006: 41-2). Whereas Marxist feminists are critical of the role of law in modern 
society, socialist feminists have revised and reformulated traditional Marxism “to incorporate the 
interconnections between capital (class) and patriarchy (gender)” (48). As noted by Comack, this 
permits them to account for “the specific nature of women’s oppression in a patriarchal capitalist 
society” (49). Socialist feminists’ attention to the role of gender in the production of social 
inequality leads to analyses of how men control women and their sexuality via law (Ibid). 
 Similarly, in The Division of Labour in Society, Emile Durkheim (1893) argues that law 
arises out the structure and complexity of particular societal arrangements. Durkheim views law 
as a measure of the type of social solidarity characterizing a given society (161). According to 
Durkheim, “life in general within society cannot enlarge in scope without legal activity 
simultaneously increasing in proportion” (159). Moreover, in line with Marx’s notion of 
dialectical materialism, for Durkheim, law both reflects and reproduces social arrangements 
(161). Although Durkheim agrees with Marx’s assertions that society is characterized by 
competition, he views this struggle as necessary: “it is neither necessary nor even possible for 
social life to be without struggle” (Ibid). Thus, it is crucial to maintain social cohesion and moral 
regulation and law is the means by which this is achieved.  
 Durkheim identifies two types of social solidarity, mechanical and organic, which he 
argues correspond to two types of law, repressive and restitutive. In small, homogeneous 
societies, mechanical solidarity prevails, ensuring unity via “close and interpersonal ties and 
similarity of habits, ideas, and attitudes” (Vago & Nelson 2008: 37). These societies are highly 
segmented and “the individual does not belong to himself [sic]; he [sic] is literally a thing at the 
disposal of society” (Durkheim 1893: 170). Conversely, societies marked by a high division of 
labour emphasize individuality and personal rights (Vago & Nelson 2008: 37). These societies 
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are characterized by organic solidarity--mutual interdependence replaces similarity as the basis 
for forging social bonds (Durkheim 1893: 171). According to Durkheim (1893), repressive or 
penal law imposes injury or disadvantage upon the wrongdoer while restitutive law aims to 
restore the previous state of affairs (162). In the case of mechanical solidarity, law reflects the 
premium placed on maintaining similarity:  
[I]ts effect is to maintain the social cohesion that arises from these similarities. It is that 
force which the penal law guards against being weakened in any way. At the same time it 
does this by insisting upon a minimum number of similarities from each one of us, 
without which the individual would be a threat to the unity of the body social, and by 
enforcing respect for the symbol which expresses and epitomises these resemblances, 
whilst simultaneously guaranteeing them. (Durkheim 1893: 165) 
 
Ensuring mechanical solidarity requires criminalizing acts that threaten collectively shared 
values and beliefs: “we should not say that the act offends the common consciousness because it 
is criminal, but that it is criminal because it offends that common consciousness” (Ibid). 
Moreover, in these societies, the law is necessarily repressive or penal, signalling to the 
collective that deviance will not be tolerated (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 38-9; Vago & Nelson 
2008: 37). Rather than being aimed at rehabilitating offenders, criminal sanctions are intended to 
maintain the “collective consciousness”. As Durkheim (1893) explains, punishment “does not 
serve, or serves only very incidentally, to correct the guilty person or to scare off any possible 
imitators….Its real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the 
common consciousness” (166). This explains the existence of laws that penalize acts which are 
not harmful to society (165). Noting that law is a product of historical development, Durkheim 
asserts that some laws merely reflect collective emotions or customs based on purely moral rules 
(Ibid). Failure to maintain these collective emotions threatens the collective consciousness on 
which social cohesion is based:  
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Every act that disturbs [collective emotions] is not dangerous in itself, or at least is not so 
perilous as the condemnation it earns. However, the reprobation such acts incur is not 
without reason. For, whatever the origin of these sentiments, once they constitute a part 
of the collective type, and particularly if they are essential elements in it, everything that 
serves to undermine them at the same time undermines social cohesion and is prejudicial 
to society. (Durkheim 1893: 165) 
  
Conversely, in modern societies the law is restitutive and emphasizes compensation to the victim 
(Ibid). For Durkheim (1893), restitutive law consists of civil, commercial and constitutional law 
(162) and, rather than being expiatory, aims to restore the ‘status quo ante’ (167). Moreover, as 
noted by Vago and Nelson (2008), in modern societies, “crimes are considered acts that offend 
others and not the collective conscience of the community” (37).  
 Durkheim’s conception of law has informed the structural functionalist approach to 
crime, which holds that the state is a neutral force operating on behalf of society to maintain 
social control or to ensure “individual conformity to the normative system” (Comack 2006: 27). 
As noted by Comack (2006), from this perspective there is no need to question law per se 
because, in line with capitalist democratic principles, laws are institutional reflections of the 
majority’s norms and values (27). Similarly, although the extent to which this perspective can be 
characterized as feminist is debatable, conservative feminists accept women’s unequal status in 
society as natural and functional, arguing that women “required the protection and guidance of 
men” (Comack 2006: 43). A discussion of the structural functionalist approach to law is 
warranted because it is particularly relevant in the present case. 
 Building on Durkheim’s theory of legal development, Talcott Parsons (1962) emphasizes 
law’s structural functions in contemporary social arrangements. For Parsons, law is a generalized 
mechanism of social control, operating diffusely in almost all sectors of society (57). Indeed, 
rather than having a specified functional content, law regulates virtually all forms of social 
relationships (Ibid). This stems from his view that as society evolves specific subsystems or sets 
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of interdependent phenomena develop in order to maintain equilibrium and ensure society’s 
proper functioning. As noted by Craig Calhoun et al. (2007), Parsons’ theory “rests on an organic 
analogy that likens a social system to a physical body, in which each subsystem is necessary to 
maintain the proper functioning of the entire organism” (401). Moreover, for Parsons (1951), just 
as biological organisms must maintain homeostasis, equilibrium is necessary for the proper 
functioning of society. This is achieved via social institutions, such as the family, school, law 
and religion, which operate as mechanisms of socialization and social control. From this view, 
law is a social institution, functioning with others, to maintain social order (Grana & Ollenburger 
1999: 36).  
 For Parsons (1962), law is particularly necessary in societies where myriad interests must 
be balanced against each other (72). Moreover, the law mainly serves as a mechanism for 
mitigating conflict and ensuring stable patterns of social interaction (58). Refuting utilitarian and 
deterministic theories of social action, Parsons (1961) argues that individuals are constantly 
balancing normative and self-interested goals: “as personalities, each individual may be 
considered as a system with its own values, goals, etc., facing [other individuals] as part of an 
‘environment’ that provides certain opportunities for goal-attainment as well as certain 
limitations and sources of frustration” (428). This stems from Parsons’ (1951) observation that 
“no actor can subsist without gratifications, while at the same time no action system can be 
organized or integrated without the renunciation of some gratifications which are available in the 
given situation [original emphasis]” (415). According to Parsons, balancing these normative and 
self-interested pressures necessitates some notion of value consensus (Calhoun et al. 2007: 403) 
and law is a mechanism for achieving this. Specifically, law reinforces values, norms and rules, 
often through the application of sanctions (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 36).  
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 According to Parsons (1962), law is a mechanism of social control operating between 
mechanisms of control focusing “primarily on the motivation of the individual” (71), such as 
mass media and therapy, and those focusing “on the solution of fundamental problems of value 
orientation involving basic decisions for the system as a whole,” such as politics and religion 
(72). However, the prominence and integrity of the legal system depend on specific social 
arrangements, without which law cannot function as an effective means of social control. For 
Parsons, law represents a particular type of social equilibrium: 
Law flourishes particularly in a society in which the most fundamental questions of social 
values are not currently at issue or under agitation. If there is sufficiently acute value 
conflict, law is likely to go by the board. Similarly it flourishes in a society in which the 
enforcement problem is not too seriously acute. This is particularly true where there are 
strong informal forces reinforcing conformity with at least the main lines of the legally 
institutionalized tradition. (71) 
 
As noted by Grana and Ollenburger (1999), if there is a great deal of agitation over the basic 
values in society, this social disequilibrium will create conflict in the legal system (38). Thus, 
normative consistency is one of the most important criteria for law’s effectiveness (57).  
 Parsons (1962) argues that the legal system’s ability to regulate interaction rests on four 
concerns: legitimation, interpretation, sanctions and jurisdiction. Legitimation refers to the basis 
for law’s claims to authority. Questions of legitimation always lead “in some form or other either 
to religious questions or to those that are functionally equivalent to religion. Law from this point 
of view constitutes a focal center of the relations between religion and politics as well as other 
aspects of society” (62). Moreover, conflict will occur if the legal system’s normative structure is 
incongruent with that of society (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 36).  
 Interpretation centers on the meaning of rules put in place via law. Noting that legal rules 
may not cover the full range of situations in which individuals find themselves or may be 
contradictory because they “must be formulated in general terms” (59), Parsons (1962) asserts 
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that the interpretive function is likely the most principal of the legal system (62). Interpretation 
involves both judges and legal practitioners. While the judiciary is responsible for maintaining 
consistency in the rule-focused aspect of the law, or “the integrity of the system of rules itself,” 
legal practitioners are responsible for maintaining the client-focused aspect of law, or the 
“relation of the rules to the individuals and groups and collectivities on whom they impinge” 
(62). Although “‘judicial independence’ from political pressures, professionalization of the 
judicial role, and institutionalization of the decision making process” are necessary for ensuring 
the integrity of the legal system, they are insufficient for ensuring that conflict does not arise 
(63).  Moreover, legal practitioners must strike a delicate balance between the authority of legal 
precedents and changing environmental conditions:  
The legal profession…has to maintain difficult balances in a tradition that is in itself 
exceedingly complex, that is applied to very complex and changing conditions, subject to 
severe pressures from interest groups, authoritatively based only on very general and 
partly ambiguous documents, and subject to change within considerable limits by the 
more or less arbitrary and unpredictable “will of the people.” (65) 
 
Indeed, for Parsons (1961), like other organisms, the social system is influenced by changes in 
the external environment, to which is must adapt in order to serve its function of maintaining 
social equilibrium. Lawyers are responsible for striking this balance because they stand between 
public authorities and private individuals (33) due to the “conspicuous dual character” of their 
role: lawyers are both officers of the court and private advisers to their clients (63). Moreover, 
“the sociologist must regard the activities of the legal profession as one of the very important 
mechanisms by which a relative balance of stability is maintained in a dynamic and rather 
precariously balanced society” (70). 
 For Parsons, sanctions are the third area of concern. Sanctions can be negative or 
positive, representing a continuum that ranges from acts of inducement to acts of blatant 
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coercion (59). Force represents the ultimate negative sanction and is also the locus of law’s 
relation to politics: “the basis of the relation of law to political organization lies primarily in the 
use of physical force or its threat as a means of coercion; that is, a means of assertion of the 
bindingness of the norm” (60). In more highly developed societies, the state has a monopoly on 
the use of force because while it serves a preventative function, “the use of force is [also] 
perhaps the most serious potential source of disruption of order in social relationships” (Ibid). 
Thus, administering physical sanctions requires at least an adequate connection between the legal 
system and the state (Ibid).  
 The final consideration for the effective functioning of law is jurisdiction. The issue of 
jurisdiction refers to questions regarding how sanctions are applied. For Parsons (1962) the 
problem of jurisdiction has two aspects: Questions about which authority has jurisdiction to 
impose the norms and questions regarding which acts, persons, roles and collectivities should be 
subject to these norms (59). 
 In contrast to the aforementioned approaches, Max Weber (1914) argues that the legal 
order evolves in tandem with capitalist arrangements. For Weber, “the existence of a capitalistic 
enterprise presupposes that a very specific kind of social action exists to protect the possessor of 
goods per se, and especially the power of individuals to dispose, in principle freely, over the 
means of production: a certain kind of legal order [original emphasis]” (250). While for Marx 
and Durkheim, law emerges out of particular social arrangements, Weber posits that social 
arrangements and law are mutually reinforcing: “the structure of every legal order directly 
influences the distribution of power, economic or otherwise, within its respective community. 
This is true of all legal orders and not only that of the state” (247). For Weber (1914), power 
refers to the ability to exercise one’s own will in spite of resistance (247). Weber identifies three 
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primary features distinguishing law from custom. For Weber, law employs threats and actions to 
pressure individuals into conformity, “the use of these threats and actions always involves force 
or coercion” and these threats and actions are always implemented by individuals in an official 
position to uphold the law (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 40-41). 
 In Weber’s view, judicial decision making processes are defined by whether rationality 
and formality are present or absent (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 41). Rational procedures 
“involve the use of scientific methods to obtain specific objectives” whereas irrational 
procedures “rely on ethical or mystical considerations such as magic or faith in the supernatural” 
(Vago & Nelson 2008: 35). As noted by Vago and Nelson (2008), “Weber argues that modern 
law is rational, whereas traditional and primitive laws were irrational, or at least, less rational” 
(36). Formal law refers to abandoning notions of fairness in favour of decision making based on 
established rules (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 41; Vago & Nelson 2008: 35). Conversely, 
substantive law involves rendering decisions based on assessments of the circumstances of 
individual cases and prevailing notions of justice (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 41; Vago & 
Nelson 2008: 35). Based on these distinctions, Weber offers four ideal types of legal systems: 
substantive irrational, substantive rational, formal irrational and formal rational. As Grana and 
Ollenburger (1999) explain: 
A substantive irrational system is based on case-by-case decision making, often 
dependent on the insight of a charismatic judge….The legitimacy of the judgement arises 
from the charismatic gifts of the individual judges. Substantive rational systems decide 
cases by applying rules from some extralegal source such as religion or a particular 
ideology…for example, the Puritan use of biblical commandments. In the formal 
irrational system, specialized legal procedures are used, although the decisions are not 
derived from general rules but are determined by supernatural forces, for example the use 
of oracles….In formal rational systems, cases are decided by applying logically 
consistent, abstract rules that are independent of moral, religious, and other normative 
criteria. All cases of the same nature should be treated equally. (41)   
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According to Weber, this latter ideal type of legal system predominates in capitalist societies: “In 
Weber’s terms, the form of legal thought that predominated in capitalist societies was one that 
came closest to his ideal type of ‘formal rational law,’ whereby law-making was based on 
principles that are autonomous, general, and universal, decisions do not differ from case to case, 
and there is no reference to moral, social, or other factors” (Comack 2006: 30). This has 
informed liberal pluralist views that the state is an impartial umpire charged with the role of 
adjudicating social conflict as different groups compete to forward their own interests or to 
exercise power in society (Comack 2006: 30). From this perspective, rather than being inherent 
to a set of activities, crime is a status conferred upon actions by those in positions to make and 
enforce the rules (31). Liberal feminist legal frameworks take a Weberian approach to the law-
society relationship. Refuting conservative feminist notions that women’s inequality is rooted in 
biology, liberal feminists hold that it is a cultural production (43). From this perspective, women 
are an interest group attempting to gain power in spite of men’s resistance and, as Comack 
explains, “if women can put enough pressure on the state, those in charge will in turn make 
appropriate changes or reforms to provide women with equal opportunities relative to men” (44). 
Moreover, for all Weberian inspired approaches to law, rationality is a fundamental feature of 
modern Western legal systems (Grana & Ollenburger 1999; Stryker 2007; Vago & Nelson 2008).  
 The law’s claims to objectivity and impartiality are derived from the doctrines of the 
separation of powers and stare decisis governing the modern legal system. Suggesting that the 
legal system is autonomous, internally consistent and “divorced from the more political 
processes of the state”, the doctrine of the separation of powers holds that the legislature and 
judiciary are separate (Comack 2006: 21). Aside from assessing the constitutionality of 
legislation when challenges arise, the judiciary is to remain completely separated from the 
Lucky 51 
 
political realm, and the state is not supposed to interfere with matters of the court. The state is 
able to represent its own interest in legal proceedings but must be subject to the same rules and 
scrutiny as any citizen when it does so. Sometimes referred to as the ‘rule of precedent’, the 
doctrine of stare decisis—“to stand by decided matters”—is supposed to ensure the 
predictability, consistency and certainty of law (Ibid). Yet, as Alison Diduck and William Wilson 
(1997) assert, rather than ensuring a separation between law and politics, these doctrines may 
obscure our understanding of political action: 
[W]hile the traditional approach claims the advantage for the liberal legal system of 
allowing judges to appear to avoid politics, it may, in fact, afford a restricted and 
arguably unjust vision of what it is to act ‘politically’. One could argue, for example, that 
construing statutes in a way which reflects existing social relations or a conception of 
social relations which existed many years ago is intensely political since it militates 
against possibly beneficial social change. It, along with the rules of stare decisis (to stand 
by things decided) and precedent, instantiates the politics of a possibly unjust status quo 
rather than facilitating the possible. (507) 
 
Moreover, the traditional approach holds remnants of Weber’s (1947) notion of traditional 
authority. As Mary Jane Mossman (1993) points out, the structure of legal inquiry contains the 
opportunity for choice and, thus, “some possibility of positive outcomes,” but its definition of 
boundaries and concept of relevance often subvert this process (548). Moreover, the legal 
method defines its own boundaries and relevance. This process respectfully involves judicial 
“choice as to which precedents are relevant and which approach to statutory interpretation is 
preferred [as well as] choice as to whether the ideas of the mainstream or those of the margins 
are appropriate” (Ibid). As noted by Mossman (1993), legal boundary-defining exercises “confer 
‘neutrality’ on the law and on its decision-makers,” relieving them “of accountability for unjust 
or just decisions” and decisions regarding relevance have the power to silence some voices while 
privileging others, thus preserving the status quo (547). But the myth of neutrality also has more 
insidious effects:  
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More sinister than this boundary-defining exercise is the potential for judicial attitudes to 
be expressed (either explicitly or implicitly) where there is no “objective” evidence to 
support them. Because of the myth of neutrality which surrounds the process, such 
attitudes may acquire legitimacy in a way that strengthens and reinforces ideas in 
"politics" and "morals" which were supposedly outside the law's boundary. (Ibid) 
 
Similarly, Lori Beaman (2008) argues that adhering to positivist myths obscures our 
understanding of legal discourse. For Beaman, “positivist tales and myths [presenting the law as 
objective and impartial] obscure the fluidity of legal discourse and occlude the sedimentation of 
power relations and resistances” (43). Moreover, rather than disqualifying all accounts of social 
reality, law employs its own logic to privilege some accounts while discounting and excluding 
others (Smart 1989: 4; Beaman 2008: 8). This observation has prompted some scholars to 
question official representations of law in the modern era.   
 Expanding on what Ngaire Nafine (1990) refers to as the “Official Version of Law”, 
Elizabeth Comack (2006) provides an informative discussion of “the image [law] portrays in 
terms of its nature, role, and functioning in society” (20). As noted by Comack, and informed by 
the notion of legal positivism, Canadian law is supposed to be completely impartial and 
dispassionate: “in both its form and its method, law asserts its claim to be impartial, neutral, and 
objective” (21). This is symbolized by the blindfolded maiden holding the scales of justice (20), 
and enacted via the adversarial system and doctrines such as the separation of powers and stare 
decisis. As Comack explains, in line with Weber’s view of law in modern societies, “much like 
other sciences, legal positivism asserts that the focus of the legal players is on facts and not 
values, such that that legal method involves the application of the appropriate rule or test to those 
facts of the case that are deemed to be legally relevant. The result is a neutral, value-free, and 
objective science of law” (21). Accordingly, legal positivists hold that the moral and the legal 
constitute separate realms (Vago & Nelson 2008: 32). As mentioned, Weber posits that modern 
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society is governed by formal-rational law, divorced from moral, social, and other factors. For 
Weber (1962), “‘equality before the law’ and the demand for legal guarantees against 
arbitrariness demand formal and rational ‘objectivity’ of administration, as opposed to the 
personally free discretion flowing from the ‘grace’ of the old patrimonial domination” (220). 
However, as noted by Comack, “to the extent that law’s view of itself is not valueless but rather 
derives from particular philosophical ideas about human nature and conceptualizations about 
society, its claims to impartiality, neutrality and objectivity become suspect” (24). Although 
Comack’s point is well taken, it is important to avoid a myopic representation of law. While law 
can be an oppressive system, it can also be a vehicle through which resistance and empowerment 
are made possible.   
 While law is often constructed as an uncontested producer of truth, legal discourse also 
provides sites of resistance. As such, scholars such as Lori Beaman (2008) and Jane Scoular 
(2010) hold that contemporary relationships between law and society must be analyzed using 
Foucault’s theory of governmentality. Noting that analyses presenting law as a unified 
phenomenon, or an internally coherent system, fail to account for how law adapts to shifts in 
power relations (25-6), Scoular (2010) explains the utility of this approach:  
Insights derived from Foucault’s theory of governmentality, which advances an 
understanding of power beyond the focus on its location in a specific site to an awareness 
of its changing techniques and rationalities of control, is vital in understanding the shifts 
in modern legal power which mirror the more diffuse forms of power in modernity. 
Viewing law through the lens of governmentality allows us to appreciate that law has 
adapted from a juridicial repressive model towards more productive forms…. (26)  
 
Rather than focusing on a specific site of interaction, Foucault’s governmentality approach 
locates power in a nexus of shifting social relations. Paralleling Durkheim, from this perspective, 
rather than providing a model for power relations in society, modern law is a pivotal medium 
through which power relations operate (28). Moreover, “as law adapts to the wider social and 
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political culture of neo-liberalism, typified by a decentered economy and forms of governance 
that operate at a distance, it too increasingly reflects its ‘economized model’ of power, operating 
through, not simply over, lives” (Ibid). Similarly, Beaman (2008) explains that the amorphous 
state of law is central to understanding its power. According to Beaman, competing claims 
within legal discourse open up sites where multiple forms of resistance become possible (8). This 
opportunity for resistance is, in part, facilitated by the way in which law produces “truth”—legal 
truth is always embedded in a series of case records, offering “a unique window into discursive 
intersections,” and thus a chance to challenge and resist the version of truth it produces (31). 
Further, while law continues to criminalize specific actions, operating as an oppressive system, it 
also functions as a liberating and empowering system because “modern law operates as much 
through freedom, rights and norms as it does through censure” (Scoular 2010: 29).   
 
The Canadian Context and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
The Weberian “ideal type” of law is especially precarious in the Canadian context where the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is capable of overruling legal precedent. Beaman (2008) notes 
that although, like all symbols, its meaning and interpretation are fluid, “the Charter [sic] is an 
important symbol of the way in which Canada, as a liberal democracy, encapsulates the public 
expression of values and norms” (62). While Canadian courts emphasize the need to adhere to 
precedent, the Charter poses a challenge to the principles of stare decisis and the separation of 
powers. Brought into effect as part one of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Charter “guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” (s. 1). Moreover, the Constitution Act 
trumps legal precedent because “the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and 
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any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, of no force or effect” (Constitution Act 1982: s. 52(1)). In order to ensure that 
Charter values are upheld, Canadian courts must occasionally revisit previous decisions in order 
to assess their legitimacy in light of social change.  
 In line with Parsons’ (1962) observation that the legitimacy of law rests on maintaining 
congruence between societal norms and those imposed via law, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has acknowledged the need to revisit previous decisions where there is evidence that they are not 
in accord with societal values (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 23). Specifically, the Supreme Court 
has outlined five factors that would permit a judge to overrule a previous decision: 
[W]here a previous decision does not reflect the values of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms; where a previous decision is inconsistent with or “attenuated” by a later 
decision of the Court; where the social, political or economic assumptions underlying a 
previous decision are no longer valid in contemporary society; where the previous state 
of the law was uncertain or where a previous decision caused uncertainty; and, in 
criminal cases, where the result of overruling is to establish a rule favourable to the 
accused. (David Polowin Real Estate Ltd. v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. 
2006 as cited in Bedford v. Canada 2010: 23) 
 
As noted by Himel, while the Supreme Court clearly has the authority to revisit its precedent 
decisions, lower courts are only able to do so in limited circumstances (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 
22). For the Supreme Court, “overruling a previous decision based on one or more of these five 
factors promotes the interests of justice and the court’s own sense of justice by bringing judge-
made law into line with constitutional, legislative, or social changes, by removing conflicts and 
uncertainties in the law, or by protecting individual liberty” (David Polowin Real Estate Ltd. v. 
Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. 2006 as cited in Bedford v. Canada 2010: 23). But 
how are Charter challenges to be assessed? 
 Proposing an alternate theory of law as a scientific endeavor, George Hebert Mead 
contends that communicative rationality is the foundation of a scientific approach to analyzing 
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“the social and moral order” (Carriera da Silva 2008: 191). As noted by Filipe Carreira Da Silva, 
rather than being limited to the social nature of the self, “Mead’s intellectual edifice is sustained 
upon the pillars of science, of social psychology, and of politics” (4). For Mead, science is a 
problem-solving activity, taking logical precedence over the pillars of social psychology and 
politics (5). Mead’s rational method for moral problem solving “is focused not so much on the 
definition of a determined final end that is supposed to motivate moral action, as on the 
definition of the procedures of a democratic and experimental moral method” (188). As such, 
similarly to Weber, he argues for a scientific approach to the resolution of social problems: 
Mead’s writings on morals and politics should be given the status of applied research 
insofar as a science of politics and morals is one of his chief aims. The resolution of 
practical moral and political problems is to be achieved through the application of the 
method of intelligence. Intelligent social reform and moral reconstruction are, then, the 
promises of Mead’s scientific approach to the “social or moral order.” (5) 
 
For Mead, those attempting to resolve moral problems must assume a role akin to that of a 
scientist: “the resolution of moral problems is inspired by the example of the research scientist in 
that both the critical moral agent and the scientist have to take into consideration all relevant 
facts” (188). This involves adopting the rational perspective of the “generalized other” and the 
rational community represented by the universe of discourse. The universe of discourse provides 
moral agents with “an imaginary context of action in which their conduct can be based on the 
principles of impartiality, publicity, and reasoned discussion” (193). As noted by Da Silva, 
“social cooperation through the exchange of rational arguments by a cognitively competent and 
informed public opinion is…the keynote of Mead’s proposed scientific method for the solution 
of [social] problems” (Ibid). Moreover, for Mead, “since moral problems involve conflicts 
between opposing ends, the crux of the question is to be able to have in mind the wider 
perspective. Only in this way can all points of view be fully appreciated” (Ibid). Thus, in contrast 
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to Weber’s approach, holding that the law must function as an objective, impartial umpire, 
divorced from the realms of politics and morals, Mead argues that moral, legal and political 
problems can only be resolved through the same process of deliberative democracy.  
 Mead’s theory of communicative rationality is inspired by the pragmatist’s radical 
democratic claim that “without concrete material equality of conditions, the abstract theory of 
political rights is no more than an abstraction that benefits some at the expense of the many” 
(173). According to the pragmatists, institutional social control involves conflict and neglects to 
incorporate the full range of interests which are necessary foundations of proper social control 
(174). Thus, intelligent social control requires the realization that the most effective form of 
governance is that which is achieved through public opinion (Ibid). For Mead, moral growth and 
social evolution necessitate a reconstruction of problematic situations: 
The moral agent does not carry inside him the solution for the problem, so to speak. Since 
the moral “problem is the community’s,” the moral agent needs first to create a new 
situation that includes all attitudes he can possibly imagine, as if he were before “an 
audience of imaginary persons,” and then he needs to confront this new situation with a 
reconstructed self. This new, reconstructed self is the sign of moral and social evolution. 
When all members of a moral community are able to put themselves completely in the 
place of each other, clear and unimpeded thinking occurs, and with it, authentic 
“democratic consciousness” emerges. (189) 
 
Intelligent solutions to social problems require consideration of all possible perspectives and 
positions. Moreover, in contrast to Weber’s approach, Mead emphasizes “the logical priority of 
concrete social democratic practices over abstract legal provisions” (195). While on the surface 
the Charter appears to represent the rational perspective of the generalized other forming the 
crux of Mead’s deliberative democratic model, its potentially progressive effects are countered 
by seemingly Weberian methods employed by Canadian courts to assess Charter challenges. 
Canadian courts assessing Charter challenges employ discourses of value neutrality, masking the 
moral assumptions inherent in any evaluation of Charter values.   
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 In an attempt to provide an “objective” measure, the “risk of harm” test has been adopted 
by Canadian courts in order to assess cases involving constitutional challenges. As Beaman 
(2008) explains: “Rights cases have become increasingly reliant on the risk of harm assessment 
as determining the boundaries of rights, often with an either implicit or explicit understanding of 
the analysis of risk of harm as an objective test” (84). In spite of being informed by social values, 
Charter challenges frequently involve the application of a so-called objective assessment by 
judges. Legal assessments of harm focus on measurable and calculable factors: 
The quest for a formulaic approach to the solving of problems presented to law is a 
residual effect of legal positivism, itself a residue of the Enlightenment preoccupation 
with rationality, with scientific and universal truths as the defining motifs of human 
behaviour. Rationality, a weighing of measurable harms, and positivism, the meter for 
measure, combine to form the basis on which harm and risk of harm are assessed. (89) 
 
This approach echoes Weber’s notion of formal rational law in which logically consistent, 
abstract rules are applied to cases in order to treat all like cases alike. Yet, rather than being 
neutral or objective, harm frameworks employ moral assumptions regarding what is good, right 
or desirable (86). Moreover, Weberian inspired discourses of neutrality and objectivity mask the 
social values that Durkheim or Parsons might emphasize, which underpin legal decisions 
regarding risks of harm.  
 Analyzing judicial constructions of obscenity law in Canada, Mariana Valverde (1999) 
notes that the risk of harm test acts as “a veritable joker card,” serving different purposes 
depending on the context in which it is employed (184). Rather than imposing a single logic on 
rights cases, “risk of harm” assessments simultaneously deploy a variety of principles, values 
and discourses (Ibid). In this sense, all interest parties can feel as though their concerns are being 
addressed by the courts because of the ambiguity of “risk of harm” assessments (Ibid). Yet, 
while in some instances this opens the door for progressive reform, in other cases “risk of harm” 
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assessments work as a means for imposing moral authoritarianism “insofar as the authorities 
retain both the right to define what is harmful and the right to prioritize those risks” (187). For 
this reason, in spite of decisions such as R. v. Morgentaler, in which the court ruled that 
Canada’s abortion laws were unconstitutional, and R. v. Egan, in which the Supreme Court read 
sexual orientation into the equality rights section of the Charter (s. 15), Valverde cautions 
against assuming that the regulation of sexuality via Canadian law can be “adequately 
understood by reference to a single dynamic of growing rationalization or liberalization” (182). 
As noted by Valverde, “the same supreme court [sic] decision that ‘read’ sexual orientation into 
the equality rights provision of the Charter, for example, also featured four judges uniting to 
write a strongly moralistic decision denying gay couples equal rights to spousal benefits” (182). 
 Building on Valverde’s (1999) notion that the “risk of harm” test acts as a joker card in 
legal arenas, Beaman (2008) contends that common sense functions as a judicial trump card to 
resolve cases in which uncertainty is prevalent. Beaman argues that judges must turn to common 
sense in order to render decisions when positivist frameworks fail to provide answers and 
uncertainty prevails: “In law then, the pursuit of risk assessment has an intriguing twin: common 
sense, or ‘what everybody knows.’ This presumed consensus fills in the gaps when positivism 
can’t provide an answer” (90). Indeed, legal constructions of risk and actual harm employ 
science as well as common sense for support. As noted by Beaman, risk “relies on measurement 
and experts” while common sense “draws on an implied and assumed consensus among citizens” 
(90). Notions of social consensus have informed the leading decisions regarding “risk of harm” 
assessments in Canadian courts. For example, assessing “risk of harm” in R. v. Labaye: 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada…very much establishes an understanding 
of the regulation of public sex based on moral and ethical convictions. However, it is 
grounded in the fundamental social, legal, and political (liberal) values—such as 
autonomy and tolerance—rather than in sexual morality….Chief Justice McLachlin relies 
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upon, in order to protect, the fundamental ethical and social considerations enshrined in 
the constitution and she does so in a manner which continues to recognize the importance 
of community and collective interests without subjugating minority desires to 
majoritarian sexual morality. (Craig 2009: 359) 
 
As noted by Beaman (2008), rather than being presented as epistemologies, legal accounts 
construct both science and common sense in ways that transform them into objective, neutral 
means of accessing “truth”:  
An examination of case law in almost any area of jurisprudence would reveal judicial 
reliance on what we all know. These confidential assertions gloss over the unknowability 
of the subject of legal analysis and belie the moral assumptions that are usually imported 
under the guise of common sense. The precariousness of this science of law is revealed 
by the tenuous nature of scientific results and also shaped by the very notion of common 
sense. The latter masks the disrupted terrain of what we all know and denies the multiple 
definitions of shared knowledge. At a more profound level, it also obfuscates the 
complexity of subjectivity(ies) and the varieties of spaces in which those are lived and 
negotiated. Shared knowledge, or common sense, if and when it exists, is partial, 
contextual, contested, and shifting. (90-91) 
 
In this sense, common sense becomes a legal “trump card” because it is irrefutable in legal 
discourse: “‘Everybody knows that’ is a difficult position to counter. If the ‘risk of harm’ is a 
joker card that can be played by anyone, surely common sense is the trump card used by courts 
to fill in the space between those things that are uncertain” (95). Indeed, as will be demonstrated, 
the arguments forwarded by interest parties in Bedford v. Canada center on common sense and 
Parsonian notions of value consensus. Thus, they cannot be reduced to pure legal rationality.   
 
The Role of Collective Values in Bedford v. Canada 
In October of 2009, Justice Susan Himel of the Superior Court of Ontario heard a challenge to 
three prostitution related provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada. In Bedford v. Canada 
(2010), three sex workers (Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovich and Valerie Scott) challenged the 
constitutionality of the provisions criminalizing living on the avails of prostitution (s. 212 (1)(j)), 
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owning, operating or being an inmate of a common bawdy-house (s. 210), and communicating in 
public for the purpose of engaging in prostitution (s. 213(1)(c)) of the Criminal Code on grounds 
that they infringed their rights to freedom of expression (s. 2(b)) and security of the person (s.7), 
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, the applicants argued 
that ss. 210, 212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code violated their right to freedom of 
expression (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s. 2(b)) and that s. 213(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Code violated their right to security of the person (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms s. 7).  
 The applicants’ argument centres on sex workers’ ability to take necessary safety 
precautions while plying their trade. As noted by Himel “the applicants’ case is based on the 
proposition that the impugned provisions prevent prostitutes from conducting their lawful 
business in a safe environment” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 8). Invoking Parsonian notions that 
law’s efficacy depends upon normative consistency (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 57), the 
applicants hold that the impugned provisions violate their liberty rights because, while 
prostitution is not illegal in Canada, each of the offences outlined by the impugned provisions 
creates the possibility of imprisonment (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 8). Further, the applicants 
contend that the impugned provisions violate their right to security of the person because “the 
operation and intersection of the impugned provisions materially contribute to the violence faced 
by prostitutes” (Ibid). Moreover, according to the applicants, these provisions criminalize safety 
enhancing practices, thus endangering sex workers: 
[T]he intersection and operation of ss. 210, 212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c) materially contribute 
to the violence which street sex workers face on a daily basis. Under s. 210, it is illegal to 
conduct business in an indoor location on a habitual basis, and the evidence tendered on 
this Application demonstrates that violence is significantly reduced or eliminated in most 
indoor settings. Under s. 212(1)(j) it is illegal to hire managers, drivers, and security 
personnel and the evidence tendered on this Application demonstrates that these types of 
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services can reduce or eliminate the incidence of violence. Finally, it is illegal under s. 
213(1)(c) to “communicate” for the purposes of prostitution and the evidence tendered on 
this Application demonstrates that the prohibition on “communication” has compelled 
sex workers to make hasty decisions without properly screening customers when working 
on the streets. (Applicants’ Memorandum of Fact and Law: 2-3) 
 
From this perspective removing the impugned provisions from the Criminal Code will allow sex 
workers to practice “their lawful business in a safe environment” (2).  
 The applicants also allege that the Supreme Court determination regarding the 
constitutionality of the communicating provision in the Prostitution Reference must be 
reconsidered in light of new evidence and a material change in circumstances (Bedford v. 
Canada 2010: 8-9). As Himel explains, in the Prostitution Reference “the entire court found that 
s. 195.1(1)(c) [now 213(1)(c)], the communicating offence, represented a prima facie 
infringement of s. 2(b) of the Charter” (19). However, the majority also found that a limitation 
of sex workers’ s. 7 rights was warranted in this case (Prostitution Reference 1990). Specifically, 
the majority determined that an infringement on sex workers’ freedom of expression “can be 
reasonably justified in a free and democratic society” (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms s. 1). For the applicants, this decision must be reconsidered because “the context in 
which this case is being heard has changed dramatically” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 21). 
According to the applicants, “in part, as a result of the serial murders of prostitutes in 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, as well as the work of advocacy groups and academics, new 
light has been shed on the violence faced by prostitutes in Canada” (Applicants’ Memorandum 
of Fact and Law: 21). Moreover, according to the applicants the normative structure of the legal 
system no longer reflects that of society. Further, the applicants hold that the communicating 
provision’s infringement on freedom of expression is unreasonable “in light of numerous 
government reports attesting to the inefficacy of the law” (9). 
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 Indeed, Himel’s decision to hear the present case rests upon the structural functionalist 
idea that normative consistency is a fundamental concern for law. Noting that “the Prostitution 
Reference is prima facie binding on this court” (19), Himel asserts that the court’s decision in 
that case should be revisited in light of changing circumstances: “In my view, the s. 1 analysis 
conducted in the Prostitution Reference ought to be revisited given the breadth of evidence that 
has been gathered over the course of the intervening twenty years. Furthermore, it may be that 
social, political, and economic assumptions underlying the Prostitution Reference are no longer 
valid today” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 23). Moreover, the decision to uphold the Criminal Code 
provisions criminalizing communicating in public for the purpose of engaging in prostitution (s. 
213 (1)(c)) and owning, operating or being an inmate of a common bawdy-house (s. 210) in the 
Prostitution Reference must be revisited in light of new research and changing conditions in 
society. Noting the Attorney General of Canada’s submission that “a lower court may only 
disregard a higher court’s decision in cases that are ‘beyond compelling’” (22), Himel decides 
that there is sufficient evidence to justify her reconsideration of the decision in the Prostitution 
Reference. Specifically, Himel accepts the applicants’ contention that Bedford v. Canada 
involves legal arguments that were not considered in the Prostitution Reference (20) and that 
there is a difference between the Bedford case, which was an “application with the benefit of a 
full factual record,” and the reference that was heard by the court in 1990 (21). Himel also 
accepts their argument that the context in which violence against sex workers is understood has 
evolved since the Prostitution Reference was heard (21).  
  The applicants’ contentions are opposed by the AG Canada and two interveners: the AG 
Ontario and the CLF and colleagues. Like the applicants, the Attorneys General of Canada and 
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Ontario and the CLF et al. invoke Parsonian notions of value consensus to support their 
arguments.  
 For the AG Canada, “prostitution entails a high level of risk for individuals who engage 
in it and significant harms to society at large” and these risks and harms “are inherent to the 
nature of the activity itself” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 9). Thus, Parliament has “decided to 
criminalize the most harmful and public emanations of prostitution” (Ibid).  According to the AG 
Canada, Canada’s prostitution laws aim to protect both prostitutes and the public: 
The prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code work together as an inter-
connected whole to prevent the harms associated with prostitution; to denounce and deter 
the most harmful and public emanations of prostitution; to protect those engaged in 
prostitution; and to reduce the societal harm that results from vulnerable youth being 
lured into prostitution and neighbourhoods being exposed to the violence, drugs and other 
harms which often accompany prostitution. (Factum of the Respondent, the Attorney 
General of Canada: 84) 
 
Moreover, removing any of the impugned provisions will place society at risk because these 
provisions work in conjunction with each other to protect its vulnerable members: 
Paragraph 212(1)(j) is intended to address the significant risks and harms to vulnerable 
women and to society at large caused by pimps living on the avails of prostitution. 
Section 210 works in conjunction with the procuring offences in s. 212 to control the 
“institutionalization and commercialization of prostitution” and the harm which is 
experienced by vulnerable persons involved in prostitution outside of public view. 
Paragraph 213(1)(c) is aimed at preventing the harms that arise from the public 
communication of the sale of sex, including community harm, influence on vulnerable 
youth, and harm to the prostitutes themselves. These offences, along with other 
prostitution-related offences in the Criminal Code, reflect Parliament’s view that 
prostitution is inherently harmful and should be discouraged wherever it is practiced. 
(Factum of the Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada: 95)   
 
Further, according to the AG Canada, prostitution is associated with physical violence, drug 
addiction, drug trafficking, organized crime and human trafficking (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 9). 
Citing law enforcement officials, the AG Canada argues that a host of harms would stem from 
decriminalizing prostitution: 
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The number of women being required to prostitute themselves would drastically increase; 
Canada would become a sex tourism destination, attracting pimps and johns; prostitution 
may become viewed as a “career choice” and families in poverty may force their 
children to prostitute themselves to provide food and shelter; competition would increase, 
resulting in decreased price and potential increases in violence; conflict and 
confrontations between prostitutes and community members would increase; it would 
“send the message that women are sexual commodities and that prostitution is harmless 
and safe or it would not be legal”; criminal offences which are associated with 
prostitution activity would increase, including increased use of drugs; and dangerous 
psychopaths and sexual predators would still find victims [original emphasis]. (Factum of 
the Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada: 86) 
 
As noted by Himel, most of the AG Ontario’s argument mirrors that of the AG Canada (Bedford 
v. Canada 2010: 9).  
 For the AG Ontario, “the physical and psychological harms experienced by prostitutes 
stem from the inherent inequality that characterizes the prostitute-customer relationship, and not 
from the Criminal Code” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 9). The AG Ontario emphasizes the need to 
interpret the legislative objectives of the impugned provisions with an understanding that they 
were intended to preserve societal values and human dignity (Ibid).  As such, while the AG 
Ontario concurs with the AG Canada regarding the objectives of the impugned provisions, he 
adds that “the prevention of harm and exploitation to prostitutes, and protection of their dignity 
as human beings” are also objectives of these laws (Factum of the Intervener, the Attorney 
General of Ontario: 199). For the AG Ontario, decriminalization “would normalize the 
exploitative conditions these prostitutes would likely continue to experience. [And] the state’s 
legitimate interest in curtailing the exposure of the public and children to prostitution would be 
impaired” (Factum of the Intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario: 108).  
 While the CLF and colleagues agree with the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario 
“that the impugned provisions are not unconstitutional from the standpoint of actual harm caused 
to prostitutes and to society” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 10), they add a moralistic component to 
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their argument. As Himel explains, for the CLF et al. “the impugned provisions are a reflection 
of society’s views, soundly rooted in interfaith morality, which is that prostitution is an act that 
offends the conscience of ordinary Canadian citizens” (Ibid).  The CLF et al. contend that 
publicly visible prostitution endangers society at large and the purpose of the impugned 
provisions is to control public prostitution: 
The communication provisions are designed to take prostitution off of the streets. It may 
still exist, but nobody should be obliged to be confronted or exposed to it. The bawdy 
house provisions similarly ensure that there is no permanent establishment where 
prostitution can take place: there can be no legitimate “place of prostitution” that can be 
frequented with regularity. The living on the avails provisions ensure that persons who 
seek to profit from prostitution as a form of business (who routinely abuse the prostitutes 
themselves) will go to jail. In short, this country has determined that prostitution can take 
place (perhaps because it cannot be stopped entirely), but Canada will not confer 
legitimacy on the practice by allowing it to take place in public. (Factum of the Christian 
Legal Fellowship, REAL Women of Canada and the Catholic Civil Rights League: 2-3; 
henceforth cited as Factum of the CLF et al.) 
 
According to the CLF and colleagues, striking down the impugned provisions “will send a signal 
to the vulnerable in society, particularly the youth, that as a last resort they can make a living by 
selling their bodies” (3).  
 Upon considering the arguments forwarded by the interest parties, Himel ruled in favour 
of the applicants, striking down the impugned provisions. Moreover, noting that “the court has 
not been called upon to decide whether there is a constitutional right to sell sex or to decide 
which policy model is better” because “that is the role of Parliament” (10), Himel ruled that the 
impugned provisions are unconstitutional. Specifically, Himel found that: 
Three provisions of the Criminal Code that seek to address facets of prostitution (living 
on the avails of prostitution, keeping a common-bawdy house and communicating in a 
public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution) are not in accord with the 
principles of fundamental justice and must be struck down. These laws, individually and 
together, force prostitutes to choose between their liberty interests and their right to 
security of the person as protected under the Charter of Rights and Freedom. (Bedford v. 
Canada 2010: 5) 
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For Himel, these laws violate section 7 of the Charter and, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Prostitution Reference, they are “not saved by s. 1 as a reasonable limit justified 
in a free and democratic society” (6). After considering the evidence tendered by interest parties 
in this case, Himel explained that “the evidence…suggests that ss. 210 and 212(1)(j) are rarely 
enforced and that s. 213(1)(c) is largely ineffective” (130). In her opinion, as it stands, the 
communicating provision “contributes to the danger faced by prostitutes” and this danger 
“greatly outweighs any harm which may be faced by other members of the public” (Ibid). As 
such, Himel ruled that the impugned provisions are of no force and effect.  
 
Conclusion 
While the law presents a Weberian inspired image of itself, closer analysis of the legal discourse 
in this case reveals an adherence to more structural functionalist notions of its function and 
purpose. This feature is likely to be particularly prevalent in the Canadian context where the 
Charter, a supposed reflection of society’s most fundamental values, is able to trump all other 
forms of law. The extent to which notions of value consensus influence contemporary Canadian 
legal arrangements is evidenced by all interest parties’ reliance on the notion of fundamental 
norms and values in their arguments to the court in the current case. In line with Durkheim and 
Parson’s theories, it appears that Canadian law is intimately connected to the social and political 
order. This image of law representing, and thus shaping society in accord with, publicly held 
values and opinions suggests that, to an extent, Canadian jurisprudence is being guided by a 
Meadian deliberative democratic model. Yet, curiously, in spite of possessing a framework for a 
truly deliberative democratic approach, Charter challenges are guided by the positivist paradigm, 
which masks the value consensus on which legal determinations rest. Common sense becomes a 
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“judicial trump card” as judges rely on assumed and implied public opinion to render their 
decisions (Beaman 2008). As noted by Valverde (1999), this process enables judges to engage in 
moral authoritarianism. While scholars such as Louie (2012) argue that legal reform requires a 
shift away from moral perspectives, to present the current case in terms of “harm reduction” 
would conceal the value consensus on which this case, and all Charter challenges, rest. Canadian 
law is based upon moral perspectives. Thus, a shift in moral perspectives is the only means by 
which legal reform can be achieved. In the next chapter I discuss the role of religious 
intervention and conventional morality in Bedford v. Canada. As will be demonstrated, in 
addition to the problems associated with using a so-called objective “risk of harm” assessment in 
rights cases, legal adherence to a Weberian-inspired image of itself also obfuscates notions of 
morality in legal discourse. 
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The Role of Religious Intervention 
The preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms itself refers to the 
“supremacy of God”, and that is in no way an accident (Factum of the CLF et al.: 4). 
This statement by the CLF and colleagues nicely captures one of the main reasons for religious 
intervention in the current debate: Canadian law was founded on Christian values. Although 
Canada is purportedly a secular society, the separation of church and state that is supposed to be 
emblematic of our liberal democracy becomes blurred by the presence of Christian values in our 
legal codes and religious intervention in legal matters. Beginning with a discussion of the role of 
conventional morality in shaping the Canadian legal tradition, this chapter explores the role of 
religious intervention in the current case. Who are these groups? Why have they been granted 
intervener status? And what do they purport to bring into the debate that would not be present in 
their absence? 
 
Conventional Morality and the Canadian Legal Tradition 
The centrality of Christian values in Canadian law is exemplified by what were originally 
considered offences against morality. From 1892 until 1953, the Criminal Code of Canada 
regulated “offences against morality” under the title “Offences Against Religion, Morals and 
Public Convenience” (Criminal Code 1892-1953). Acts such as buggery, incest, seduction, 
procurement and defilement were criminalized as offences against morality (Ibid) until 1954 
when, with the exception of procurement, they were redefined as “sexual offences” under the 
title “Sexual Offences, Public Morals and Disorderly Conduct” (Criminal Code 1954). At this 
time, procurement was moved to “Part V: Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting” (Ibid). A 
brief discussion of two of such offences against morality--sex with women who were considered 
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“mentally deficient” and the “seduction of unmarried women”-- demonstrates the extent to which 
preserving chastity overtly pervaded Canadian criminal law until the 1980s and reveals how the 
law has historically served as a tool for preserving traditional views of male and female 
sexuality. 
 Early laws prohibiting sexual relations with women considered to be “feeble-minded” 
provide an exemplar of how the law has historically served as a mechanism for regulating female 
sexuality. As Joan Sangster (2001) explains, particularly during the interwar period, eugenicists 
considered feeble-mindedness to be a cause of promiscuity: “In the interwar period especially, 
feeble-mindedness was seen as a cause of both promiscuity and prostitution, a view promoted by 
Helen MacMurchy and C.K. Clarke, leading Canadian doctors with eugenicist sympathies” (88). 
Acts legislating the sexual sterilization of “mental deficients” (see, for example, the Alberta 
“Sexual Sterilization Act” 1928) throughout Canada during the early 20th century demonstrate 
the ferocity with which the state aimed to deal with this perceived social ill. Originally section 
189 and changed to section 219 in 1906, from 1892 until 1953 the Criminal Code prohibited any 
sort of sexual relation with women who were considered “mentally deficient”:  
Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to four years’ imprisonment who 
unlawfully and carnally knows, or attempts to have unlawful carnal knowledge of, any 
female idiot or imbecile, insane or deaf and dumb woman or girl, under circumstances 
which do not amount to rape but where the offender knew or had good reason to believe, 
at the time of the offence, that the woman or girl was an idiot, or imbecile, or insane or 
deaf and dumb.  
 
 While from 1892 until 1953 sex with “feeble-minded” women was considered an offence 
against morality, this offence was redefined as a sexual offence in 1954. This change was 
accompanied by an amendment permitting sexual relations with a “feeble-minded” woman to 
whom a man was married:  
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Every male person who, under circumstances that do not amount to rape, has sexual 
intercourse with a female person 
    (a) who is not his wife, and  
    (b) who is and who he knows or has good reason to believe is feeble-minded, insane, 
or is an idiot or imbecile, 
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years. (s. 140) 
 
Although it was moved to section 148 in 1970, this section of the Criminal Code remained in 
place until it was repealed in 1982. In addition to preventing sex with “feeble-minded” women in 
order to discourage promiscuity and prostitution and to prevent these women from reproducing, 
preserving the chastity of “good women” has historically been an imperative of the laws 
governing morality.  
 Seducing women of “previously chaste character” who were under the age of 21 (at 
which point, they would have been considered spinsters if they were unmarried) was considered 
an offence against morality until the 1950s and was criminalized in a variety of contexts up until 
the 1980s. For example, from 1892 until 1954, when it was redefined as a sexual offence, the 
Criminal Code outlawed “seduction under promise of marriage”. Specifically, section 182 of the 
Criminal Code stated that “Every one, above the age of twenty-one years, is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to two years’ imprisonment, who [sic], under promise of marriage, 
seduces and has illicit connection with any unmarried female of previously chaste character 
under twenty-one years of age”. This offence of “seduction under promise of marriage” appeared 
as a sexual offence under section 144 of the Criminal Code from 1954 until 1969 and section 
152 from 1970 until it was repealed in 1987 (Criminal Code, 1954-1987). 
 Writing on the separation of religion and politics in modern Western society, Alessandro 
Ferrara (2009) identifies three different narratives of secularism: political secularism, social 
secularism, and “the phenomenological transformation of the experience of believing”. For the 
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purpose of this discussion, I will focus on political and social secularism. Political secularism is 
the most common understanding of the secular state: 
In the classical version of the separation between the state and the churches religious 
faiths are protected in their freedom to articulate revealed knowledge and paths to 
salvation, to administer the interpretation of what is holy, to regulate rituals, to infuse 
transcendence in daily life, to celebrate the bond shared by the faithful, as long as they 
never invoke support from the state’s coercive power, never pretend to turn sin into 
crime [my emphasis] and always allow their believers to change their mind and turn to 
another religion or no religion. (78)  
 
In this context, churches are free to influence social life so long as they refrain from using the 
state or any other means to impose their values on citizens. In contrast, social secularism, which 
Ferrara asserts is the logical ensuant to political secularism (79), refers to a separation between 
the church and social phenomena. In essence, political secularism refers to diminishing 
importance of religion in all facets of social life, including law, politics, education, rites of 
passage and social networks (78-9). Moreover, in politically secular societies, religious 
communities cease to influence “public life in general and become functionally specialized sub-
groups, communities of like-minded believers” (78). For the purpose of this discussion, it is 
noteworthy that in both senses of secularism there is a separation between religious influence and 
law. However, as noted by Ferrara, this is a failed ideology because “there is no doubt that 
religion has forcefully returned to the political scene” (79).  
 Indeed, globalization and increasing immigration have led some scholars to 
reconceptualize the relationship between religion and politics, arguing that modern Western 
society is more accurately characterized as post-secular (see, for example, Habermas, Blair & 
Debray 2008; Ferrara 2009).  Post-secular societies are characterized by a change of 
consciousness in which the experience of believing is understood as one existential option 
among many (Habermas et al. 2008: 21; Ferrara 2009: 80). Moreover, “in these societies, 
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religion maintains a public influence and relevance, while the secularistic certainty that religion 
will disappear worldwide in the course of modernization is losing ground” (Habermas et al. 
2008: 21). Jürgen Habermas, Tony Blair and Régis Debray (2008) attribute this shift in 
consciousness to presentations of global conflicts “as hinging on religious strife,” increasing 
participation by churches and religious organizations as “communities of interpretation” in the 
public domain—especially regarding “value conflicts requiring political regulation” such as 
abortion and euthanasia--and the immigration of “guest-workers” and refugees from highly 
traditional countries (20).  
 Yet, as noted by Ferrara (2009), rather than being viewed as rival theories, in post-secular 
societies, theism and atheism are merely perceived “as different ways of being in the world” 
(80). Although it can be argued that, as the foregoing discussion of the evolution of offences 
against morality demonstrates, there has never been a complete separation of religion and 
politics, Ferrara’s assertion that increasing globalization and immigration have altered the 
function of law in supposed liberal democracies is well taken. However, if increasing religious 
influence in the political realm is due to globalization and immigration, we should expect that 
non-Christian denominations would be playing a central role. Moreover, if globalization and 
immigration are leading to increasing religious influence in the political realm, we should expect 
non-Christian denominations to be a strong voice in Bedford v Canada. This is not the case, 
however--only Christian groups acted as interveners in this case. 
 
Religious Intervention in Bedford v. Canada 
While other interest groups, such as Maggie’s, “an organization run for and by local sex 
workers” in Toronto in order to help sex workers “live and work with safety and dignity” by 
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controlling their “own lives and destinies” (http://maggiestoronto.ca/about) were denied 
intervener status in this case, the CLF and colleagues were permitted to intervene as friends of 
the court. According to REAL Women of Canada, this intervenership was granted in spite of 
dissent from other parties:  
Originally we were denied intervenership. There was much opposition to our intervening. 
So, we had to appeal the decision not to accept us as interveners. And the judge who 
heard that appeal [Justice Himel] stated that there was a moral component to this issue 
and we had something to offer the overall understanding of the situation…it was 
determined by the judge that there was a moral component to the issue and they 
welcomed our input. So, as a consequence we were accepted as interveners because we 
had something different to present. Quite often they’ll turn people down if someone’s 
already presenting that view point. (Interview excerpt, REAL Women of Canada) 
 
Justice Himel explains that they were granted leave to intervene because “they have a real, 
substantial, and identifiable interest in the subject matter of the application and an important 
perspective different from the [other] parties” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 10). Indeed, according 
to the CLF et al., “missing from the entire debate between parties is the most important and 
obvious point of all: the laws are a reflection of society’s views, soundly rooted in interfaith 
morality, which is that prostitution is an act that that offends the conscience of ordinary citizens” 
Factum of the CLF et al.: 1). From their perspective, this is the sole basis for prohibiting 
prostitution related activities:  
Let’s face it, it’s not a violent activity as a rule…you know, now-a-days quite a few 
people think it’s consenting adults but the reason it was outlawed in the first place is 
because of a social consensus that it’s not a right thing to be doing. (Interview excerpt, 
Catholic Civil Rights League) 
 
Yet, the Attorneys General of Ontario and Canada chose not to emphasize this point because it 
was controversial:  
I guess [the government] excluded it from their position because it’s a rather sensitive 
point in our culture…prostitution not being a Canadian value, not being something 
positive that’s accepted by the general population. (Interview excerpt, REAL Women of 
Canada) 
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Prior to discussing the CLF et al.’s arguments, it is useful to understand the nature and purpose 
of these groups.  
 While the Christian Legal Fellowship (CLF) and the Catholic Civil Rights League 
(CCRL) are expressly religious organizations, REAL Women of Canada claims to be an 
interfaith, non-partisan, alternative women’s movement. According to their website, the CLF 
views legal practice as a divine calling and aims to integrate Christian faith and law: 
Christian Legal Fellowship (CLF) is a national not-for-profit, charitable organization 
founded in 1978 out of the conviction that the vocation of law is a calling from God. 
With God's calling comes the responsibility and stewardship of integrating Christian faith 
and law. As Christian lawyers, law students, legal professionals and interested friends, we 
recognize the privilege and responsibility of joining together as a national voice to affirm 
our Christian convictions.  
 
According to the CLF’s website, they intervene “primarily in issues threatening sanctity of life, 
religious freedom, the traditional family, and such other issues that serve to challenge our beliefs 
as contained in the Bible and reflected in our Statement of Faith.” Similarly, the CCRL “is a 
national lay Catholic organization committed to combating anti-Catholic defamation, working 
with the media to secure a fair hearing for Catholic positions on issues of public debate, and 
lobbying government and intervening in court challenges in support of law and policy 
compatible with a Catholic understanding of human nature and the common good.” Advocating 
for the “gift of all human life” and respect for “the intrinsic dignity of every human person”, the 
CCRL holds that “the highest norm of human life is the Divine law - eternal, objective and 
universal. This law has been revealed in its fullness in the Gospel of Jesus Christ.” Unlike the 
CLF and CCRL, REAL Women of Canada does not claim to represent a divinity. According to 
REAL Women of Canada’s website, they are an alternative women’s movement dedicated to 
preserving the traditional family: 
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Until the formation of REAL Women of Canada, there was no voice to represent the 
views of those many thousands of women who take a different point of view from that of 
the established feminist groups.  We're filling a need that has long existed….REAL 
(Realistic, Equal, Active for Life) Women of Canada, a non-partisan, inter 
denominational organization, believes the social and economic problems of women 
should be resolved by taking into consideration the effects on family life and society as a 
whole.  REAL Women believes the family is the most important unit in society, as we 
have yet to develop a better model to care for the young, protect the weak and attend the 
elderly….REAL Women speaks for women who support traditional family 
values.  Society may change, but society's need for strong, stable families remains. 
 
Clearly, whether explicitly or not, the CLF and colleagues all support Christian values and their 
views are informed by biblical teachings. As will be discussed, maintaining traditional, religious 
values concerning sexuality is central to the CLF et al.’s argument that the current legal regime 
must remain intact. Interestingly, in spite of the obvious Christian values informing these 
organizations and their arguments in the current debate, the CLF et al. hold that their position 
reflects the values of the Canadian public and it would be anti-democratic to alter laws reflecting 
the majority view.   
 The CLF et al. preface their argument on the notion of democratic inclusion of all faiths. 
Moreover, for the CLF et al. religious views must be included in the current debate because “the 
overwhelming majority of Canadians identify themselves as being religious” (Factum of the CLF 
et al.: 4). According to the CLF and colleagues, “Canada is a moral country, [t]hat morality is 
derived, in part, from religious views” (4) and “generally people view the sale of sex as immoral, 
dehumanizing and inherently wrong” (9). Evidence for their claims is founded in the fact that 
religion continues to play a central role in the social and political realms of Canadian society:  
Religion is an important aspect of modern Canadian society: 92 percent of Canadians 
have either had religious groups perform at least one rite, such as a wedding, baptism or 
funeral, in the past, or expect to turn to a religious group for such a rite in the future. As 
of 1998, more than 80 percent of Canadians asserted a belief in god. Religion has also 
shown to have influenced the political decisions of Canadians: research has consistently 
shown voting preferences to be invariably associated with religious affiliation, and that 
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this association is at least as strong as, if not stronger than, those between voting and 
other variables, such as social class or ethnicity. (7-8) 
 
Interestingly, while their arguments are prefaced on Christian views and aim to uphold laws 
infused with Christian dogma, the CLF and colleagues claim to represent the views of Canada’s 
four major religions. Noting that “early legislation focused on instilling the moral views of an 
almost exclusively Christian society into law” (6) and that “while largely Christian, Canada is no 
longer exclusively so” (8), the CLF et al. explain why prostitution is considered immoral for all 
four of Canada’s major religions: 
All four of Canada’s major religions consider prostitution to be immoral. Christianity 
teaches that expressions of human sexuality should reflect a concern for faithfulness in 
relationships, and that the proper place for such expression is marriage. As such, 
prostitution is considered immoral and dishonourable to both participants and to God. 
Judaism has consistently viewed prostitution as contemptible to morality. Both Hinduism 
and Islam recognize the need to protect marriage and the family; prostitution and other 
extramarital sexual behaviours are condemned as immoral and illicit [my emphasis]. (8-
9) 
 
It is noteworthy that in the advent of the sexual revolution and the 2005 invocation of the Civil 
Marriage Act, which legalized same sex unions in Canada, arguments for preserving the 
traditional family form continue to have a place in legal debates. While they assert that 
“Canadian laws must evolve as society evolves” (1), the CLF and colleagues place a premium on 
condemning extra-marital sexual relations. However, as noted by Ferrara (2009), “if the only 
currency used in the public arena of politics is…the reasonable ‘secular’ reasons shareable by 
believers and non-believers alike, then due to the religious nature of their most profound beliefs, 
citizens who are believers are required to go an extra hermeneutic mile…in order to formulate 
reasons that can be legitimately used in the political arena” (81-2). As such, the CLF et al. frame 
their argument using discourses of human rights and democratic principles. For the CLF and 
colleagues, striking down the impugned provisions, and thus legitimizing public prostitution, not 
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only “offends the consciousness of ordinary Canadian citizens”, but also threatens Canada’s 
democratic system: “The Laws [sic] prohibit conduct that attacks the dignity of the victims of 
prostitution and defines acts that are inappropriate in public. The state has a duty and legitimate 
interest in enforcing these prohibitions to protect values that are integral to a free and democratic 
society” (Factum of the CLF et al.: 17).   
 Given the emphasis on democratic inclusion in the CLF et al.’s account, it is useful to 
consider interest parties’ positions on the role of conventional morality in the current case. While 
Canadian law is informed by the Christian values it was designed to reflect, the legal system and 
judicial decision making processes are supposed to be guided by objectivity and impartiality. 
Thus, the role of legal moralism in the current debate must be taken into consideration.  Is 
enforcing Christian values still a valid legal objective? If not, what is the current function of law? 
As recommended by Jane Scoular (2010), rather than focusing on its purported method, it is 
helpful to look at how the law works in practice when issues associated with female sexuality are 
in question—what exactly does law do in this context?  
 
The Role of Legal Moralism 
All interest parties in the debate attempt to negotiate the role of legal moralism. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines moralism as follows: “Natural system of morality, religion reduced to 
moral practice.” As the present discussion demonstrates, analyzing interest parties’ positions on 
this issue provides a starting point for assessing what law is doing in the present context. Judicial 
definitions of legal moralism and attempts by the judiciary to distinguish it from paternalism are 
ambiguous, leading to significant controversy over the role of conventional morality in Canadian 
law. Beginning with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s attempts to define legal  moralism and 
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to distinguish it from paternalism provides a backdrop for understanding interest parties’ 
interpretations of what constitutes legally moralistic legislation and its role in Canadian law. 
Further, analyzing interest parties’ positions on the issue reveals their conception of the function 
of law in Canadian society.  
 In contrast to law’s official version, legal moralism refers to the belief that certain 
behaviours should be prohibited under the laws because they are morally wrong and degrading 
(Dworkin 2005). Writing for the majority in R. v. Butler, Supreme Court Justice Sopinka J. offers 
a similar definition of legal moralism: 
To impose a certain standard of public and sexual morality, solely because it reflects the 
conventions of a given community, is inimical to the exercise and enjoyment of 
individual freedoms, which form the basis of our social contract. D. Dyzenhaus, 
“Obscenity and the Charter: Autonomy and Equality” (1991), 1 C.R. (4th) 367, at p. 370, 
refers to this as “legal moralism”, of a majority deciding what values should inform 
individual lives and then coercively imposing those values on minorities. The prevention 
of “dirt for dirt's sake” is not a legitimate objective which would justify the violation of 
one of the most fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Charter. (R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S. 
C. R. 452: 48)  
 
As noted by Gerald Dworkin (2005), it is not always easy to distinguish between legal moralism 
and paternalism, the latter being the notion that certain behaviours that are considered immoral 
and degrading must be prohibited in order to protect those who engage in them. However, it 
appears that in Butler the Supreme Court rejects Durkheim’s mechanistic laws. Reinforcing 
notions of the separation of powers, this refutation of legal moralism as a legitimate legal 
objective suggests that while the political realm is democratic, the legal realm is not.  In his 
article, “Legal Moralism Reconsidered”, Carl Cranor (1979) notes that legally moralistic 
arguments generally take three different forms: that the immorality of the act is a sufficient 
condition for criminalization, that the immorality of the act is a necessary, but insufficient, 
condition for criminalization, and that the act must be criminalized because “the or a function of 
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the criminal law is to enforce community morality [original emphasis]” (147). Echoing Cranor’s 
assertion, Lars O’Ericsson (1980) identifies two common charges against prostitution from 
conventional morality: 
The prostitute, according to the moralist, is a sinful creature who ought to be banned from 
civilized society. Whoredom is “the great social evil” representing a flagrant defiance of 
common decency. The harlot is a threat to the family, and she corrupts the young. To 
engage in prostitution signifies a total loss of character. To choose “the life” is to choose 
a style of living unworthy of any decent human being. And so on. There is also a less 
crude form of moralism, which mixes moral disapproval with a more “compassionate” 
and “concerned” attitude. The fate of the whore is “a fate worse than death.” The hustler 
is a poor creature who has to debase herself in order to gratify the lusts of immoral men. 
Prostitution is degrading for all parties involved, but especially for women (337).  
 
Whereas the first charge against prostitution outlined by O’Ericsson is clearly in line with 
definitions of legal moralism, the second charge he identifies illuminates the difficulty associated 
with distinguishing between legal moralism and paternalism noted by Dworkin. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to clarify the distinction between these two modes of 
governance. According to the majority in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R v. Caine:  
The protection of vulnerable groups from self-inflicted harms does not, as Caine argues, 
amount to no more than “legal moralism”. Morality has traditionally been identified as a 
legitimate concern of the criminal law (Labatt Breweries, supra, at p. 933) although 
today this does not include mere “conventional standards of propriety” but must be 
understood as referring to societal values beyond the simply prurient or prudish:  Butler, 
supra, at p. 498; R. v. Murdock (2003), 11 C.R. (6th) 43 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 32.  ([2003] 
3 S. C. R. 571, 2003 SCC 74, at ¶ 77). 
 
According to the Supreme Court, “prudishness” is a determining factor in deciding the role of 
morality as a valid legislative objective. Moral arguments based on prudish notions are 
insufficient and considered tantamount to legal moralism while moral arguments extending 
beyond prudish notions are worthy of consideration—these arguments are paternalistic. Of 
course, it is not clear what subject matter would be considered “prudish” or “beyond prudish”. 
One would guess that in the face of weak criterion to operationalize this, it would be the subject 
Lucky 81 
 
of much contested negotiation. Specifically, while mere prudishness is not a sufficient argument 
for upholding a law, the legislation is entitled to assume a paternalistic role in order to protect 
vulnerable citizens on grounds of morality extending beyond “conventional standards of 
propriety”. This is striking in light of the above mentioned determination that coercively 
imposing the values of a majority upon the individual lives of a minority undermines our social 
contract (R. v. Butler 1992: 48).  
 Additionally, it appears that the alleged harm must affect unwilling participants for state 
intervention to be permitted. Moreover, according to the majority in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R.  v. 
Caine, in cases where the alleged harm is inflicted upon both participants and wider society, the 
state has a legitimate concern and may prohibit the allegedly harmful conduct: “In our view, the 
control of a ‘psychoactive drug’ that ‘causes alteration of mental function’ clearly raises issues of 
public health and safety, both for the user as well as for those in the broader society affected by 
his or her conduct. The use of marihuana is therefore a proper subject matter for the exercise of 
the criminal law power” (2003, at ¶ 77 & 78). This explanation contradicts the above mentioned 
determination that under certain conditions the state has a right to prohibit conduct for the 
purpose of protecting vulnerable groups from self-inflicted harm. Moreover, this definition casts 
law in line with Durkheim’s notion of restitutive law, which he argues is characteristic of modern 
societies. Given the debatable nature of what distinguishes legal moralism from paternalism, it is 
not surprising that this is highly contested in the current case. 
 For the applicants, the impugned provisions and their objectives must be recast in terms 
of harm-based considerations (Applicants’ Memorandum of Fact and Law: 243). Moreover, “the 
sex trade offences must be justified on the basis of social harm and not on the basis of a moral 
objection to the trade itself” (Ibid). Asserting that “it is no longer considered constitutionally 
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valid to justify criminal law on the basis of ‘legal moralism’” (243), the applicants argue that 
moral assessments of prostitution should not be considered in the present case: 
It is respectfully submitted that the impugned provisions cannot be grounded or justified 
upon the basis of an evaluation of the moral worth of the act of selling sexual services. 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has concluded that Parliament can validly take 
action to protect and preserve “core values”, in the modern era it no longer has authority 
to enact laws based solely on the values of a moral majority. (208) 
 
In line with Weber’s (1914) assertions, the applicants hold that religious values have no place in 
modern law—while it is valid to legislate on the basis of rational values, legislating on the basis 
of irrational or religious values is not. Moreover, as Sopinka J. explains in Butler, “core values” 
are those that extend beyond “the [moral] conventions of a given community” (1992: 48). Of 
course, this begs the question, what if “core values” are based on “conventional notions of 
society”, thus reflecting the moral conventions of a given community? In addition to citing 
Sopinka J.’s aforementioned assertion in Butler, the applicants offer an example to clarify how 
the courts must consider prostitution related provisions in the modern era: 
The rejection of legal moralism can be seen most clearly in the dramatic re-fashioning of 
the elements of the offence of “keep common bawdy house for the purpose of indecency” 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2005. With respect to the question of whether a “sex 
club” for “swingers” can be characterized as a bawdy house, the Court replaced the 
traditional “community standards” test for determining indecency with a harm-based test 
grounded in secular values. (Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 209) 
 
Accordingly, the applicants rely on R. v. Labaye to demonstrate how the courts should establish 
whether or not conduct results in social harm. In Labaye, the majority of the Supreme Court 
defines social harm as conduct that is incompatible with society’s proper functioning and offers 
guidance for establishing which conduct falls into this category: 
Incompatibility with the proper functioning of society is more than a test of tolerance. 
The question is not what individuals or the community think about the conduct, but 
whether permitting it engages a harm that threatens the basic functioning of our society. 
This ensures in part that the harm be related to a formally recognized value, at step one. 
But beyond this it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct, not only by 
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its nature but also in degree, rises to the level of threatening the proper functioning of our 
society. (R. v. Labaye, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728, 2005 SCC 80: 28).  
  
Echoing Durkheim’s (1893) definition of penal or repressive law, the majority in Labaye holds 
that conduct threatening the collective consciousness must be criminalized. Moreover, an act 
must be injurious to the entire collective for it to be considered criminal (Comack 2006: 27). As 
noted by Comack (2006), Durkheim holds that all crimes consist of “acts universally 
disapproved of by members of society” (as cited: 27), inspiring structural functionalist 
assumptions that the primary function of the state is to ensure individual conformity to the 
normative system (27). Additionally, the Supreme Court of Canada identifies the conditions 
under which sexual activity can be considered “incompatible with the proper functioning of 
society”: in cases of harm based on threats to autonomy and liberty “arising from unwanted 
confrontation by a particular kind of sexual conduct,” the crown must establish a real risk to 
persons other than willing participants; in cases of harm based on predisposing others to anti-
social conduct, concrete evidence that anti-social behaviour stems from the linkage between the 
sexual conduct at issue and negative attitudes and between those attitudes and anti-social conduct 
must be provided; and in cases based on physical or psychological harm to participants, the 
crown must establish that injury has occurred or that there is a real risk that it will occur (R. v. 
Labaye 2005: 29). Caution must be taken to avoid mistaking disgust with psychological harm 
(Ibid). As mentioned, “risk of harm” acts as a joker card in legal arenas (Valverde 1999: 184) 
and common sense operates as a judicial trump card in cases where positivistic measures fail to 
provide resolutions (Beaman 2008: 90). For the applicants, this demonstrates that the arguments 
forwarded by other interest parties amount to legal moralism and should not be considered valid. 
 Conversely, the CLF and colleagues argue that morality continues to be the basis of 
criminal law. Asserting that “the Applicants’ argument that legal moralism has been rejected by 
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the courts is simply wrong” (20), the CLF et al. hold that “morality is recognized as a legitimate 
public purpose of criminal law” and that “the notions of moral corruption and harm to society are 
inextricably linked” (Factum of the CLF et al.: 18). Moreover, acts that conflict with public 
morals are harmful to society’s proper functioning and criminalizing these activities is a valid 
legislative objective: 
Parliament enforces this social morality by enacting statutory norms in legislation, such 
as the Criminal Code. Morality is conveyed by means of provisions that demand that 
each individual case be assessed in light of its specific context and circumstances to 
gauge Canadians’ tolerance for the acts in question. Harm is thus linked to a concept of 
social morality. There is also harm where what is acceptable to the community in terms 
of the public morals is compromised. The purpose of the Laws is not to legislate on the 
basis of a “particular”, fleeting or prudish conception of morality, but rather on the basis 
of fundamental conceptions, which are integral to promoting and protecting our values in 
Canadian society. (19) 
 
In Weberian terms, this implies that the Canadian legal system is a substantive rational system, 
in which cases are assessed in light of their individual circumstances as well as prevailing 
notions of justice and the decision making process is informed by rules “from some extralegal 
source such as religion or a particular ideology” (Grana & Ollenburger 1999: 41). Similarly, this 
definition falls in line with what Durkheim (1893) conceptualizes as law based on collective 
emotion or tradition, which he argues is most characteristic of less developed societies (165). For 
the CLF and colleagues, some moral values are so firmly entrenched in our society that they 
justify a legally moralistic approach.  
 The CLF and colleagues refute the applicants’ interpretation of Labaye, explaining that 
“while the Supreme Court in Labaye adopted a harm-based analysis, it also made clear that 
social values do have a role to play in the analysis [original emphasis]” (Factum of the CLF et 
al.: 20). Moreover, for the CLF and colleagues, tolerance does factor into evaluations of 
compatibility with society’s proper functioning: “To ground a finding that acts are indecent, the 
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harm must be shown to be related to a fundamental value reflected in our society’s Constitution 
or similar fundamental laws, which constitutes society’s formal recognition that harm of the sort 
envisaged may be incompatible with its proper functioning [original emphasis]” (Ibid). It is 
noteworthy that while both the applicants and the CLF et al. take a Durkheimian or structural 
functionalist approach to law, they use this approach to justify oppositional stances. Whereas for 
the applicants this demonstrates the invalidity of legally moralistic legislation, for the CLF and 
colleagues this justifies a legally moralistic approach. According to the CLF et al., social 
abhorrence of prostitution is a fundamental value and the Supreme Court of Canada has 
acknowledged this fact: 
In their factum, the Applicants take pains to argue that mere moral assertions cannot 
sustain a law. They are right, in part. Mere prudish sensibilities cannot be invoked to 
justify a law that threatens the life, liberty, or security of the person of Canadians. Mere 
“moral views” with respect to the place of women in the 1950s, or ethnic minorities 
before that, obviously have evolved today, and Canadian law must evolve as society 
evolves. But there are certain core values—values that are so entrenched in society—that 
can, should, and must be valid objectives underlying the laws. There is such a thing as 
“right” and “wrong” and the criminal law properly reflects and enforces those views. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has been clear that there is no requirement that the criminal 
law only punish those acts that directly “harm” other persons. The Supreme Court has 
stated that it is legitimate, and entirely constitutional, to punish those acts that society 
views as being immoral, or inherently wrong, where that moral view is rooted in 
legitimate and fundamental concepts that are otherwise compatible with Charter values. 
That is the case here [my emphasis]. (Factum of the CLF et al.: 1-2) 
 
In contrast to notions that modern law must be rational and objective, this definition of what 
constitutes legitimate criminalization is highly subjective. Once again, this suggests that 
Canadian law is grounded in what Durkheim refers to as laws reflecting collective emotions or 
custom. As aforementioned, for Durkheim, rather than penalizing conduct that is harmful to 
society, these laws solely prohibit conduct that undermines social cohesion and are characteristic 
of highly segmented social arrangements.  
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 Interestingly, for the CLF and colleagues, the fundamentality of the values underlying 
Canada’s prostitution related Criminal Code provisions is akin to the fundamental nature of the 
values reflected in laws against rape and murder. As the CLF et al. explain: 
The social prohibition on murder and rape are fundamental values that do not change 
over time, and are thus codified in the criminal law as fundamental concepts of morality. 
In the same way, the disapproval of soliciting prostitution, keeping a common bawdy 
house or pimping because of the social and physical harms these acts cause society are 
fundamental conceptions, and thus underlie the objectives of the Laws. (19) 
 
However, far from reflecting fundamental values, our current rape laws reflect years of feminist 
struggle to remove dogmatic beliefs from legislation. For example, prior to 1983 a husband could 
not be charged with raping his wife and proof of vaginal penetration was a requirement in rape 
cases (Busby 2006: 265). Further, as noted by Karen Busby (2006), “until 1985, sexual offences 
against children focused on whether the complainant was ‘of previously chaste character’ and 
applied, in most cases, only to females” (265). Additionally, it is irrational to argue that 
prohibitions against rape and murder are based solely on societal values because these acts pose 
obvious harms to unwilling participants.  
 The AG Ontario concurs with the applicants’ assertion that legal moralism has no place 
in criminal law but, in line with the CLF et al., argues that enforcing moral values is a valid 
legislative objective. Moreover, according to the AG Ontario, while “as noted by the Applicants 
in R. v. Butler, the Supreme Court of Canada did conclude that moral legalism had no place in 
criminal law” (87), “in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated 
that reliance on moral values does not necessarily descend into legal moralism” (Factum of the 
Intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario: 88). Asserting that “the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court of Canada…makes it clear that respect for human dignity is one of our society’s 
core values and it is permissible for Parliament to legislate to protect that value” (91), the AG 
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Ontario argues that “prevention of harm and exploitation of prostitutes, and protection of their 
dignity as human beings, continue to be valid constitutional objectives of the bawdy house 
provisions, and, indeed, the other impugned provisions” (90). Citing the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Mara and Labaye, the AG Ontario posits that prostitution infringes on the 
fundamental value of human dignity and thus must be prohibited by law: 
In Mara the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that it is an appropriate use of the 
criminal law to address conduct which publicly portrays individuals in a servile and 
humiliating, undignified manner, as sexual objects. This type of portrayal is incompatible 
with the recognition of the dignity of each human being. The Subsequent case of R. v. 
Labaye builds on the principles set out in Butler and Mara. The Court clarifies that three 
types of social harm are legitimately addressed by the criminal law and captured under 
the indecency provisions: (1) harm to those whose autonomy and liberty may be 
restricted by being confronted with inappropriate conduct; (2) harm to society by 
predisposing others to antisocial conduct; and (3) harm to individuals participating in the 
conduct. These same harms arise out of the public display of prostitution. (89) 
 
Moreover, for the AG Ontario, public displays of prostitution cause harm to both participants and 
to wider society by undermining human dignity, which is a fundamental value. Like the 
applicants and the CLF et al., for the AG Ontario, as Durkheim would argue, Canadian law is 
central in upholding collectively shared values and punishing those who threaten these values. 
 In contrast to other interest parties, the AG Canada does not entertain a discussion of 
morality in his factum. Assuming a paternalistic position, the AG Canada explains that, rather 
than being an issue of legal moralism or the validity of legislating moral values, “the issue is 
whether there is a ‘reasoned apprehension of harm’ beyond the de minimis range [original 
emphasis]” (Factum of the Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada: 108). Noting that “the 
harms targeted by the challenged offences constitute a legitimate state interest in criminalizing 
the most harmful public emanations of prostitution” (108), the AG Canada asserts that “the state 
interest in protecting against harms is legitimate where the harm is beyond the de minimis range 
or is not insignificant or trivial” (110). In contrast to other interest parties’ assertions that 
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preventing harm to the wider public may be a valid legislative objective, for the AG Canada, this 
harm need not affect anyone other than participants: “The Supreme Court in Malmo-
Levine…held that the principles of fundamental justice do not include the so-called “harm” 
principle, namely, that the law should only prohibit conduct that harms persons other than the 
accused. Rather, the criminal law may be used to protect legitimate state interests other than the 
avoidance of harm to others [original emphasis]” (110). Elaborating on this point, the AG 
Canada asserts that prohibiting conduct offending the public conscience is a valid legislative 
objective: 
In addition to the avoidance of harm to others, the criminal law may also legitimately 
address conduct that “affects the public”, or that constitutes “a wrong against the public 
welfare”, or is “injurious to the public”, or that “affects the community”. The law may 
also legitimately criminalize conduct “that causes harm only to the accused”. The 
Applicants may consider this “paternalistic”, but the Supreme Court has confirmed that 
this objection “does not go to the validity of prohibiting the underlying conduct” [original 
emphasis]. (110-111)  
 
Moreover, for the AG Canada protecting the public and participants from the harms stemming 
from public displays of prostitution is a valid legislative objective. While not purportedly 
enforcing moral standards, clearly the AG Canada supports the notion that the impugned 
provisions are informed by moral values, as evidenced by his defence of the laws even if they are 
considered merely paternalistic.  
 
Conclusion 
Fuelled by the ambiguity in Supreme Court definitions of legal moralism and attempts to 
distinguish it from paternalism, interest parties’ positions on what constitutes valid legislative 
objectives provide an interesting starting point for understanding their positions in the current 
debate. Moreover, in their attempts to negotiate the role of legal moralism in the current case 
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interest parties implicitly offer their perspectives on the state of the Canadian legal system. 
Although their reliance on precedent cases and rules of procedure suggest that all interest parties 
view the Canadian legal system as formal and rational, they part ways when discussing the 
purpose of the impugned provisions. Whereas the applicants’ interpretation of the purpose of the 
impugned provisions is in line with Weberian notions of formal rational legal systems the CLF et 
al. and the Attorneys General of Ontario and Canada believe that the law’s purpose is to maintain 
social cohesion and uphold moral values.  
 Indeed, in contrast to Louie’s (2012) argument that reducing harm to sex workers while 
respecting their liberty right requires a shift away from strictly moral perspectives to more 
objective measures such as harm reduction, the current case centres on collective values and 
notions of social cohesion. Moreover, upholding liberty rights in the Canadian context means 
upholding core Charter values, which are a reflection of the moral values held by Canadian 
citizens. Canadian law was founded on Christian values, creating a space for religious 
intervention in cases of a purportedly secular nature. Yet, analyzing the role of legal moralism in 
the Canadian context reveals that morality in the contemporary Canadian legal arena takes on a 
much broader meaning. Moreover, in the contemporary Canadian context, legal moralism refers 
to the “core values” of the majority of the Canadian public. In this sense, morality refers to the 
collectively held values enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, without 
which the current challenge to Canada’s prostitution laws would not be possible. As mentioned, 
the courts have a prima facie obligation to uphold the collective values enshrined in the Charter. 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is capable of overriding any laws and legal 
precedent which are not consistent with its provisions, as evidenced by the necessity of invoking 
the Charter in order to challenge established legal codes and the need for courts to revisit legal 
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precedent in order to assess whether or not it is still a reflection of our collective values. Clearly, 
moral values are central features of law and legal reform in the Canadian context. The applicants 
contend that the impugned provisions must be recast in terms of harm-based considerations and 
Louie concurs. But casting Charter challenges in terms of risk of harm disguises the value-laden 
nature of judicial determinations in cases involving social values (Valverde 1999; Beaman 
2008). While Louie’s contention that Canada’s prostitution laws are in need of reform is well 
taken, this reform must be achieved by demonstrating changes in the values of the Canadian 
public in order for it to be in line with the foundation of the Canadian legal structure. It is 
important to note that arguing that the moral values of the Canadian public ought to be the 
driving force behind legal reform is not a call for a strictly Christian sense of morality to guide 
discussions of this sort. In line with Mead’s vision, this should be a deliberatively democratic 
approach, ensuring that all relevant voices are given equal standing in debates in which our 
collective values are in question (Carriera da Silva 2008). Given findings that the majority of 
Canadians feel that Canada’s prostitution laws are unconstitutional (Lowman and Louie 2012), 
adhering to the cornerstones of the Canadian legal tradition promises to bring about the changes 
sought by the applicants.  
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The Role of Expert Witnesses 
If the “experts” are experts, why do they disagree? (Hoffman 1996: 81) 
In the last few decades, the law has become increasingly reliant upon science to resolve the 
disputes that come before the courts. This point has been noted by judges and academics alike. 
As Justice Doherty J. A. explains: “the increased reliance on expert opinion evidence by both the 
Crown and defence in criminal matters is evident upon a cursory review of the reported 
cases….Expert evidence is particularly prevalent where inferences must be drawn from a wide 
variety of human behaviour” (R. v. Abbey 2009: 32). Similarly, Sheila Jasanoff (1999) argues 
that the institutions of law and science have become so thoroughly enmeshed that “the law is 
now an inescapable feature of the conditioning environment that produces socially 
embedded…science” (762). This increasing reliance has led to a wealth of scholarly work on the 
relationship between law and science; academics from a host of persuasions have explored the 
interactions between these two institutions from a variety of angles. Perhaps because it is the 
most common locus of interaction between science and law, the majority of scholarly work on 
the relationship between these institutions focuses on interactions between law and natural 
science in criminal cases and tort litigation (see, for example, Schuck 1993; Goodstein 2000; 
Jasanoff 2002; Winiecki 2008; Haack 2009; Kristzer 2009; and Sanders 2009). Further, the bulk 
of these analyses focus on the interactions between law and science in American courts.  
 Many of the insights stemming from analyses of natural science and law in criminal cases 
and tort litigation offer legal practitioners and scientists a basis for establishing a better 
understanding of how the other works. Yet, as noted by Jasanoff (1999), most literature on the 
interactions between law and science remains polarized—for the most part, lawyers have 
analyzed the legal side of this relationship while scientists have analyzed the scientific side 
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(767). While these endeavours have produced useful starting points for understanding the nature 
of the relationship between law and science, by neglecting to probe into the other’s “claims 
concerning the authority of their respective epistemic and normative practices” each institution 
reinforces the others’ status (768). This has been the central focus of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) analyses. STS scholars have focused on what Jasanoff refers to as the co-
production framework; these constructivist accounts emphasize the cooperative effort between 
law and science to construct and reinforce dominant social understandings of expertise, evidence 
and, more generally, how society functions (772). As a result, “science studies...continues to 
function as an agnostic field, in which analytic prowess and disciplinary insight by no means 
suffice to ensure that STS insights and findings will circulate to audiences outside the field” 
(780). As noted by Jasanoff, accounts of interactions between law and science that 
simultaneously attempt to destabilize the authority of legal rule-making and the authority of 
scientific fact-making will benefit both science studies and the law (774). Further, analyses of 
interactions between social science and law, which are sparse at present, have potential to offer 
novel insight to the current conversation.  
 Analyzing interactions between social science and law is necessary because social 
scientists are increasingly being called upon to assist the courts, particularly in cases involving 
Charter challenges. While social science experts, especially sociologists, seldom interacted with 
the legal system until the 1990s and even then sociology maintained “a rather low status in the 
legally defined pecking order of knowledges” (Valverde 1996: 204-5), courts are increasingly 
relying on evidence from social scientists regarding a range of subject matters. As noted by 
Mariana Valverde (1996), whereas prior to the late 1980s courts tended to turn to psychologists 
when social scientific evidence was necessary to assist the court in resolving conflicts, the 
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Supreme Court of Canada’s recognition of “systemic” discrimination in the 1989 Andrews case 
“opened the door for sociological expertise” (204). The extent to which legal reliance on social 
science experts has increased in the wake of these changes is demonstrated by a key term search 
of provincial and federal cases and tribunals for “social science experts” on the Canadian Legal 
Information Institute’s website (www.canlii.org). Whereas this search yields only 67 results for 
the decade from 1980-1990, 521 results appear for the decade from 1990-2000 and a search of 
the last decade yields over 1800 results. Given this increase, understanding how the law 
constructs social science in cases where social science expert witnesses come before the courts is 
a useful line of inquiry. And exploring how legal actors in the Bedford case construct the role of 
expert witnesses is a starting point for assessing interest parties’ constructions of the situation 
currently facing Canadian sex workers.  
 Academics were granted status positions, as experts, in the court room, giving their 
evidence more weight than the evidence presented by sex workers in Bedford v. Canada. While 
the applicants were permitted to share their experiences and perceptions of the sex trade with the 
court and both sides of the debate submitted affidavits from other sex workers or “experiential 
witnesses”, these accounts were not the focus of the proceedings. Moreover, the accounts of 
“experiential witnesses” were intended to provide “corroborative voices” and to challenge the 
accounts of “experiential witnesses” proffered by the other side while the accounts of “the 
experts” were intended to assist the court in rendering a decision on the issue (Bedford v. Canada 
2010). Should this have been the case? Is privileging the accounts of social science researchers 
over those of sex workers warranted in a case concerning the constitutional rights of individuals 
who sell sex? As noted by Valverde (1996), “in order to achieve legal existence [social] 
movements need first of all to reduce themselves either to individuals fighting individual cases or 
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to groups seeking intervenor [sic] status. Then, these necessarily unrepresentative representatives 
of movements have to find themselves a legal voice by securing sympathetic lawyers and 
sympathetic ‘expert’ witnesses” (213). In addition to obfuscating the real nature of these legal 
proceedings, this process obscures our understanding of the role of expert witnesses in these 
cases. This is particularly true in the Bedford case where sociologists who are part of competing 
social movements regarding sex work were called in to provide the sex workers with a legal 
voice. As will be discussed in chapter 6, in line with the accounts presented by sex workers in 
this case, the expert witnesses presented diametrically opposed positions on the issue. The 
positions taken by expert witnesses in the Bedford case are partly due to the adversarial nature of 
legal proceedings and partly the result of the current state of sociological research on the sex 
trade (Weitzer 2009b). In this sense, the evidence presented by expert witnesses does not differ 
from that which is offered by “experiential witnesses” in Bedford v. Canada. Prior to analyzing 
the arguments forwarded by interest parties in this case, it is necessary to understand legal 
constructions of the role of expert witnesses in court.  Thus, in this chapter I analyze how the law 
constructs expertise and the role of expert witnesses. Exploring legal constructions of expertise 
and the role of expert witnesses while drawing on insights from STS illuminates the performative 
nature of expertise and how law’s incessant recourse to constructed binaries works to subvert the 
social movements for whom academic claims are being made in rights cases.  
 
Expert versus Lay Knowledge 
Legal accounts offer a concrete definition of expertise, privileging it over other ways of 
knowing. According to legal accounts, expertise is the acquisition of “special or peculiar 
knowledge through study” (R. v. Mohan [1994] 2 S. C. R. 9: 21), which enables individuals to 
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provide opinions that “a person of ordinary experience and intelligence would not be able to 
form…based on the same set of circumstances” (O’Melia 1991: 7). Thus, while the current and 
former sex workers who offered testimony in this case are considered lay witnesses and were 
only permitted to provide “fact evidence” for the judge’s consideration, the academic witnesses 
in this case were permitted to provide opinions to assist the judge with her decision making 
process (Bedford v. Canada 2010). As Steven O’Melia (1991) explains:  
Unlike ordinary ‘lay’ witnesses, the expert witness is called not to testify with respect to 
the factual background of an action but rather to provide an opinion with respect to those 
facts which will help the judge, jury or tribunal reach its conclusion. The ability of an 
expert witness to provide evidence in connection with a factual situation with which they 
had no connection is thus a major exception to the hearsay rule, which generally provides 
that indirect evidence may not be led to support the truth of the matter asserted. Expert 
evidence is by definition an opinion only, based on facts which have been provided by a 
first-hand examination by the expert, by listening to the testimony of lay witnesses who 
are familiar with the facts of the case, or by responding to a hypothetical fact situation.  
(1) 
 
Expert witnesses are granted status over other witnesses because they are expected to provide 
insights that others cannot. Moreover, legal definitions of expertise distinguish expert knowledge 
from common sense: “expert evidence is necessary only where the judge or jury would not be 
able to form an adequate opinion based solely upon their own knowledge. Expert evidence is 
inadmissible in cases where only a common-sense or otherwise non-expert opinion is necessary” 
(O’Melia 1991: 2). Thus, in line with Beaman’s (2008) contention that common sense is a 
judicial trump card to resolve apparently intractable cases (90), common sense is invoked as an 
objective measure in determinations of the admissibility of expert evidence. Moreover, 
sociological expertise is called upon to help judges establish “common sense” understandings 
where positivistic measures cannot provide answers. Indeed, as noted by Valverde (1996), 
sociology is only brought into court proceedings in cases where there is no consensus on the 
issue(s): 
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If one analyzes in some detail the specific ways in which sociological expertise plays out 
in legal arenas, it becomes clear that the law’s increasing recourse to sociology is due not 
to that discipline’s inherent virtues but rather to the fact that there is no longer a 
consensus either among the public at large or within law about a series of social issues 
impinging directly on the law’s work. (206) 
 
This was certainly the case in Bedford v. Canada. As noted by Himel, “the only consensus that 
exists is that there is no consensus on the issue” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 5). Thus, Himel relied 
on the evidence proffered by expert witnesses to establish a common sense understanding of the 
situation in order to render her decision.  
 Yet, deeper analysis of how expert witnesses come before the courts and the role that law 
constructs for the expert witnesses suggests that the structure of  Canadian legal proceedings 
prevents experts from fulfilling the duty that law has carved out for them. Specifically, just as 
legal adherence to positivist myths obfuscates our understanding of political action (Diduck and 
Wilson 1998: 507), it obscures our understanding of what expert witnesses contribute to rights 
cases. Rather than providing objective evidence to assist the judge in his/her decision making 
process, social science is a means by which the claims of social movements gain legal standing. 
Expert witnesses act as vessels through which these claims are transformed into the language of 
law, mutating lived experiences into legal categories and solidifying binary distinctions between 
the knowledge they possess and that of the individuals they are representing. As Valverde (1996) 
asserts, “while the position of the sociologist within law can be studied and found to be 
subordinate, the position of social movements within law is even more subordinate, despite the 
fact that without the movements’ political effectivity there would be no experts on social 
inequality in the first place” (212).  
  Challenging binary distinctions between lay and expert knowledge, research from STS 
draws attention to the performative nature of expertise and the need for a more inclusive 
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approach to participation in decision making processes. As noted by Robert Evans and Harry 
Collins (1999):  
[O]ne of the most important outcomes of STS work has been to highlight the expertise 
and knowledge that exists outside of the mainstream scientific community. As a result, 
we now know that expertise is often partial, that experts frequently emphasize some 
aspects of a problem but overlook others, and that, even if we could find the right experts, 
they may not have answers. (609) 
 
For Evans and Collins, while experts might be best suited to decide certain matters of fact, value 
judgements about how the knowledge of experts is to be used are better left to lay citizens (623). 
According to STS accounts, expertise is enacted and maintained through boundary work (610). 
Moreover, communities of individuals must agree upon what counts as competent performances 
of expertise because expertise is shared, transmitted and validated by the community (Ibid). As 
noted by Evans and Collins, “knowledge is acquired by socialization, so expertise is acquired 
through a prolonged period of interaction within the relevant community and is revealed through 
the quality of those interactions” (620). From this perspective, expertise must be 
reconceptualized as “a continuum of knowledge states, ranging from ignorance to complete 
expertise” (Ibid). Evans and Collins propose an approach to expertise that accounts for how 
different types of expertise are distributed as individuals move between states in this continuum: 
[S]ome sorts of expertise (e.g., speaking and writing a natural language) will be so widely 
distributed as to be ubiquitous. Others, like milking cows or growing stem cells, will be 
restricted to such small groups that they are seen as esoteric expertises. Similarly, while 
some expertise will be about substantive domains, other kinds of expertise might operate 
at a meta level, providing the criteria and skills needed to make judgements about the 
expertise held by others. (Ibid) 
 
Specialist expertises range from ubiquitous tacit knowledge (such as knowing standardized facts, 
popular understandings and primary source knowledge such as the knowledge gleaned from 
written works on the topic) to specialist tacit knowledge (such as what Evans and Collins refer to 
as “interactional expertise” and “contributory expertise”) (621). Whereas both interactional and 
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contributory expertise “rest on tacit knowledge specific to the group in question,” a distinction 
must be drawn between individuals who are able to speak fluently about a domain of expertise 
(interactional experts) and those who are able to contribute to it (contributory experts) (Ibid). 
Moreover, individuals possessing interactional expertise are able to speak fluently about a 
domain of expertise and thus pass as native members of the community but “contributory 
expertise signifies that a person has both the conceptual and practical expertise held by the 
group” (Ibid). Meta-expertises enable individuals to “make judgements about the substantive 
expertise of others” and consist of “internal” expertise (such as technical connoisseurship, 
downward discrimination and referred expertise) and “external” expertise (such as ubiquitous 
and local discriminations) (Ibid). According to Evans and Collins, whereas “internal meta-
expertise denotes those judgements that require some kind of socialization within the 
community” external meta-expertise represents judgements that are possible in the absence of 
being socialized in the relevant community of experts (621-2). As noted by Evans and Collins, 
while lay citizens do not possess the esoteric knowledge required to be considered experts in 
specialist fields and decide matters of fact, their lack of membership in these communities makes 
them the best candidates to decide what should be done with the knowledge of experts: “lay 
participation [in deliberative and participatory decision making models] is warranted via the idea 
of meta-expertise, particularly ubiquitous and local discrimination, which use more generic 
social knowledge and skills to put political and moral preferences into actions” (623). Analyzing 
the role of expert witnesses in Bedford v. Canada through this lens reveals that sociological 
expertise holds a rather precarious position of privilege in these proceedings.  
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The Role of the Expert Witness 
Expert witnesses are expected to remain impartial throughout legal proceedings, providing 
objective evidence for the assistance of the court. Yet, sociology is not allowed to enter the court 
on its own accord—expert witnesses are only permitted to submit evidence to the court if they 
have been enlisted by lawyers for the interest parties and/or interveners in the case to do so and 
those who are chosen as experts are not enlisted to provide what they feel is pertinent 
information: 
Social science evidence, while officially treated with full diplomatic honours as a 
knowledge from an autonomous realm, cannot appear before the courts on its own steam. 
Social scientists cannot on their own account get legal standing; they must be first of all 
be chosen as experts. And even after being selected, they are not at liberty to say 
whatever they think is relevant to the case: they are experts for a particular lawyer, they 
are briefed by them on what is required and their affidavits are corrected by the lawyers. 
The desired bits are then turned into legal raw matter and processed through the legal 
system’s existing mechanisms [original emphasis]. (Valverde 1996: 208) 
 
Thus, expert witnesses are compelled to provide evidence for the court by employing discourses 
and categories that are already familiar to law (Valverde 1996: 209). Moreover, expert witnesses 
are expected to present evidence in ways that they normally would not. Valverde (1996) explains 
how she felt compelled to give her evidence a positivistic spin when testifying as an expert 
witness: “Not wanting to undermine the case for which I was testifying, and having the 
impression that for lawyers social science basically means positivistic knowledge, I have often 
given my answers a much more definite epistemological status than I would do in teaching a 
class” (208). Further, legal discourse relies on binaries and oppositional categories, forcing 
experts to define situations in these terms even if they do not endorse the concrete divisions that 
law mandates (210). Moreover, law promotes a sense of opposition between parties even when 
none exists in reality. Curiously, in spite of the process by which they come before the courts, in 
contrast to lay witnesses, experts are expected to remain impartial throughout the proceedings.  
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 The potential for expert witness partisanship is a prima facie concern for Justice Himel in 
Bedford v. Canada (2010). In contrast to lay witnesses, such as current and former sex workers 
and police officers, who are restricted to providing “fact evidence”, “qualified expert witnesses 
are granted a right to give opinions for the assistance of the court” (27). However, in line with 
the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses, Himel notes that this opinion must not be influenced 
by the party calling the expert witness—expert witnesses are expected to maintain an “attitude of 
strict independence and impartiality” throughout the proceedings (Ibid). Moreover, “an expert 
witness…should never assume the role of an advocate [my emphasis]” (National Justice 
Compania Navieria SA v. Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. as cited in Bedford v. Canada 2010: 27).  
 Yet, as noted by Gary Edmund (2009), apart from the fact it would be impossible to find 
an expert who does not have some sort of subjective view, this approach is problematic because 
experts are often brought before the courts to testify because of their commitments to particular 
ideologies: “all experts are (and expertise is) more or less aligned, subjective, interested, biased, 
and dependent….Although experts selected by the different parties may well take on aspects of a 
case, based in part on their contractual relationship, these experts will often be selected because 
they already adhere to particular assumptions and commitments or employ methodologies 
considered valuable [original emphasis]” (173). Indeed, this was the case in Bedford v. Canada. 
The applicants’ experts were all selected because of their alignment with the position the 
applicants were forwarding in court: 
I had written an article critiquing Melissa Farley’s work, and other people who take her 
position, basically, on sex work. And I think that Alan Young and people he worked with 
were aware of that article and reached out to me….they might have done a Google search 
on me as well and decided that I was the kind of person that they might be able to use. 
(Interview excerpt, Weitzer) 
Moreover, witness selection is driven by the adversarial nature of legal proceedings. Thus, 
witnesses are likely to be selected because they hold partisan views on the issue(s) in question. 
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For Edmund (2009), party selection of expert witnesses is a more significant factor in the 
production of bias than the adversarial context in which expert witnesses find themselves: 
“Expert selection may be far more important than any pressures or importunity brought about by 
adversarial alignment and interactions with parties and their lawyers” (Ibid). While Edmund’s 
point is well taken, Michael Saks (1990) analysis of potential roles for expert witness’ in court 
suggests that expert witness partisanship is a complex issue. 
 Analyzing expert witnesses’ behaviour and interactions with other participants in the 
legal process as well as the tension between the role that law designates for experts and the part 
they enact in court, Saks (1990) identifies four possible roles for expert witnesses in court. The 
“Mere Conduit/Educator” serves his/her discipline at the expense of the cause for which s/he is 
providing evidence. According to Saks “the Educator makes the field the first priority and is 
impervious to the claims of the cause on whose behalf it is employed” (296). In contrast to this 
role, the “Philosopher-Ruler/Advocate” acts at the behest of the cause, believing there is a 
greater good at stake, and “is more or less indifferent to the contents of the field” (Ibid). While 
similar to “Philosopher Rulers”, Hired Guns are indifferent to both the cause and the contents of 
the field. These witnesses are generally motivated by retainers or financial incentives (Ibid). As 
noted by Saks, the roles of educator, philosopher-ruler and hired gun are associated with the 
dilemma that experts face in relating the knowledge of their field to the cause at stake (Ibid). 
While Saks identifies a fourth option, which in its pure form is “an expert witnesse’s heaven on 
earth,” he cautions that this role poses a different ethical dilemma (297). For Saks, the fourth cell 
in the matrix of possible roles for expert witnesses is one in which “the data are so helpful to a 
cause you believe in that you can be entirely forthcoming about them” (Ibid). However, this cell 
is a triviality because it presents no choices and, according to Saks, this cell does not realistically 
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exist (Ibid). Moreover, “no matter how good the data are, they never are good enough for an 
advocate’s purpose. Pressures may develop to stretch or to over-state, or to make more clear and 
unambiguous data that are never altogether clear and unambiguous” (Ibid). In an attempt to 
rectify these potential issues, judges are charged with the role of evidentiary gatekeeper in legal 
proceedings.  
 Citing the decision in National Justice Compania Navieria SA v. Prudential Assurance 
Co Ltd., Himel explains that she has a duty to guard against expert bias and advocacy: “expert 
evidence should not be influenced by the interests of the party calling him or her. The judge’s 
role as gatekeeper requires vigilance to ensure that the necessary responsibilities of an expert are 
adhered to” (27). Moreover, when social science and law interact, the value and admissibility of 
the evidence social science has to offer is determined according to legal standards: “Sociological 
facts are transmuted into legal facts, and their subsequent effectivity is wholly determined by 
legal processes completely outside the control and even the knowledge of the social scientist who 
entered the facts into evidence” (Valverde 1996: 2008). 
 First advocated in the American case, William Daubert, et ux., etc., et al., v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (509 U. S. 579 (1993)) and later incorporated into Canadian decisions 
such as R v. Mohan (1994), R. v. J.-L. J. (2 S. C. R. 600) and R. v. Abbey (2009 ONCA 624), the 
judge’s role of evidentiary gatekeeper has been enshrined in American and Canadian law. As 
evidentiary gatekeepers, judges are required to ensure that only “reliable” evidence that will 
“assist the trier of fact” is admitted in legal proceedings. It is important to note the definition of 
reliability used by judges assessing the admissibility of expert evidence—judges assess the 
admissibility of expert opinion based on its evidentiary reliability. In Daubert the court 
concludes that evidentiary reliability will be based upon whether or not the expert’s theory 
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proves what it is intended to prove (1993, f.n. 9). Moreover, distinguishing between scientific 
reliability and scientific validity, the court concludes that in cases involving scientific expert 
evidence “evidentiary reliability will be based on scientific validity [original emphasis]” (Ibid). 
In this sense, the evidence proffered by expert witnesses is processed and evaluated in terms 
which are foreign to them. Justice Doherty J. A. explains that “This ‘gatekeeper’ component of 
the admissibility inquiry lies at the heart of the present evidentiary regime governing the 
admissibility of expert opinion evidence” (R. v. Abbey 2009: 34-35). Judges’ role as evidentiary 
gatekeepers extends beyond the duty to protect lay persons from biased expert opinion in jury 
cases: “As an impartial adjudicator, an application judge cannot disregard his or her role as 
gatekeeper simply because there is no jury” (Bedford v. Canada 2012: 28). Moreover, as Himel 
explains, “in Charter cases, judges are also the triers of fact” (30). Thus, they are “expected to 
disabuse themselves of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence” (Ibid). Yet, the process by which 
this is accomplished permits the judge’s personal views to permeate the proceedings. In order to 
fulfil her duty to remain vigilant against expert bias and advocacy, Himel employs an “evidence 
based approach” as explained by David Paciocco to evaluate the proffered expert opinion(s). 
 In “Taking a ‘Gouge’ out of Bluster and Blarney: and ‘Evidence-Based Approach’ to 
Expert Testimony” Paciocco (2009) synthesizes the “evidence-based approach” to expert 
evidence imposed by the court in Mohan with the recommendations for how to achieve this in 
practice made by the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario (the Gouge Report). 
In Mohan (1994) the Supreme Court of Canada sets out the conditions for the admissibility of 
expert evidence: relevance, necessity to the trier of fact, the absence of any exclusionary rule; 
and a properly qualified expert (16). As noted by Paciocco (2009), the Gouge Report details how 
to achieve this legal requirement in practice (136). Paciocco asserts that “expert evidence is a 
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dangerous thing” (139) and “courts who are fooled by experts who claim to offer more than they 
really do, or who furnish opinions outside of their field of expertise, or who expect to be believed 
on their authority alone, or who are biased, or selective, or who puff up the statute of their 
discipline or their training” cannot be tolerated (156). Thus, in order to help the courts safeguard 
against these dangers, he synthesizes an “evidence-based approach to evaluating expertise” into 
four predicates:  
(1) the theory or technique used by the expert must be reliable, and so too must the use of 
that theory or technique by the expert;  
(2) the expert must not be biased (the expert must “keep an open mind to a broad menu of 
possibilities”);  
(3) the expert must be objective and complete in collecting evidence, must reject 
information that is not germane to the theory or technique being used, and must be 
transparent about all the information and influences they have been exposed to; and  
(4) the expert must clearly express not only the opinion, but also the complete reasoning 
process that led to it, and must be candid about the shortcomings of the theory or 
technique and the opinion reached, offering fair guidance on the level of confidence that 
can be placed in the opinion expressed [original emphasis]. (146-7) 
While the Gouge Report, and thus Paciocco’s work, center on forensic pathology, it is useful to 
consider the first two predicates because they have direct bearing on the admissibility of expert 
opinion in Bedford v. Canada. 
 For Paciocco (2009), the means of assessing the reliability of the expert’s theory or 
technique and the way s/he employed it depends on whether the expert invokes “science” to 
validate his/her claims or s/he is presenting more interpretive evidence (148-9). Paciocco 
explains that in cases where “experts…invoke ‘science’ to validate their opinions” Daubert’s 
scientific standards must be used to scrutinize their evidence. This involves considering “whether 
the theory or technique has been tested, whether it has been subject to peer review and 
publication, its known or potential rate of error, and its general acceptance in the relevant field of 
expertise” (148). However, in cases where the expert’s evidence is of a more interpretive nature 
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“a more nuanced approach is called for” (149). This approach involves assessing whether or not 
the expert has appropriate training and experience; the degree to which the empirical evidence 
s/he relies upon “is accurately recorded;” the extent to which his/her “reasoning process is 
clearly explained and logical” as well as how justifiable his/her opinion appears to be; whether or 
not s/he acknowledges the limitations of the science s/he has employed; whether his/her opinion 
“is located in an area of controversy;” whether or not s/he offered “reasoned rejection of 
alternative conclusions;” and whether or not “a system of quality assurance and meaningful peer 
review” exists in his/her discipline (Ibid).  
 Guarding against expert bias requires ensuring that expert witnesses maintain an open 
mind to a broad range of possibilities (Paciocco 2009: 150). As is evident in Himel’s statements, 
guarding against expert bias is a major concern for the courts. Similarly, Paciocco notes that “an 
adversarial posture is not one that is uncommon for experts to take” (151). Echoing, Saks (1990), 
Paciocco (2009) explains that expert bias takes on many forms: the expert has some sort of 
connection to the party calling him/her; “adversarial bias” stemming from witness selection 
based on the party’s needs rather than the integrity of his/her opinions; “association bias,” which 
arises from our natural inclination to do something serviceable for those who remunerate us for 
services; witness predisposition because they are assigned to teams in our legal system; bias 
stemming from the expert’s professional interest in advancing his/her theory or technique or 
credibility; “noble cause distortion” or a belief that a particular outcome is “the right one”; and 
“confirmation bias” (150-51). Indeed, “what makes the bias of expert witnesses so invidious is 
that it is often unconsciously held” (151). The Gouge Report suggests that experts should be 
expected to make their reasoning process, including explanations for why they have rejected 
alternative theories and opinions explicit in their reports and testimony (Paciocco 2009: 151) 
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However, as noted by Paciocco,  “even advocates frame their self-interested arguments by 
explaining their reasoning, so doing so is no guarantee of impartiality” (151). This process may 
be further complicated when expert witnesses are sociologists. As noted by Valverde (1996), in 
cases involving “conflicts between traditional assumptions about the social and the claims put 
forward by social movements” (204), such as Charter challenges, sociological experts are often  
in some ways surrogates for the social movements making the claims (203).  Moreover, the 
presence of experts often works to silence the movements for whom they are acting, if only as 
surrogates, in court (212). And, as mentioned, sociological experts are a means by which the 
claims of social movements are translated into legal terms in court proceedings. Thus, 
sociological experts act at the behest of these claims regardless of whether or not they are 
explicitly biased. The Gouge Report also recommends the implementation of a code of ethics for 
expert witnesses, emphasizing that the expert’s “first duty is to the court” (Paciocco 2009: 152). 
 Canada has implemented such a code. Pursuant to section 52.2 (c) of Canada’s Federal 
Court Rules, Canada has a code of conduct for expert witnesses. Sections 1 and 2 of the Code of 
Conduct for Expert Witnesses emphasize the expert’s duty to the court: 
An expert witness named to provide a report for use as evidence, or to testify in a 
proceeding, has an overriding duty to assist the Court impartially on matters relevant to 
his or her area of expertise. This duty overrides any duty to a party to the proceeding, 
including the person retaining the expert witness. An expert is to be independent and 
objective. An expert is not an advocate for a party. 
 
The need for experts to remain impartial is also emphasized in section 3 (k) of the Code of 
Conduct for Expert Witnesses:  Affidavits or reports submitted by experts to the courts must 
contain “particulars of any aspect of the expert’s relationship with a party to the proceeding or 
the subject matter of his or her proposed evidence that might affect his or her duty to the Court.” 
 According to Paciocco (2009), the Gouge Report “could have gone even further than it 
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did by providing for the absolute exclusion, in some cases, of biased witnesses” (152). Yet, if the 
duty of expert witnesses is to the court, you would expect attempts by both sides to draw on the 
expertise of the witness during proceedings and this is not the case. Rather than drawing on the 
expertise of expert witnesses under cross examination, lawyers attempt to discredit the witness’ 
proffered by their opponent(s): 
During the cross examination they basically tried to pick apart my affidavit and my CV 
and asked a lot of questions that, you know, I expected from them, challenging basically 
the claims that I had made in my affidavit about the lack of scientific integrity on the part 
of some of the other actors like Melissa Farley and Janice Raymond. The government’s 
side basically tried to weaken my case, as they would in any kind of court proceedings 
like this, by trying to find inconsistencies in what I’d written or said in public….it wasn’t 
just a simple fact finding exercise on their part, they were attempting to weaken the case 
that the applicants had made. (Interview excerpt, Weitzer) 
 
As Charles Bazerman (2009) points out, cross examination of expert witness testimony centres 
on ad hominem attacks because of the distinct standing that expert witnesses occupy in legal 
proceedings: “expert witnesses do not necessarily have any direct observations to report but are 
valued for their opinions, not, like lay witnesses, for their personal trustworthiness, but for their 
expertise. Their testimony can be impeached only by attacking that expertise or, more precisely, 
its relevance and use in the case at hand” (104). And the expertise of the witness is determined 
by legal standards, not those of the discipline for which the expert witness is supposed to be a 
representative. As Valverde (1996) explains, in her experience as an expert witness, “it was 
law’s precedent that counted for establishing [her] credentials, not [her] standing within 
sociology” (211). Further, the evidence that expert witnesses present to the judge while testifying 
is limited to what lawyers question them about: “Sometimes I would try to add points or I 
wanted to make points that were a bit off topic that I wanted them to be aware of and I wanted to 
be recorded in the record. And they would try to stop me and say ‘well that wasn’t the question’” 
(Weitzer). Moreover, lawyers constrain the evidence available for judges to consider when 
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making decisions with the assistance of expert witnesses. Judges then make subjective 
determinations regarding the admissibility of the limited evidence proffered by expert witnesses 
in order to render a decision. 
 In order to fulfill her role as evidentiary gatekeeper, Himel weighs the evidence presented 
by the parties, assigning little or no weight to evidence that is not in accord with the standards for 
admissibility (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 30). Moreover, noting that it would be impractical to 
engage in an admissibility analysis of each piece of evidence tendered and that neither party 
objected to the opposition’s evidence, Himel sets out five factors, derived from the requirements 
in Mohan and Abbey, which she uses to determine the weight to be given to expert evidence in 
this case: 
Unwillingness of the expert to qualify an opinion or update it in the face of new facts 
provided (often in cross-examination); bold assertions without a properly outlined basis 
for the claim; refusal to restrict opinions to expertise or the expertise demarked by the 
judge as required by the court; lack of sufficient independence from the party proffering 
the expert; and prior history as an advocate on the topic. (30)  
  
Using this supposedly objective measure, Himel decides to grant less weight to the evidence 
tendered by some of the expert witnesses: Melissa Farley, Janice Raymond, Richard Poulin and 
John Lowman. As will be discussed in chapter 6, her decision to discount the evidence presented 
by these witnesses centres on the extent to which they appeared to be acting as advocates for the 
positions of the interest parties who called them to make submissions. Yet, given the issues with 
legal constructions of expertise and the role of expert witnesses in legal proceedings outlined in 
this chapter, it should not be surprising that the evidence tendered by experts was designed to 
advance the argument being presented by the parties who called them. 
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Conclusion 
While social science evidence is intended to assist judges and/or juries in their decision making 
process, the adversarial nature of legal proceedings prevents social science from presenting a 
view that differs in any significant way from that presented by the interest parties. Party selection 
of experts combined with the ways in which the evidence these witnesses tender is submitted for 
the consideration of the court ensures partisanship in spite of legal demands that expert witnesses 
remain impartial. Sociologists do not enter court proceedings on their own accord and the 
evidence they tender is constrained by lawyers and the need to employ categories and discourses 
that law is familiar with. Thus, the role of sociological expert witnesses in rights cases is more 
accurately described as a means by which the claims of social movements are translated into 
oppositional legal accounts. In this sense, sociology and law collude to silence those for whom 
these challenges are being mounted (Valverde 1996). Moreover, “social science, purportedly 
courted because it can inject useful ‘facts’ into the legal process, is through the legal process 
reduced to the status of mirror for law’s narcissistic deliberations” (Valverde 1996: 202). 
 Specifically, the process by which sociological evidence enters court proceedings, 
particularly rights cases, perpetuates legal fictions constructing law as impartial, neutral and 
objective. Legal constructions of expertise as an objectively identifiable category and the role of 
the expert witness as non-partisan mask the extent to which Charter challenges rest on moral 
assumptions. Privileging the accounts of social scientists over those of “experiential witnesses” 
grants an unwarranted status to knowledge generated at the behest of the social movements for 
whom these challenges are being mounted. Further, legal constructions of expertise and the role 
of expert witnesses enable judges to engage in moral authoritarianism under the guise of making 
assessments based on objective measures. In the next chapter, I explore interested parties’ 
Lucky 110 
 
constructions of the situation currently facing Canadian sex workers and their constructions of 
“the risk of harm” in the Bedford case. Attending to sites of silence and excluded voices in this 
case reveals that through the process of transmuting lay knowledge into the language of law, 
social science colludes with law and religion to conceal the moral and political nature of the 
current debate. Interestingly, this collusion results in a more morally charged representation of 
the Canadian sex trade than would have been the case if the accounts of sex workers had been 
granted the same status as the accounts of other actors in this case.  
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Constructing the Canadian Sex Trade 
The topic of prostitution raises issues of morality, sexuality, organized crime, health and 
public safety, the exploitation of women and children, inequality between men and 
women, and human rights, among other things (SSLR 2006: 1). 
Indeed, challenging Canada’s prostitution laws deploys myriad perspectives and issues, all of 
which have a moral basis. Exploring interested parties’ constructions of the situation currently 
facing Canadian sex workers as a backdrop to analyzing which evidence Himel considers and 
which evidence she omits in her decision permits analysis of how law, science and religion 
collaboratively construct the Canadian sex trade in the current case. How do the interested 
parties in Bedford v. Canada construct the situation? To what extent do these parties rely on 
expert witnesses to construct their accounts? And, what influence does this evidence have on the 
court?  In order to explore these questions, I begin by analyzing the accounts presented to the 
court by the applicants, the Attorney’s General of Canada and Ontario and the CLF and 
colleagues. Drawing attention to the sites of silence in the evidence presented in their facta 
highlights the extent to which social science evidence acts at the behest of rival social 
movements in the Bedford case. Following this account, I consider Himel’s reasoning for her 
decision to strike down the impugned provisions, focusing on which evidence was considered in 
order to render this decision and the broader implications of constructing the Canadian sex trade 
in this manner.  
 Ronald Weitzer (2009b) identifies two “diametrically opposed” positions in academic 
constructions of the sex trade: the empowerment paradigm and the oppression paradigm. The 
empowerment paradigm “focuses on the ways in which sexual commerce qualifies as work, 
involves human agency, and may be potentially empowering for workers” (215). Proponents of 
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the empowerment paradigm “avoid essentialist conclusions based on only one mode of 
production”, arguing that sex work manifests itself differently depending on the legal regime in 
place (Ibid). Rather than arguing that sex work is empowering, proponents of this view hold that 
sex work has potential to be empowering in contexts where it is legal and regulated (Ibid). 
However, as noted by Weitzer, proponents of the empowerment paradigm tend to emphasize 
success stories, neglecting the accounts of sex workers who have had “highly negative 
experiences” (215). Echoing Weitzer, Scoular explains that feminist accounts employing sex 
worker discourses hold that prostitution is a legitimate form of work and failure to acknowledge 
its legitimacy amounts to legal discrimination (346-7). In contrast to the empowerment 
paradigm, the oppression paradigm holds that “sex work is a quintessential expression of 
patriarchal gender relations” (Weitzer 2009b: 214). In addition to making essentialist claims 
about male domination, some proponents of the oppression paradigm “make generalizations 
about specific aspects of sex work” and employ slavery discourses to characterize prostitution 
(Ibid). Moreover, some proponents of the oppression paradigm hold that:  
[M]ost or all sex workers were physically or sexually abused as children; entered the sex 
trade as adolescents, around 13-14 years of age; were tricked or forced into the trade by  
pimps or traffickers; use or are addicted to drugs; experience routine violence from 
customers; labour under abysmal working conditions; and desperately want to exit the 
sex trade. (214) 
 
According to Weitzer (2009b), proponents of the oppression paradigm generally employ 
“dramatic language to highlight the plight of workers” and present worst case scenarios as 
representative (Ibid). Similarly, Scoular (2004) notes that radical feminist accounts highlight the 
harms experienced by sex workers, holding that violence, inequality and oppression are 
fundamental features of prostitution (344). As noted by Scoular, for radical feminists, 
prostitution is a form of sexual slavery (Ibid). Analyzing interested parties’ constructions of the 
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situation currently facing Canadian sex workers in Bedford v. Canada highlights the extent to 
which these diametrically opposed positions permeated the debate before the court. 
 In line with Beaman’s (2008) observation that Canadian courts are becoming increasingly 
reliant on the “risk of harm” test as a so-called objective measure in rights cases, Bedford v. 
Canada centres on defining the harm faced by Canadian prostitutes. As such, interested parties in 
the Bedford case all attempt to define the “risk of harm” associated with sex work in Canada, 
employing the oppression and emancipation paradigms to construct their arguments. As noted by 
Valverde (1999), the “risk of harm” test acts as a “veritable joker card” in these cases, deploying 
a host of values and discourses under the guise of objectivity (184). Moreover, harm frameworks 
are constructed using moral assumptions (Beaman 2008: 86) but the role of collective morality in 
shaping these constructions is hidden by discourses of objectivity and neutrality surrounding 
applications of the “risk of harm” test in legal accounts. The ambiguity of “risk of harm” 
assessments allows all interested parties to feel as though their concerns are being addressed by 
the courts (Valverde 1999: 184). However, when positivist frameworks do not provide answers 
and uncertainty prevails, judges rely upon common sense to fill in the gaps (Beaman 2008: 90). 
As noted by Beaman (2008), in this sense, “the ‘risk of harm’ is a joker card that can be played 
by anyone [and]…common sense is the trump card used by the courts to fill in the space between 
those things that are uncertain” (95). Indeed, this is the case in Bedford v. Canada.  
 
The Applicants’ Account 
Offering testimony from various academic experts, police and other community members as well 
as testimony from experiential witnesses, the applicants present an account suggesting that, 
although it is a dangerous enterprise at present, the sex trade can be a safe, legitimate vocation 
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for Canadian women. It is important to note that all of the applicants’ experiential witnesses are 
women involved with groups advocating for sex workers’ rights such as the Prostitute 
Empowerment Education and Resource Society (PEERS), the B.C Coalition of Experiential 
Women, and the Canadian Guild for Exotic Labour and Sex Professionals of Canada. These 
groups all aim to confer legitimacy on the sex trade. For example, according to the mission and 
principles listed on Sex Professionals of Canada (SPOC)’s website: “SPOC operates on the 
principle that all forms of consensual adult sex work are legitimate and valid. We provide a 
public voice that promotes the validity of our occupation. We assert that one’s decision to be a 
sex worker is equally and unequivocally as valid of a choice as is the decision to be in any other 
legal occupation” (http://spoc.ca/index.html).  
 In line with proponents of the emancipation paradigm, the applicants view sex work as 
legitimate entrepreneurship. Accordingly, the applicants emphasize the business aspects of sex 
work and the need to ensure that practitioners are able to operate under safe working conditions:  
The act of prostitution per se has always been a legal activity under the Criminal Code 
but the Code prohibits many other activities accompanying or associated with this lawful 
business. In a nutshell, this case is based on the proposition that sex trade activities 
prohibited by the Criminal Code prevent or prohibit sex trade workers from conducting 
their lawful business in a safe environment. (Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 
2) 
 
From this perspective, sex work is both legitimate and legal employment yet the law prevents 
practitioners from taking necessary safety precautions. The applicants refute constructions of sex 
workers as victims. For example, the applicants note that “Professor [Deborah] Brock stresses 
that the all-encompassing view of the ‘prostitute-as-victim’ is wrong” (66) and that, according to 
Brock, “a more realistic view of the sex industry is not of a homogeneous monolith, but as a 
complex sector where activities, work patterns, income and risk vary widely” (67). Citing 
Deborah Brock, the applicants argue that sex work can be an edifying and lucrative vocational 
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choice for many who engage in it: “women often enter the sex trade after determining that it is a 
better option compared to other opportunities, such as unskilled labour. The process by which 
women get into sex work is ‘not so different a process from the way in which working-class 
women find working-class jobs, generally’” (Ibid). As noted by Weitzer (2009b), proponents of 
the emancipation paradigm generally highlight the routine aspects of sex work, aligning it with 
“kindred types of service work” (215).   
 For the applicants, indoor sex work is safer than working on-street because those working 
indoors are able to employ safety measures that are not available to those working in outdoor 
settings. Moreover, for the applicants, a fundamental distinction must be drawn between indoor 
and outdoor sex work. Invoking the “legal trump card” of common sense (Beaman 2008: 95), the 
applicants assert that “the proposition that street prostitution is far more dangerous than indoor 
prostitution being conducted with the assistance of third parties is primarily a matter of common 
sense and simple inference” (Applicants’ Memorandum and Fact of Law: 7). While all women 
working on-street are more vulnerable to violence than indoor sex workers, this threat is 
increased for Aboriginal women working on-street: “Darlene Maurga Mooney, former sex-trade 
worker and Aboriginal Youth Case Worker, noted that the violence against street workers is 
heightened with respect to Aboriginal sex workers” (27) because of “the combined social 
marginalization, racism and sexism experienced by Aboriginal women” (38). According to the 
applicants’ account, while there is always the potential for violence indoors, sex workers are able 
to employ a host of security measures to reduce this threat and deal with violence should it occur. 
However, operating independently is not an option for many women engaged in sex work. For 
example, Amy Lebovich “remains aware that ‘the possibility of working indoors is a privilege’ 
and that ‘this is not a luxury that others enjoy’” (16). And Darlene Mooney “acknowledges that 
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‘as a sex worker, it is a privilege to be able to work indoors’ due to the high costs that may arise 
when advertising and renting space” (37). As a result, the relative safety of working indoors 
currently depends on management: 
In cross-examination, Ms. Bedford conceded that dangers can arise in indoor locations as 
the safety of a given venue depends on how it is being run and the safety measures put in 
place to protect workers. (Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 14) 
 
After leaving the street, the Applicant [Amy Lebovitch] began working for an escort 
service. She admits that outcalls “still carry with them the potential for danger” and that 
she experienced “reduced safety” due to poor management of the particular escort 
service. (Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 15) 
 
It is noteworthy that for the applicants the potential for violence in indoor settings is a concession 
rather than an assertion. As noted by Weitzer (2009b), proponents of the empowerment paradigm 
“tend to highlight success stories to demonstrate that sex work can be edifying, lucrative, or 
esteem-enhancing” (215). From this perspective, the current legal regime is the basis for the 
harms associated with working in the sex trade. 
 According to the applicants’ account, the law forces sex workers to operate in the most 
dangerous venue for sex work. For the applicants, the current legal regime perpetuates violence 
against street workers by forcing those working indoor venues onto the street where they are 
subject to increased violence. Citing John Lowman’s research, the applicants assert that 
“criminal law plays a causal role in violence against prostitutes by creating conditions in which 
violence can flourish” (Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 75). Moreover, “by 
preventing sex workers from organizing safe work conditions, [the law] plays a decisive role in 
creating opportunities for violence against prostitutes to occur” (Ibid). Noting “that the ‘criminal 
law materially contributes to the violence against prostitutes’ along with other causal factors 
such as poverty, drug addiction and lack of education” John Lowman deposes that the 
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“governing legal regime ‘materially contributes’ to the victimization of sex trade workers” in 
three ways: 
1) the Criminal Code provisions force survival sex workers outside and into vulnerable 
areas, such as isolated streets and industrial areas;  
2) street-involved prostitution is more violent than working in off-street venues; and  
3) in spite of this increased vulnerability, prostitutes do not benefit from the same level of 
protection and response from police authorities, especially when compared to other 
citizens. (74-5) 
Similarly, Wendy Harris explains that “a great deal of the harm that is perpetrated against 
women in the sex trade industry is a result of the laws which [promote working on the street]…I 
have heard numerous stories where women, out of fear of prosecution have moved out of their 
homes and onto the streets only to be viciously attacked” (as cited in Applicants Memorandum 
of Fact and Law: 30). And Dr. Leyton argues that “we must cease our practice of forcing [sex 
workers] out on the streets, where they are subject to the tender mercies of pimps and passing 
psychopaths” (as cited in Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 29).  
 Indeed, psychopaths such as serial killers are a serious threat to sex workers and the 
current legal environment contributes to this danger. Citing Statistics Canada, the applicants 
assert that the sex trade is an “occupation at risk”: “In recent years Statistics Canada, in its 
annual Juristat report Homicide in Canada, has characterized the ‘sex trade as an occupation at 
risk’” (Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 20). Further, with regard to official statistics 
on the rate at which sex workers are murdered, “whatever the precise numbers may be, it is 
important to note the high prevalence of violence against sex trade workers had been well-
documented many years prior to statistics Canada’s decision to characterize the sex trade as an 
‘occupation at risk’” (21). Moreover, the applicants note that “Professor Augustine Brannigan 
submitted a report to the Department of Justice in 1994” (22) and that “it is clear from this report 
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that risk of violence at the hands of serial killers extends beyond Robert Pickton [sic] and Lower-
East side Vancouver, and it is clear that the government was aware of the problem” (23). Indeed, 
although, “Jody Patterson of PEERS (Prostitution Empowerment, Education and Resource 
Society) deposed that ‘it is naïve to blame all of the violence on a single serial killer…because 
violence is systematic in outdoor prostitution” (25) and “Oscar Ramos of the Vancouver Police 
Department testified that the problem of vulnerability to predators had not subsided since the 
arrest of Robert Pickton [sic]” (26), a great deal of the applicants’ argument concerning violence 
in the outdoor sex trade centers on the danger of the serial killer. As noted by the applicants: 
Since the late nineteenth-century, starting with the horrors of Jack the Ripper 
disemboweling street prostitutes with surgical precision, we have seen a repeating array 
of similar killers targeting street prostitutes: Gary Ridgway (Green River Killer—48 
victims, early 1980’s); Peter Sutcliffe (the Yorkshire Ripper—13 victims—late 1970s); 
Arthur Shawcross (Genesee River Killer—10 victims, late 1980’s) and Joel Rifkin (New 
York City—9 victims, early 1990’s). (29) 
 
For the applicants, a large proportion of sex worker homicides are at the hands of serial killers: 
“Dr. Leyton suspects that prostitutes make up close to half of all serial killer victims. However, 
on cross-examination, he conceded that there is no hard data on this point” (Ibid). This discourse 
of serial killer as prima facie risk of harm to sex workers invokes a highly moralistic image of 
the Canadian sex trade. Analyzing news media coverage of the missing and murdered women in 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside and the subsequent arrest of serial killer Robert Picton for their 
murders in the Vancouver Sun from 2001-2006, Yasmin Jiwani and Mary Lynn Young (2006) 
find that these accounts reproduce stereotypical discourses surrounding femininity, monogamy 
and Aboriginality. Moreover, for Jiwani and Young, these accounts invoke dominant societal 
constructions of hypersexual, racialized, deviant sexuality, constructing narratives in which 
“race, class, and sexuality intersect and interlock to sustain hegemonic power” (900). Similarly, 
writing on the social construction of serial murder, Philip Jenkins (2001) argues that narratives of 
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“sex killers” or “rippers” tend to advance cultural messages concerning “matters of race, gender 
and sexual orientation” (2). Moreover, noting that “serial murder accounts for no more than 
(perhaps) two percent of homicides in any given society” (1), Jenkins argues that cases involving 
“rippers” garner “a massively disproportionate amount of attention from both media and law 
enforcement” (1) because these narratives provide cultural and moral messages that tales of other 
forms of homicide do not (10). By focusing on middle-aged white men preying on street-level 
prostitutes, “sex killer” narratives employ discourses of white male violence against women and 
reproduce discourses of hegemonic heterosexuality and proper feminine conduct (17-18). 
According to the applicants, sex workers are often victims in homicides because of the nature of 
on-street sex work and the legal regime in which they operate: “Dr. Leyton believes prostitutes 
represent society’s invisible, overlooked victims…compared to the average person, street 
working sex workers represent easy targets for serial predators because of their accessibility; it is 
much more difficult for a stranger to lure the average person into their car, whereas street 
workers enter strange vehicles as part of their work and because of the ‘societal failure to provide 
adequate protections’” (Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 28). This failure to provide 
adequate protections stems from the legally endorsed social stigma associated with sex work.  
 For the applicants, the law poses a risk of harm to sex workers because the legally 
endorsed social stigma associated with this vocation dehumanizes them: “criminalization of sex 
work…leads to a high degree of stigma, dehumanizing sex workers in the eyes of johns, police 
and the wider public—turning them from women into ‘disposable people.’ [And] this 
dehumanization enables violence and predation, while simultaneously reducing public concern 
and empathy” (60). Dan Gardiner, a journalist who has reported extensively on the dangers of 
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the sex trade in Canada, explains that the stigma created by the law reduces public concern for 
the plight of sex workers: 
Mr. Gardiner’s experiences also show the power of stigma of criminalization on sex 
workers. By being labelled criminals, sex workers are denied access to employment in 
other industries, and are often forced to continue to work the streets in a fundamentally 
unsafe environment. Stigma also denies sex workers concern and compassion from the 
public notwithstanding the terrible conditions they are often forced to work in. Mr. 
Gardiner has been particularly struck by the lack of reaction from his readers to his pieces 
on prostitution, leading him to believe that members of the public simply do not believe 
that sex workers merit concern when they are murdered. (51) 
 
And Professor John Lowman “deposes that his research has led to the conclusion that the 
Criminal Code provisions actually contribute to legal structures which propagate the belief that a 
prostitute is responsible for her own victimization, and thus reinforces the line of ‘they deserve 
what they get’” (75). This legally endorsed stigma compounds the dangers posed by serial 
killers:   
According to Dr. Leyton, the targeting of prostitutes by serial killers is compounded by 
the fact that society routinely overlooks and minimizes their personhood. Of the infamous 
abduction and murder of street workers in Vancouver’s East end in the 1990’s, the 
witness remarks, “nobody [in the police force] wanted to know: it was only the worthless 
ones disappearing, so nothing need be done, and the killings continued for years”. Dr. 
Leyton similarly recounts police inaction surrounding the murder of dozens of prostitutes 
in Coquitlam, BC—their remains left on a pig farm. To Dr. Leyton, such ambivalence 
suggests “some lives are more sacred than others.” (29) 
 
Further, when sex workers are the victims of homicide these cases have a much lower clearance 
rate (the official measure of how many crimes have been solved by police) than other homicides: 
“there is a 46% clearance rate for resolving cases against sex workers, whereas there is an 80% 
clearance rate for all other victims” (24). Indeed, the social stigma associated with sex trade 
involvement leads to police indifference toward the victimization of sex workers. As noted by 
the applicants, “virtually all witnesses called by the Applicant, both experiential and expert, 
testified as to the high level of distrust between sex workers and police officers and the 
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perception or belief that some police officers are indifferent to the violence experienced by sex 
workers, and in some cases the police are the perpetrators of violence” (24-5). Wendy Babcock 
“identifies abuse and neglect by police officials toward prostitute as a major problem 
contributing to the victimization of sex workers” (32), and Linda Shaikh “recounts being forced 
to perform sexual acts on officers” upon police detention (31). Further, the current laws prevent 
sex workers from reporting incidents of violence against them. According to Valerie Scott “even 
when bad dates are reported and sex crimes unit knows who the assailant is, women are still 
terrified to come forward due to possible repercussions against them and the inability for the 
government to protect their safety…the law in effect deters sex workers from reporting the 
violence” (as cited in Applicants Memorandum of Fact and Law: 19-20).  
 While the applicants claim to challenge constructions of the sex trade as a monolithic 
entity, their account focuses on gendered legal discrimination, thus legitimizing dominant 
discourses surrounding heterosexuality and femininity. As noted by Scoular (2004), accounts 
that challenge “objections to prostitution as degrading women by asserting its role in promoting 
sexual expression and economic freedom for women” (348) tend to fall into the trap of casting 
deviant sexuality as normative, thus reproducing heteronormative discourses (347). This 
approach “ignores the role of law and material structures in producing, as well as constraining, 
sexual preferences and acts (Ibid). The applicants’ reliance on the dangers posed by 
“psychopaths” such as serial killers in their construction of the “risk of harm” facing Canadian 
sex workers exemplifies the extent to which normative discourses surrounding heterosexuality 
and femininity pervaded their arguments in this case. As mentioned, serial killer narratives tend 
to advance cultural and moral discourses regarding, race, sexuality and sexual orientation 
(Jenkins 2001: 2; Jiwani & Young 2006: 900). 
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The AG Canada’s Account 
In line with proponents of the oppression paradigm, the Attorney General of Canada presents an 
account of the sex trade as a monolithic, characteristically dangerous enterprise. Noting that “the 
Applicants’ argument is based upon the false premise that there is a constitutional right to engage 
in prostitution, which there is not” (96), the AG Canada explains that “the risks and harms 
flowing from prostitution are inherent to the nature of the activity itself. The risks and harms 
exist regardless of the many ways in which prostitution is practiced, whether “street” or “off-
street”, and regardless of the legal regime in place [original emphasis]” (Factum of the 
Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada: 1). Moreover, for the AG Canada, “the criminal 
prohibitions relating to prostitution…do not preclude access to some kind of ‘safe’ haven for 
prostitution, as there is no such thing [original emphasis]” (103). As noted by Weitzer (2009b), 
“the most prominent exponents of [the oppression paradigm] go further…claiming that 
exploitation, subjugation and violence against women are intrinsic to and ineradicable from sex 
work, transcending historical time period, national context, and type of sexual commerce” (214). 
For the AG Canada, prostitution involves an inherent “risk of harm” due to the medical dangers 
associated with sex trade involvement. 
 According to the AG Canada, psychological harm, such as post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), and cervical cancer are major risks of harm for prostitutes. Citing Melissa Farley, the 
AG Canada explains that the prevalence PTSD in prostitutes is evidence that the sex trade is 
inherently dangerous: “Experts have reported that prostitution involves an inherent risk of harm, 
even if violence is never realized. This is due to the physical and psychological harms that result 
from prostitution. Studies show that women engaged in prostitution suffer from high rates of 
both dissociation and post-traumatic stress disorder” (Factum of the Intervener, the Attorney 
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General of Canada: 19). Further, prostitutes are seldom aware of the psychological damage 
incurred as a result of their participation in the sex trade until after they exit: “they [former 
prostitutes] have stated that they only become aware of the damage that has occurred as a result 
of the repetitive use of their bodies for paid sex once they have left prostitution” (20). Indeed, 
promiscuity is the cause of many of the harms faced by prostitutes. The AG Canada argues that, 
in addition to the fact that “the lifestyle of a prostitute often involves little sleep, poor nutrition, 
drug addiction, frequent unprotected sex and abusive relationships which can lead to many health 
problems, including injury, infection, HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases” cervical 
cancer is a major hazard for prostitutes: “prostitutes are also subject to higher rates of cervical 
cancer, with two risk factors being the younger age at which they engage in sexual activity and 
the high number of sexual partners” (24). These risks of harm are compounded by the dangers 
posed by pimps and organized crime syndicates who traffic women and children. 
 Refuting the applicants’ assertions that the sex trade is comprised of different venues 
with varying levels of relative safety, the AG Canada explains that the sex trade is a monolithic 
entity. For the AG Canada, the distinction between indoor and outdoor prostitution is a myth: 
“One of the myths about prostitution is that there is a sharp divide between street prostitution and 
off-street prostitution. In reality, prostitution can be practiced in a wide variety of venues, and 
there is fluidity between them” (12). This fluidity between prostitution venues “has been 
compounded by the advent of cell phones and the internet” (16), creating an environment where 
“in some situations, prostitutes will work the streets, while carrying a cell phone to take calls 
from escort agencies, thus working both street and off-street simultaneously” (15). Interestingly, 
while the AG Canada holds that the distinction between indoor and outdoor prostitution is a 
myth, he offers a more detailed typology of prostitution than any other interest party. Based on 
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evidence submitted by expert witnesses and police, the AG Canada explains that street 
prostitution constitutes roughly 10-20 percent of all prostitution and occurs on various “strolls”:  
[T]he high track , where prostitutes who are generally Caucasian, clean, and not drug 
addicted offer a higher-priced menu and generally have pimps; the low track, where drug-
addicted prostitutes provide services for $10-$20 or a piece of crack cocaine; the trannie 
stroll (for transvestites); the kiddie stroll (for under-age prostitutes); and boystown (for 
those, generally men, seeking male prostitutes). (13-14) 
 
However, circumstance may lead prostitutes to move from one stroll to another: “a so-called 
‘street’ prostitute may move from the high track to the low track as she descends into drug 
addiction or loses her attractiveness [original emphasis]” (14). There are also myriad types of 
indoor prostitutes: 
[T]hose working for escort agencies on an “in-call” basis (services provided on site) or 
an “out-call” basis (service provided in location provided by the john); specialized 
prostitution practices catering to specific preferences, such as sado-masochism and 
bondage; women trafficked from other countries into indoor venues, where they can be 
more easily hidden than on the street; and similarly, under-age prostitutes are sometimes 
found indoors, where it is harder for the police to find them. (14) 
 
For the AG Canada, this fluidity between venues is largely due to pimps who move their 
prostitutes between venues in order to maintain control over them and keep them isolated from 
social supports (Ibid).  
 According to the AG Canada, the majority of women working in the sex trade have 
pimps who use abuse and manipulation to force these women to engage in prostitution. For the 
AG Canada, “up to 50% of prostitutes could have pimps” (22) who employ a host of 
manipulation strategies to lure young women into a life of prostitution: 
Expert, police and experiential evidence indicates that prostitutes become emotionally 
and financially dependent on their pimp and will gradually give in to their requests to 
engage in prostitution to show their “love” and commitment to the pimp. Pimps often 
provide drugs, creating a drug addiction which makes the prostitute even more dependent 
on them and creates the need to make money through prostitution to buy drugs for herself 
and her ‘boyfriend’….In addition to psychological control, physical violence is also used 
by some pimps as a method to control prostitutes and prevent them from leaving 
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prostitution or going to work for another pimp. For example, the Hell’s Angels in Quebec 
use gang rape as a technique to break down a woman, strip her of any sense of self-worth, 
in order to manipulate and control her. (23-4)  
 
However, pimps need not always be human. As the AG Canada explains, sometimes drugs 
operate as a pimp: “On the low track, prostitutes are usually drug addicted and it is the drug (or 
the drug dealer) that is the ‘pimp’ or the coercive force which motivates a prostitute to continue 
to sell sexual services for money or drugs. Crack cocaine is particularly addictive and provides 
only a short high—creating “prostitutes for whom crack is the pimp [original emphasis]” (14).  
 For the AG Canada, the harms stemming from connections between indoor prostitution, 
organized crime, drugs and sex trafficking are significant risks of harm faced by Canadian 
prostitutes. As noted by the AG Canada, “experts and police testified that organized crime is 
involved in prostitution. It is involved in the procuring of women, as well as the trafficking of 
women and children for prostitution, often in tandem with other criminal activity such as drug 
trafficking, automobile theft, and trafficking in illegal weapons” (18). For the AG Canada, “the 
keeping of common bawdy houses is an integral part of human trafficking syndicates, as this is 
where victims may be ‘trained’ and housed, and then transported elsewhere for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation [original emphasis]” (25). Moreover, “police report being called to 
investigate residential brothels where women brought from Asia or under-age girls were working 
as prostitutes” (25). Constructing the “risk of harm” faced by Canadian prostitutes using sex 
trafficking discourses adds yet another morally charged component to the debate in Bedford v. 
Canada. As mentioned, scholars have noted an emergent tendency for researchers to conflate 
prostitution and sex trafficking (Weitzer 2007; Hubbard et al. 2008: 139; Farrell & Fahy 2009: 
621; Weitzer 2009a: 88; Scoular 2010: 16; Weitzer 2010: 70). According to Weitzer (2007), this 
tendency is the product of an institutionalized moral crusade. Moreover, analyzing the 
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construction of sex trafficking by leading activists and organizations in the United States, 
Weitzer argues that “the degree to which current claims recapitulate arguments made a century 
ago regarding ‘white slavery,’ a problem that was largely mythical” is striking (467). Like the 
issues with the applicants’ constructions of the dangers posed by serial killers, the AG Canada’s 
construction of the “risk of harm” posed by sex traffickers invokes moral discourses regarding 
race, class and sexuality. Scholars have noted a tendency for sex trafficking discourses to be 
couched in the language of border control (see, for example, Schaeffer-Grabiel 2010; Ticktin 
2008; Sethi 2007). As noted by Anupriya Sethi (2007), Canadian sex trafficking discourses tend 
to focus on border control, conflating human trafficking and prostitution and omitting the 
experiences of Aboriginal women who are domestically trafficked for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation:  
Human trafficking has received growing attention in recent years, both in Canada and 
worldwide, especially, in the wake of increased focus on nation State’s security and 
tightening of borders. The discourses on sex trafficking of women and girls in Canada 
continue to highlight international trafficking thus positioning Canada more as a transit 
and destination country than an origin country. [As a result] domestic trafficking has not 
received the attention it deserves. Instead of being contextualized in a trafficking 
framework, sexual exploitation of Aboriginal girls is portrayed and understood as a 
problem of prostitution or sex work. (57) 
 
As such, domestic trafficking of Aboriginal women and girls is not acknowledged and 
“Aboriginal peoples are stereotyped as ‘willing’ to take up sex work” (61). For Sethi, this is 
particularly problematic given that Aboriginal women and girls comprise 60% of the sex trade in 
some regions in Canada (59). Conducting interviews with 18 individuals from “NGOs, women’s 
organizations and other community-based groups or individuals dealing with the issue of sexual 
exploitation in Canada”, some of whom had been victims of domestic sex trafficking themselves, 
Sethi finds that the experiences of Aboriginal women who are trafficked domestically for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation differ from those of other sex trafficking victims. Specifically, the 
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domestic trafficking of Aboriginal women in Canada is often familial-based trafficking (women 
and girls are trafficked by family members) linked to poverty and the intergenerational effects of 
colonization and residential schools (59). Moreover, in contrast to the AG Canada’s account, 
drawing connections between organized crime syndicates and sex trafficking, it could be that the 
“risks of harm” associated with sex trafficking in Canada originate in the homes of victims. Yet, 
the experiences of victims of domestic sex trafficking and/or Aboriginal women involved in the 
sex trade are not mentioned in the AG Canada’s submission to the court in the Bedford case. 
 
The AG Ontario’s Account 
The AG Ontario concurs with the AG Canada and proponents of the oppression paradigm, 
arguing that prostitution is an inherently dangerous enterprise and that the “risks of harm” facing 
Canadian prostitutes are linked to medicalized risk as well as the dangers posed by sex 
traffickers and pimps. Yet, as will be discussed, in contrast to the AG Canada’s assertion that all 
forms of prostitution carry the same “risk of harm”, for the AG Ontario outdoor prostitution is 
safer than indoor prostitution. In addition to presenting some of the applicants’ testimony under 
cross-examination, the AG Ontario provides the court with affidavits from current and former 
prostitutes, police officers, social workers and concerned advocates. The AG Ontario’s 
experiential witnesses have all been involved with Streetlight. Although Streetlight’s website 
does not offer a description of the organization, according to the Prostitution Education & 
Research website (http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/services/toronto/), Streetlight is “a 
community based, non-profit organization, created to provide alternatives for individuals 
involved in Sex Trade activities”. In addition to being involved with Streetlight, all but one of the 
AG Ontario’s experiential witnesses are either in the process of completing or have completed 
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the Assaulted Women’s and Children’s Counsellor and Advocacy program at George Brown 
College. Accordingly, these witnesses argue that “the idea of normalizing prostitution by making 
it ‘work’ is insulting” to many women who have or continue to sell sex (D.S. as cited in Factum 
of the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario: 34).  
 Echoing the AG Canada’s assertions, the AG Ontario holds that the sex trade is an 
inherently a harmful enterprise: 
[P]rostitution involves the use of a person’s body, most often that of a woman, by another 
person, most often a man, for his own sexual satisfaction. Prostitution is not a mutually 
pleasurable exchange of the use of bodies but the unilateral use of one person’s body by 
another in exchange for consideration, usually money….The ability of the prostitute to 
effect any control in that relationship is related to her own social and economic power 
vis-à-vis the customer. (Factum of the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario: 2)  
 
For the AG Ontario, “the physical and psychological harms experienced by prostitutes stem from 
the inherent inequality that characterizes the prostitute-customer relationship” (Ibid). Yet, the 
AG Ontario goes even further, citing dangers to the public in his constructions of the “risk of 
harm” associated with prostitution: “Members of Canadian communities forced to witness 
prostitution also experience harms” (4).  
 In line with the AG Canada, the AG Ontario argues that prostitution carries a significant 
“risk of harm” due to medical dangers associated with sex trade involvement. In addition to 
noting that two thirds of prostitutes meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD (63), the AG Ontario 
argues that cervical cancer and hepatitis are significant risk factors for prostitutes: “Prostituted 
women have an increased risk of cervical cancer and also chronic hepatitis” (72). Like the 
applicants and the AG Canada, the AG Ontario constructs the Canadian sex trade in gendered 
terms, reproducing heteronormative discourses. 
 The AG Ontario holds that all forms of commercialized prostitution are inherently 
dangerous and must be prohibited. The AG Ontario explains that, as reflected in the laws, non-
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commercialized prostitution presents a safer alternative to commercialized venues: “The 
combined operation of the provisions does not extend to the private practice of prostitution in 
circumstances where the prostitute is arguably at less risk of exploitation by pimps and 
managers. One level of exploitation is removed from the practice” (3). Moreover, even if there is 
a difference between indoor and outdoor prostitution it is a moot point because all 
commercialized prostitution is extremely dangerous: 
Based on what is known to date, there may be different types of risks of harm or different 
rates of risk of harm arising from “indoor” prostitution as distinct from “street” 
prostitution; however, in all types of commercialized venues prostitutes face significant 
danger. Commercial institutional prostitution is associated with harms to those who are 
prostituted and to those who purchase sex. Members of Canadian communities forced to 
witness public prostitution also experience harms. (4) 
 
Interestingly, while for the AG Ontario all forms of commercialized prostitution are extremely 
dangerous, working outdoors is safer than working indoors because indoor prostitution is more 
clandestine and it is connected to organized crime and sex trafficking. For example, H.C., 
explains that “working indoors is not safer, and in some ways can even be more dangerous” (47) 
because “underage girls can be hidden indoors” (45) and “women working indoors are robbed of 
the safety and witnesses that come from walking the streets” (as cited in Factum of the 
Intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario: 47). According to H.C., legalizing bawdy houses 
will lead to an increase in violence against prostitutes: “women working indoors will be even 
more hidden, police will not be able to go in and check out what is happening, and the chances of 
‘getting out’ will decrease” (Ibid). In addition to feeling “a sense of independence on the street” 
because “on the street she could make more money while providing fewer sexual services”, 
Natasha Falle “felt it was safer ‘since we went mainly to hotels and rarely to someone’s house’ 
[original emphasis]” (Factum of the Intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario: 27). As noted 
by the AG Ontario, “numerous affiants gave evidence that street solicitation is sometimes 
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preferred to bawdy house or brothel work due to safety concerns about brothels” (54). In contrast 
to the applicants presentation of Terri-Jean Bedford’s experience running an escort agency, 
which focuses on how she “used a variety of safety measures to protect herself and her 
employees” (13) but was charged and convicted “with ‘being a keeper’ of a common bawdy 
house” following “a ‘humiliating’ and violent police raid” (Applicants Memorandum of Fact and 
Law: 14), the AG Ontario’s account describes links to organized crime and drugs: 
When she was 24, she stated up her own escort agency in Windsor which employed 19 
women. Ms. Bedford fired one woman who was associated with the Outlaws biker gang, 
and organized crime gang. Ms. Bedford testified that the woman she fired has seen how 
much money Bedford was making with the escort service, the only one in Windsor at the 
time. Ms. Bedford was visited by two members of the Outlaws gang who took her for a 
ride in their car, offering to buy her escort business. “And I said, ‘It’s not for sale,’ and 
they go, ‘Well, we have ways of getting what we want.’” Ms. Bedford testified that the 
Outlaws “wanted the money [from prostitution], and if I wasn’t able to co-operate, then 
they would take me down.” Ms. Bedford attributes her failure to co-operate with the 
Outlaws for the complaint later made to Windsor police by the woman she had fired. Ms. 
Bedford’s escort agency was raided by police and shut down and she was charged with 
procuring, exercising control and keeping a common bawdy house. Terri Bedford was 
addicted to crack at this time. (Factum of the Intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario: 
8-9) 
 
For the AG Ontario, drugs are an integral part of the indoor sex trade. When H.C. began working 
for an escort agency, she “began to drink heavily and use cocaine, like everyone around her” 
because “drugs were readily available and ‘it was something to look forward to’” (44-5) and 
“escort work exposed Ms. Falle to cocaine and other drugs” because “escort drivers sold cocaine 
and guns to the prostitutes they drove” (28).  
 Also in line with the AG Canada, the AG Ontario contends that abuse and manipulation 
at the hands of pimps are features of the sex trade, both indoors and outdoors.  According to the 
AG Ontario, most prostitutes “are extremely susceptible to manipulation and pressure by persons 
desiring to exploit the labour of the prostitutes, whether this be an abusive and controlling pimp 
or the ostensibly benign brothel or agency owner, who may even be female” (94). Experiential 
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witness accounts presented by the AG Ontario emphasize the role of the pimp in the sex trade. 
Natasha Falle “met and fell in love with a pimp whom she later married at age 23. She thought 
things would be better with a pimp for protection, but found ‘he had other girls behind my back.’ 
When Ms. Falle confronted her pimp-husband about this, he whipped her with a cable cord. She 
testified, ‘There were many beatings after that’” (27). When T.D. became a prostitute at age 15 it 
was because of a pimp: 
T.D. ran away from the group home [where she was residing] with her roommate and 
started working as a prostitute at age 15. Within a few days, T.D. met an older American 
man in an arcade. He took her to his motel room. This man became her pimp for 14 
years. T.D.’s pimp also acted as a boyfriend and father figure, but she knew he was a 
pimp. He lived off her work as a prostitute for 14 years. He had other women working for 
him at times as prostitutes, but none of them stayed. T.D. was his “main girl.”  He had 
been selling drugs when T.D. met him, but he gave this up when he started living off 
T.D.’s prostitution. (Factum of the Intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario: 40-41) 
 
T.D.’s pimp was also abusive and controlling. He “did not allow her to use birth control when 
they had sex, although she used condoms with customers. She had five pregnancies, 2 abortions 
and a miscarriage. T.D.’s pimp forced her to give up three of their children for adoption when 
each was born” (41). When T.D. finally managed to leave her pimp because “she became 
pregnant for a fourth time” and she “could not bear the possibility of losing another child” she 
went to live with her mother and stayed out of prostitution (Ibid). However, T.D. “moved back to 
Toronto” when her son was two years old and “her pimp immediately came to visit and got her 
back into prostitution for a few months. This continued periodically until her son was 5” (42).  
Pimps also contribute to the sex trafficking characteristic of the sex trade: “T.D. was moved from 
city to city and in and out of every province in Canada by her pimp in order to control her and 
isolate her from friends and family. ‘He also moved me because it is good for business to be the 
fresh, new face on the street.’ T.D. was also taken by her pimp to the United States, where they 
moved around for 6 ½ years” (41). And, in line with the AG Canada’s assertion that pimps 
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contribute to the fluidity between venues, Natasha Falle’s pimp “wanted her to work indoor 
locations, ‘since that way he could keep track of me more easily’” (27). While, in contrast to the 
AG Canada’s account, the AG Ontario draws attention to domestic sex trafficking, like the AG 
Canada, he omits the experiences of Aboriginal women whom researchers suspect comprise the 
majority of domestic trafficking victims in Canada due to increased vulnerability stemming from 
a host of social inequalities (Sethi 2007; Baldo 2010). Moreover, through silencing the accounts 
of Aboriginal victims of domestic sex trafficking, like the AG Canada, the AG Ontario 
reproduces discourses of border control and the “white slave trade”. 
 
The CLF and Colleagues’ Account 
Like the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario, the CLF et al. employ the oppression 
paradigm to construct the situation currently facing Canadian sex workers. According to the CLF 
and colleagues, “prostitution victimizes anyone who engages in it” and “it perpetuates a 
fundamentally offensive and abusive gender imbalance” (Factum of the CLF et al.: 2). The CLF 
and colleagues rely on the submissions of expert and experiential witnesses proffered by the 
Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario to demonstrate that prostitution is harmful to those 
who engage in it as well as society at large. Moreover, in line with the AG Ontario, the CLF et 
al. go even further than the AG Canada, citing dangers to the public in their construction of the 
risks of harm associated with sex work in Canada. According to the CLF and colleagues, in 
addition to the harms prostitution poses to the women involved in the sex trade, such as physical 
and psychological exploitation and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (12), “prostitution 
destigmatizes and may even encourage the rape, sexual assault or sexual harassment of women 
who partake in prostitution and, indeed, women in general” (11). Further, the existence of 
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prostitution encourages views that women are slaves: “prostitution offends the dignity of all 
women in society by creating a culture of sexual commodification wherein women are 
objectified as mere bodies that may be bought, sold, or traded” (12). As noted by Weitzer 
(2009b), proponents of the oppression paradigm tend to use slavery discourses when 
constructing the sex trade (214).  
 Like the applicants, the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario and the CLF et al. 
construct an inherently moralistic and patriarchal image of the Canadian sex trade.  For these 
interested parties, the sex trade is the epitome of male domination. As noted by Scoular (2004), 
such accounts are “frequently achieved at the expense of a recognition of women’s agency and 
the complexities and contradictions inherent in analyzing selling sex across space and time, 
without regard for the structuring roles of culture, class and race” (345). Indeed, racial 
oppression was largely absent from the debate in this case. While the Attorneys General of 
Canada and Ontario focus on social inequalities in their constructions of the Canadian sex trade, 
these issues are attributed to sexism, omitting the racist and colonial policies affecting Aboriginal 
prostitutes. Researchers focusing on the experiences of Aboriginal women in the Canadian sex 
trade note that many of these women are involved in the sex trade due to sexual exploitation and 
that poverty and racism significantly shape their experiences (Sethi 2007; Baldo 2010). Yet, in 
spite of their reliance on sex trafficking discourses to construct the “risk of harm” facing 
Canadian prostitutes, these factors are absent from the accounts provided by the Attorneys 
General of Canada and Ontario and the CLF et al. Given that Aboriginal women are 
overrepresented in the Canadian sex trade (SSLR 2006: 12; Sethi 2007: 59; Baldo 2010: 11), one 
would expect their experiences to be at the forefront of the current debate. However, this is not 
the case in Bedford v. Canada. Similarly, especially given interested parties’ focus on street 
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prostitution, one could reasonably expect that the experiences of male, transvestite and 
transgendered sex workers would enter the current debate over Canada’s prostitution laws. 
According to the Subcommittee on Solicitation Law Reform (SSLR), male, transgendered and 
transvestite prostitutes make up approximately 20% of Canada’s street-level sex trade (2006: 
14). But, like the experiences of Aboriginal women, these accounts are largely absent from the 
Bedford case. 
 
Justice Himel’s Account 
Couched in legal fictions presenting the law as a neutral, objective producer of “truth”, Himel 
renders a highly moralistic decision, constructing the Canadian sex trade using gendered, 
heteronormative discourses. It is noteworthy that Himel’s perspective is constrained by the 
evidence tendered by interested parties in this case. Moreover, Himel is charged with rendering a 
decision based on the arguments before her and is unable to bring new elements into the debate. 
However, Himel’s recourse to positivist myths regarding law’s application conceals the moral 
basis of the arguments informing her decision as well as the subjective nature of her choice to 
focus on some aspects of the debate and omit others from her decision making process.  
 In order to fulfill her role as evidentiary gatekeeper, Himel weighs the evidence presented 
by the parties, deciding to assign less weight to the evidence presented by expert witnesses 
whom, in her view, had entered the realm of advocacy. Himel explains that she was struck by the 
fact that some expert witnesses “had entered the realm of advocacy and had given evidence in a 
manner that was designed to persuade rather than assist the court” and that “while it is natural for 
persons immersed in a field of study to begin to take positions as a result of their research over 
time, where these witnesses act primarily as advocates, their opinions are of lesser value to the 
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court” (Bedford v. Canada 2010: 46). Accordingly, Himel assigns less weight to the evidence 
tendered by three of the respondents’ expert witnesses, Dr. Melissa Farley, Dr. Janice Raymond 
and Dr. Richard Poulin, and one of the applicants’ expert witnesses, Dr. John Lowman (92-3). 
Himel assigns less weight to Farley’s evidence because “although Dr. Farley has conducted a 
great deal of research on prostitution, her advocacy appears to have permeated her opinions” 
(92). According to Himel, “Farley’s choice of language is at times inflammatory and detracts 
from her conclusions” (Ibid). And during cross-examination Farley conceded that some of her 
opinions, “including ‘that prostitution is a terrible harm to women, that prostitution is abusive in 
its very nature, and that prostitution amounts to men paying a woman for the right to rape her’” 
were formed prior to her research on the sex trade (92-3). Similarly, Himel assigns less weight to 
the evidence proffered by Raymond and Poulin because they had entered the realm of advocacy:  
I find that Drs. Raymond and Poulin were more like advocates than experts offering 
independent opinions to the court. At times, they made bold, sweeping statements that 
were not reflected in their research. For example, some of Dr. Raymond’s statements on 
prostitution were based on her research on trafficked women….[And] in his affidavit Dr. 
Poulin suggested that there have been instances of serial killers targeting prostitutes who 
worked at indoor locations; however, his sources do not appear to support his assertion. I 
found it troubling that Dr. Poulin stated during cross-examination that it is not important 
for scholars to present information that contradicts their own findings (or findings which 
they support). (93) 
 
Noting that “the applicants’ witnesses are not immune to criticism,” Himel explains her 
reluctance to assign full weight to Lowman’s evidence because he “made a direct causal link 
between the Criminal Code provisions at issue and violence against prostitutes” in his affidavit 
(Ibid). Yet, “During cross-examination, Dr. Lowman expressed discontent with portions of his 
affidavit, citing ‘careless’ language and ‘poorly reasoned argument’ [and] he rightly takes 
responsibility for the content of his affidavit, which was drafted for him by law students” (Ibid). 
Himel further explains that while “such inattentiveness on such a crucial issue is indeed 
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concerning, [d]uring cross examination, Dr. Lowman gave nuanced and qualified opinions, 
which more accurately reflect his research” (Ibid). Rather than being based on objective 
measurements, Himel’s assessments of the evidence proffered by these expert witnesses is highly 
subjective. Further, given party selection of experts and the adversarial nature of the proceedings, 
it should not be surprising that expert witnesses offered partisan accounts in the Bedford case. 
 Having decided to assign less weight to the evidence presented by Farley, Raymond, 
Poulin and Lowman, Himel omits factors such as sex trafficking and the dangers posed by serial 
killers from her decision. According to Himel, while these are important issues, they have no 
bearing on the case at hand: “the evidence from some of [the international expert witnesses] 
tended to focus upon issues that are, in my view, incidental to the case at bar, including human 
trafficking, sex tourism, and child prostitution” (46). And, although Himel notes that Statistics 
Canada finds that prostitutes “are at a heightened risk of violence and homicide due to their 
profession” (77), the issue of serial killers does not enter her decision making process. As such, 
Himel decides that there is a high risk of violence involved in prostitution but this risk can be 
reduced if sex workers are able to employ safety precautions which are currently prohibited by 
Canadian law. As noted by Himel, “while both parties agree that prostitutes in Canada face a 
high risk of violence, they disagree as to whether violence is intrinsic to prostitution or whether 
there are ways that prostitution can be practiced that may reduce the risk of violence to 
prostitutes” (79). Moreover, Himel defines the “risk of harm” in the Bedford case as the “risk of 
violence to [female] prostitutes” (79). But, invoking a so-called evidence-based approach to 
expert witness testimony, Himel determines that the risk of violence against female sex workers 
does not involve the risk of sex trafficking or the risk posed by “psychopaths” such as serial 
killers. As noted by Valverde (1999), as a “veritable joker card”, the “risk of harm” test allows 
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judges to engage in moral authoritarianism through the process of defining what is harmful and 
prioritizing those risks (187).  
 Having defined the “risk of harm” facing Canadian sex workers as the risk of violence to 
female prostitutes, Himel attempts to resolve the dispute amongst interested parties regarding the 
extent to which legal reform will enhance the safety of female sex workers in Canada. Himel 
bases this decision exclusively on social science evidence regarding the relative safety of 
prostitution venues. Moreover, noting that “these studies, as with other prostitution studies 
before me, must be viewed in context and the discreet findings cannot be generalized”, Himel 
decides that “upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole presented on this issue…there are 
ways in which risk of violence towards prostitutes can be reduced [original emphasis]” (Bedford 
v. Canada 2010: 86). Siding with the applicants’ argument that “the proposition that street 
prostitution is far more dangerous than indoor prostitution being conducted with the assistance of 
third parties is primarily a matter of common sense and simple inference” (Applicants’ 
Memorandum and Fact of Law: 7), Himel determines that working indoors and working 
independently reduce the risk of harm faced by Canadian sex workers: 
The evidence led on this application demonstrates on a balance of probabilities that the 
risk of violence towards prostitutes can be reduced, although not necessarily eliminated. 
The two factors that appear to affect the level of violence against prostitutes are location 
and venue of work and individual working conditions. With respect to venue, working 
indoors is generally safer than working on the streets. Working independently from a 
fixed location (in-call) appears to be the safest way for a prostitute to work in Canada. 
(Bedford v. Canada 2010: 79) 
 
Moreover, while Himel acknowledges that the relative safety of working indoors can vary, 
depending on management, she generally accepts the applicants’ proposition that being able to 
legally ply their trade from indoor locations will reduce the risk of harm faced by Canadian sex 
workers. Thus, Himel rules in favour of striking down the impugned Criminal Code provisions. 
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As noted by Valverde (1999), in some cases the ambiguity of “risk of harm” assessments creates 
a space for progressive reform in judge made law (187). But the grounds on which Himel 
decides that the impugned provisions ought to be stricken from the Criminal Code call the 
progressiveness of her determination into question. By defining the “risk of harm” as the risk of 
violence to female prostitutes, Himel reproduces gendered discourses surrounding sexuality and 
sexual orientation. A brief discussion of the submission made to the Ontario Court of Appeals by 
sex workers who were denied intervener status in the original hearing of Bedford v. Canada 
elucidates the extent to which the interested parties in these proceedings construct a more 
morally charged situation than would have been the case had sex workers been granted the same 
status as others in these proceedings. 
 Shifting attention to the multiple forms of oppression which intersect to produce the 
situation currently facing Canadian sex workers, POWER and Maggie’s present a more balanced 
account than any of the interested parties in the original Bedford case. While they ultimately 
agree with the applicants, POWER and Maggie’s present a much less morally charged 
construction of the situation, arguing that “the decision to pursue sex work is a choice about 
one’s body, one’s sexuality, and specifically who to have sex with and on what terms” (Factum 
of the Interveners, POWER and Maggie’s, Court of Appeal for Ontario: 2-3). Rather than 
constructing the sex trade using the emancipation paradigm or the oppression paradigm, POWER 
and Maggie’s acknowledge that the Canadian sex trade is a complex entity and that sex workers’ 
experiences vary widely:  
[S]ome sex workers are coerced into sex work; that some sex workers choose sex work 
from among a particularly restricted set of options; that some sex workers believe that 
violence and abuse is [sic] inherent in sex work; and that some sex workers decide to 
change jobs when given the opportunity. (5) 
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Citing Deborah Brock, POWER and Maggie’s argue that sex work can restore a sense of 
autonomy for women as well as gay and transgendered individuals:  
Sex work can empower women not only by providing them with financial security, but 
by allowing for ‘the development of alliances between women, bodily integrity and 
sexual self-determination. As well, some members of the gay and transgendered 
communities, whose sexuality and gender expression is frequently marginalized, find that 
sex work provides acceptance of their sexuality and gender expression that is lacking 
elsewhere. (3) 
 
Contrary to constructions of the risk of violence to female sex workers characterizing the debate 
in the original hearing of Bedford v. Canada, POWER and Maggie’s draw attention to the 
dangers associated with sex work for gay and transgendered sex workers such as violence related 
to sexism, homophobia and transphobia (10) and lacking access to health and social supports due 
to “transphobia on the part of service workers” (13). Indeed, this assertion echoes the SSLR’s 
(2006) findings that “men are less likely [than women] to suffer physical violence at the hands of 
their clients…[but] they are more likely to be victims of violence by members of the public; this 
is particularly true for transvestites and transgendered individuals, who are doubly marginalized” 
(14-15). Similarly, Shaver et al. (2011) find that while all sex workers in their studies reported 
that clients, managers/employers, members of the public and even police at times threatened 
their persons and their property, transvestite and transgendered sex workers “consistently 
reported harassment and assault that exceeded that of other PWSI [persons working in the sex 
industry]” (53). Moreover, in contrast to constructions of the Canadian sex trade in the original 
hearing of Bedford v. Canada, POWER and Maggie’s assert that “a relatively large proportion of 
street-level sex workers are racialized, Aboriginal, and/or transsexual or transgendered” (7-8) 
and the impugned provisions exacerbate “the various and intersecting disadvantages that sex 
workers otherwise face” (Factum of the Interveners, POWER and Maggie’s, Court of Appeal for 
Ontario: 8).   
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 By drawing attention to the unique circumstances of male, transvestite, transsexual and 
Aboriginal sex workers POWER and Maggie’s are able to present a more balanced and less 
morally charged account of the situation than the interested parties in the original hearing of the 
Bedford case. While still assuming a moral perspective, as all interested parties in rights cases 
do, POWER and Maggie’s construct a more nuanced account of the “risk of harm” facing 
Canadian sex workers, giving voice to a wide range of experiences and avoiding essentialist 
conclusions regarding the Canadian sex trade. Yet, these factors were not considered in Himel’s 
determination because sex workers’ groups were denied intervener status in this case and the 
accounts of expert witnesses were privileged over those of experiential witnesses. Moreover, 
while the expert witnesses in this case were permitted to provide opinions to assist Himel in her 
decision making process, sex workers who offered evidence were restricted to detailing their 
personal experiences for the court. As a result, the evidence Himel considered centred on the 
accounts of female sex workers because they were the only “experiential witnesses” proffered by 
the interested parties and because sociologists have yet to engage in rigorous exploration of the 
experiences of male, transgendered and transsexual sex workers (Lowman 2001; 
Vanewesenbeeck 2001; Benoit & Shaver 2006; Weitzer 2009b).   
 
Conclusion 
Paralleling submissions to the SSLR, the debate over prostitution reform in Bedford v. Canada is 
characterized by two broad, conflicting discourses (SSLR 2006; Taylor 2010). In the Bedford 
case, this polarization is fueled by party selection of expert witnesses as well as lawyer 
constraints over the evidence presented by these witnesses and the need to translate the claims of 
oppositional social movements into adversarial accounts. Through the process of transmuting lay 
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knowledge into legal accounts, the voices of those for whom this challenge was mounted are 
silenced and law, science and religion collaboratively construct a moralistic and patriarchal 
image of the Canadian sex trade in Bedford v. Canada. Exploring how sex workers’ groups 
construct the situation reveals that interested parties in the Bedford case construct a more morally 
charged situation than would have been the case if the accounts of sex workers had been granted 
the same status as those of other actors in this case. Moreover, using social science research on 
the sex trade which has been noted to concentrate on female, on-street sex workers (Lowman 
2001; Vanweesenbeeck 2001; Benoit & Shaver 2006; Weitzer 2009) actors in the Bedford case 
discursively construct “the risk of harm” as the risk of violence to female prostitutes. The moral 
nature of this position is masked by legal claims that judicial decisions are based on neutral and 
objective measures such as evidence-based approaches to expert witness testimony and the “risk 
of harm” test. As such, Himel is able to make highly subjective decisions and invoke assumed 
value consensus to render her determination regarding the “risk of harm” faced by Canadian sex 
workers (defined as non-Aboriginal females at the exclusion of the experiences of Aboriginal, 
male, transgendered and transsexual sex workers) and the extent to which the impugned 
provisions contribute to this harm.  
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Conclusion 
Analyzing the role of religion, law and science in Bedford v. Canada reveals how these 
institutions collude to construct a situation in which legal fictions presenting law and politics as 
separate conceal the inherently moral nature of the current debate while constructing a false 
binary between lay and expert knowledge. Analyzing discursive constructions of the Canadian 
sex trade in the Bedford case reveals the extent to which, as a result of this collusion, religious 
interveners are granted an erroneous status as representatives of the Canadian moral fabric. 
Privileging the accounts of law and science results in a more morally charged representation of 
the situation than would have been the case if the accounts of sex workers had been granted the 
same status as those of other actors in this case.  
 In the Canadian context, rights cases are premised on collective values. Moreover, as a 
reflection of the fundamental values held by Canadian citizens, the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms introduces a moral component to all legal cases involving civil liberties in 
Canada. The extent to which notions of value consensus influence contemporary Canadian legal 
arrangements is evidenced by all interest parties’ reliance on the notion of fundamental norms 
and values in their submissions to the court as well as Judge Himel’s recourse to “common 
sense” in her evaluation of the extent to which the “risk of harm” faced by Canadian prostitutes 
can be reduced by altering the current legal regime. However, the moral and political nature of 
these debates is obfuscated by legal fictions presenting the law as a neutral umpire, allowing 
judges to engage in moral authoritarianism under the guise of making decisions based on 
objective criteria.  
 In the case of Bedford v. Canada, law, religion and science collude to construct a false 
distinction between law, morality and politics. As a result of this collusion, religious interveners 
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are granted an erroneous status as representatives of the Canadian moral fabric in the current 
debate. Presenting Charter challenges in terms of “risk of harm” disguises the value-laden nature 
of judicial determinations in cases involving social values (Valverde 1999; Beaman 2008). All 
interested parties in the Bedford case rely on assumed value consensus to build their arguments 
and construct the situation currently facing Canadian sex workers in highly moralistic terms. Yet, 
these accounts are couched in discourses of objectivity and value-neutrality, concealing the 
inherently moral and political nature of their positions in the current debate. As noted by Diduck 
and Wilson (1997), traditional assumptions that law and politics represent separate realms 
obscure our understanding of political action (507). Rather than introducing a novel element to 
the debate in the Bedford case, the presence of religious interveners places pressure on the court 
to reinforce legal fictions that the law is somehow separate from the realms of morality and 
politics. Through this process, religious interveners in the current debate are able to forward 
strictly Christian values while purporting to represent the majority views of all Canadians. 
Further research exploring the extent to which a similar situation emerges as a result of religious 
intervention in other rights cases would greatly inform current understandings of the role of 
religious intervention in Charter challenges.  
 Similarly, legal recourse to so-called objective measures permits expert witnesses to 
occupy a precarious position in the current debate. Just as legal adherence to positivist myths 
blurs our understanding of political action (Diduck and Wilson 1998: 507), it obscures our 
understanding of the role of expert witnesses in Charter challenges. Analyzing legal 
constructions of expertise and the role of expert witnesses reveals that, when faced with 
uncertainty over the issues at hand, judges rely on sociologists to assist them in forming common 
sense understandings in order to resolve disputes before the courts. Moreover, rather than 
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providing objective evidence to assist the judge in his/her decision making process, social 
science is a vehicle for transmuting lay knowledge into legal accounts. Party selection of expert 
witnesses combined with the adversarial nature of Canadian legal proceedings enhance the odds 
of expert witness partisanship in spite of legal demands that expert witnesses remain impartial 
throughout the proceedings. Judicial determinations regarding the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony are replete with legal fictions, disguising judges’ subjective opinions with discourses 
presenting the law as objective and impartial. As noted by Edmund (2009), rather than being 
analytically reliable concepts, “partisanship” and “adversarial bias” allow judges to selectively 
privilege (or discount) particular expert witnesses and opinions (172). 
 In the Bedford case, the admission of sociological expertise permitted a highly polarized 
academic debate to permeate the legal proceedings. Echoing proponents of the emancipation 
paradigm, the applicants focused on the routine aspects of sex work, highlighting success stories 
and omitting the experiences of those who have had highly negative experiences (Weitzer 2009b: 
215). Conversely, the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario and the CLF and colleagues’ 
accounts paralleled those forwarded by proponents of the oppression paradigm, constructing 
prostitution as inherently harmful and degrading and using dramatic language to highlight the 
plight of those who are “prostituted” (Weitzer 2009b: 214).  
 Ironically, Himel’s privileging of the accounts of expert witnesses in Bedford v. Canada 
resulted in a more morally charged construction of the Canadian sex trade than would have been 
the case if the accounts of sex workers had been granted the same status as those of other actors 
in this case. Through a mutual exclusion of the experiences of Aboriginal women as well as 
those of male, transvestite and transgendered sex workers, interested parties in Bedford v. 
Canada construct a highly moralistic and patriarchal image of the Canadian sex trade. Through 
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the process of transmuting the claims of social movements into legal discourse, actors in the 
Bedford case define the “risk of harm” facing Canadian prostitutes as the risk of violence to 
female sex workers. Actors’ constructions of the risk of violence do not include the experiences 
of Aboriginal women involved in the sex trade. Thus, the effects of racial oppression and 
colonization on the risk factors faced by Aboriginal women in the sex trade are largely excluded 
from this debate.  
 Comparing the accounts of interested parties in the original hearing of the Bedford case 
with the account provided to the Ontario Court of Appeals by POWER and Maggie’s 
demonstrates that sex workers’ groups who were permitted to intervene during the appeal of 
Bedford v. Canada provided a more balanced and less morally charged construction of the 
situation than any of the interested parties in the original hearing of this case. While this suggests 
that a more inclusive definition of the risk of harm may influence the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision regarding the constitutional challenges raised in the Bedford case, as interveners, 
POWER and Maggie’s ability to influence the outcome of the proceedings is limited. Moreover, 
the courts will likely continue to privilege the accounts of expert witnesses over those of sex 
workers as this case advances to the Supreme Court level. Future research comparing how the 
Canadian sex trade is being discursively constructed as this case advances and more voices are 
permitted to enter the conversation would be a worthwhile endeavour. Further, the case of 
Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society v. Attorney General (Canada) 
offers an interesting basis for comparative analysis between a case mounted by individual sex 
workers and a case mounted by a sex workers’ group. Further research in this area would be an 
invaluable contribution to current understandings of contemporary discursive constructions of 
the Canadian sex trade. 
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 Several limitations to the present study suggest that further research in this area is 
necessary to increase our understanding of how law, religion and science interact in rights cases. 
Due to time constraints and challenges obtaining transcripts for the proceedings, my analysis was 
conducted using the facta submitted to the court as well as Himel’s determination in Bedford v. 
Canada. A more detailed examination taking into account the affidavits filed by all parties 
presenting evidence in this case as well as the transcripts from the proceedings would have 
offered a more informed examination of how the sex trade was discursively constructed in this 
case. Similarly, while I intended to conduct interviews with lawyers and expert witnesses for the 
applicants and the respondents as well as all interveners and excluded parties, such as Maggie’s 
and the United Church of Canada, from this case, I was only able to interview three expert 
witnesses for the applicants and representatives from two of the religious intervener groups. A 
more detailed examination involving interviews with all of the parties I had initially set out to 
include in my study would yield a more informed examination of how law, science and religion 
interacted in the Bedford case. Further, my examination lacks comparative analysis with other 
rights cases, restricting my conclusions to the current case study. Research comparing the role of 
law, religion and science in the Bedford case with other Canadian rights cases would enhance 
current understandings of how these institutions interact in Charter challenges.  
 While the findings from my study are tentative and partial, they provide an interesting 
contribution to the conversations on discursive constructions of the sex trade and the relationship 
between social science and law. While other scholars, such as Louie (2012), argue that shifting to 
a harm reduction approach is necessary in constitutional challenges of this sort, the present case 
study demonstrates that applying so-called objective measures such as the “risk of harm” in 
rights cases masks the collective morality on which such challenges are premised, allowing 
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actors to engage in moral authoritarianism under the guise of using objective measures to 
forward their opinions. Contributing to existing literature on the social construction of sex work, 
the present case study elucidates the extent to which public perceptions of the danger posed by 
serial killers and the emergent moral panic over sex trafficking are reshaping the way in which 
the Canadian sex trade is being discursively constructed. As a result, constructions of the 
Canadian sex trade continue to employ gendered, heteronormative discourses and discount the 
experiences of male, transvestite and transgendered sex workers. The present research also 
provides novel insight into the interactions between law and social science in Canadian rights 
cases. Scholarly legal analyses generally identify a conflict between the interests of science and 
religion in the court room (see, for example, Beaman 2008; Jasanoff 2008). However, these 
studies tend to focus on the interactions between law and natural science in American criminal 
cases and tort litigation (see, for example, Schuck 1993; Goodstein 2000; Jasanoff 2002; 
Winiecki 2008; Haack 2009; Kristzer 2009; and Sanders 2009). Further research examining the 
relationship between law, religion and social science in Charter challenges has the potential to 
offer novel insights into theories of secularism as well as STS scholarship on expertise and the 
law-science relationship. In contrast to conventional assumptions that law, religion and science 
represent conflicting epistemologies, these institutions collude to construct a situation in which 
legal fictions presenting the law and politics as separate mask the moral and political nature of 
the current debate while constructing a false binary between lay and expert knowledge in the 
Bedford case. As a result of this collusion, sex workers are silenced and Bedford v. Canada 
constructs a more morally charged situation than would have been the case if the accounts of sex 
workers had been granted the same status as other accounts in this case. 
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